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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of four independent chapters on urban and development 
economics.  
 
Chapter 1 looks at the issue of distance and labour outcomes in urban areas of a 
developing country. It studies the effect of a housing relocation program on the labour 
supply and living conditions of low-income households across major cities in South 
Africa. For this, I use four waves of panel microdata collected between 2008 and 2014, 
and I exploit the arbitrary eligibility rules of the policy with a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design to obtain causal estimates. In the short-term of two to four years 
following relocation, I find that the labour supply of recipient households decreases by 
one standard deviation, driven mostly by a decrease in female hours. I find evidence of 
a large increase in distance (km) to economic opportunities. This is likely to be an 
important factor behind the decline, directly or indirectly through within-family shifts in 
livelihood strategies. Evidence is limited regarding improvements in housing and 
neighbourhood quality. 
Chapter 2 examines how neighbourhoods where children grow up can play a 
significant part in shaping their opportunities later in life. It provides unique evidence in 
a developing country context by using the random allocation of households to 
ethnically segregated residential areas during apartheid in South Africa. The main 
observations come from a panel of young adults aged 14 to 22 at baseline and residing 
in the city of Cape Town. It covers 5 periods of their life between 2002 to 2009. I focus 
on black children in families living in former black-only residential areas. I find 
compelling evidence of neighbourhood effects on labour and educational outcomes in 
adulthood across deprived neighbourhoods. The differences are more marked for 
young women, suggesting a stronger hold of social norms and institutions for young 
men. Location, both in terms of access to jobs and access to higher quality public 
amenities (schools), social networks and the underlying human capital composition of 
the neighbourhood are positively correlated to having better socioeconomic outcomes 
in adulthood. 
Chapter 3 moves beyond socioeconomic outcomes, to study the relationship 
between extreme weather events and disease in developing cities. As climate change is 
making extreme weather events more frequent around the world, urban residents in 
developing countries have become more vulnerable to health shocks due to poor 
sanitation and infrastructure. The chapter empirically measures the relationship between 
weather and health shocks in the urban context of sub-Saharan Africa. Using unique 
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high-frequency datasets of weekly cholera cases and accumulated precipitation for 
wards in Dar es Salaam, we find robust evidence that extreme rainfall has a significant 
positive impact on weekly cholera incidence. The effect is larger in wards that are more 
prone to flooding, have higher shares of informal housing and unpaved roads. We 
identify limited spatial spillovers. Time-dynamic effects suggest cumulated rainfall 
increases cholera occurrence immediately and with a lag of up to 5 weeks.  
Chapter 4 addresses questions related to the local impact of economic policies in 
developing countries. Specifically, I provide evidence on the local effect of a popular 
trade policy: export processing zones. The chapter examines the impact of their 
establishment on the levels of per capita expenditure across Nicaraguan municipalities 
for the period 1993 to 2009. Using the time and cross-section variation of park 
openings in a difference-in-differences framework, I find that on average consumption 
levels increased by 10% to 12% in treated municipalities. Yet, average effects mask 
significant disparities across the expenditure distribution. The results suggest that the 
policy benefited the upper-tail the most: expenditure levels increased by up to 25% at 
the 90th percentile. At the opposite end of the distribution, only the bottom decile 
registered a positive increase in expenditure levels of close to 10% across the period.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis consists of four independent chapters that fall on the realm of urban 
and development economics. A central theme explored in this thesis is how the 
inherently uneven spatial distribution of economic activities and people affects lower-
income populations. Sorting of firms and households within cities and across regions is 
one of the fundamentals of urban economics. Agglomeration economies push firms to 
cluster (Duranton & Puga 2004); household sort in cities according to income levels and 
land prices (Alonso 1964; Mills 1967 and Muth 1969), transport mode choices (Glaeser 
et al. 2008), and amenities (Brueckner et al. 1999). Consequently, there are significant 
spatial variations in housing and infrastructure quality, environmental and transport 
externalities, public service provision and amenities across and within regions and cities.  
In developing countries, poor households are disproportionately penalized by these 
spatial differences. They not only have limited access to efficient markets and quality 
infrastructure (Banerjee & Duflo 2007), they have to attribute disproportionately larger 
shares of their incomes and time to mobility (Baker et al. 2005). Under these conditions, 
geography, in the sense of location and distances, disproportionately affect the lives of 
the poor. This thesis contributes to improving our understanding of how and when this 
happens.  
Relatedly, the process of urbanization in developing countries holds a fundamental 
place across these chapters. Rapid urbanization has often led to unplanned spatial 
expansions that put significant strain on housing and serviced land, resulting in 
congestion, contagion, insufficient public service provision, and limited formal 
employment opportunities. How these “demons of density” (Glaeser 2011) affect the 
urban poor relates to the fundamental relationship between space and poverty. Poor 
city dwellers often locate at the peripheries where land is cheaper but economic chances 
are scarcer, or settle in slums typified by inadequate physical infrastructure and high 
densities (Barnhardt et al. 2016), prone to become poverty traps (Marx et al. 2013). 
Limited urban connectivity and high levels of employment informality means that they 
face complex trade-offs between location-specific characteristics (such as public 
amenities and distances to jobs) and housing quality.  
How distances and locations affect the poor through labour markets is a key 
dimension explored in this thesis (chapters 1,2 & 4). Distances create frictions and 
inefficiencies in urban labour markets (i.e. the spatial mismatch hypothesis; Kain 1968; 
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Zenou 2009; Gobillon et al. 2011). The emergence of slums testifies to the premium on 
proximity that poor households are willing to pay by living in substandard housing 
conditions to be close to employment opportunities (Galiani et al. 2016). Unequal 
access to infrastructure and public services and amenities is another mechanism 
explored (chapters 1,2&3). The under-provision of public services such as waste 
collection or public transport heavily burdens the poor in their daily transactions. It also 
makes them more vulnerable to weather shocks, and related negative income shocks 
(Burgess et al. 2017). Because of its relationship with labour markets, public amenities 
and infrastructure, location is also intrinsically related to socioeconomic mobility 
(Chetty et al. 2015).  
Government and city authorities can affect the relationship between space and 
poverty. They can do this either by directly addressing market failures and negative 
externalities, or indirectly by impacting local economies. Some of the chapters (chapters 
1& 4) of this thesis look at these policy options.  
Three chapters focus on these questions by looking at cities in sub-Saharan Africa.  
The fourth focuses on larger regions in one of the poorest countries in Latin-America. 
Chapter 1 looks at the fundamental question of how distances affect employment 
opportunities of low-income households in contexts of high commuting costs, low 
public transit provision and high frictions to access urban labour markets. These 
features imply that poor households obtain a higher utility from being closer to central 
areas (Glaeser et al. 2008) where public services and transit provision is higher. They are 
inversely more heavily burdened by living far. For instance, the disconnect from job 
opportunities can introduce search inefficiencies either by restricting the size of the 
effective labour market or because of information distortions; it can increase reservation 
wages and jobs search costs due to high commuting costs; and employers may 
discriminate against workers living far away, as they may consider it deteriorates their 
productivity (Zenou 2009; Gobillon et al. 2011).  
I explore these relationships by examining a large relocation housing program 
across main metropolitan areas of South Africa. The chapter provides quasi-
experimental evidence on the effect the program has on labour outcomes and living 
conditions of recipient low-income households in the country largest cities. To do this, 
I use four waves of panel micro data collected between 2008 and 2014, and I exploit the 
arbitrary eligibility rules of the policy with a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to 
obtain causal estimates. I find evidence that in two to four years following relocation to 
public housing, households are not better off on a majority of outcomes, including a 
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deterioration of their labour supply. A large increase in distance (km) to economic 
opportunities is likely to be an important factor behind the decline, directly or indirectly 
through within-family shifts in livelihood strategies. Evidence is limited regarding 
improvements in housing and neighbourhood quality.  
Findings in this chapter offer significant insights into the response mechanisms of 
low-income households to relocation programs, particularly by inspecting the trade-offs 
they are willing to make between location-specific characteristics and housing quality. 
They suggest that in contexts of high commuting costs and high frictions to access 
urban labour markets, the location of dwellings can have a large effect on poor families’ 
wellbeing. Much of the effect also depends on their possibility to implement alternative 
livelihood strategies.  
Chapter 2 continues to investigate the relationship between location and poverty 
by exploring how it affects socioeconomic mobility. To do this, the chapter examines 
neighbourhood effects for children growing up in disadvantaged urban ghettos. This 
chapter is more descriptive in nature.  
Neighbourhoods where children grow up can play a significant part in shaping their 
opportunities later in life (Glaeser & Cutler 1997; Oreopoulos 2003; Chetty et al. 2015). 
Growing up in deprived or ‘bad’ neighbourhoods, i.e. areas with high levels of 
unemployment, poverty, criminality and low-quality local public goods, can be 
detrimental in adulthood (Case & Katz 1991; Crane 1991). How they affect 
socioeconomic mobility is central to understanding the persistence of inequality over 
time (across generations) and space (poverty traps). This question is particularly relevant 
in developing countries, where cities display high levels of income inequalities, 
emphasized by stark spatial differences in the access to public services, formal housing, 
formal jobs and consumption amenities. There is extremely little empirical evidence of 
neighbourhood effects in this context. This chapter addresses this gap, by using the 
quasi-natural social experiment of apartheid in South Africa to measure the effects of 
growing up in disadvantaged neighbourhoods or ghettos. It also provides suggestive 
evidence on the main channels through which some neighbourhoods may be better 
than others for the life trajectories of children.  
The analysis uses the random allocation of households to ethnic specific residential 
areas during apartheid in South Africa to disentangle the fundamental problem of 
measuring neighbourhood effects: observed differences in neighbourhoods may just 
reflect the spurious correlation induced by the likelihood that the same factors that lead 
to a given location choice also lead to certain socioeconomic outcomes. The main 
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observations come from a panel of young adults aged 14 to 22 at baseline and residing 
in the city of Cape Town. It covers 5 periods of their life between 2002 to 2009. I focus 
on compliers in black ghettos only; that is black children in families living in black-only 
residential areas (townships) by 1991 (when residential segregation was formally lifted). I 
provide strong evidence that for this group of young adults, residential decisions were 
exogenous and sorting is very limited.  
I find compelling evidence of neighbourhood effects on labour and educational 
outcomes in adulthood across ghettos. The differences are more marked for young 
women, suggesting a stronger hold of social norms and institutions for young men. 
Location, both in terms of access to jobs and access to higher quality public amenities 
(schools), social networks and the underlying human capital composition of the 
neighbourhood are positively correlated to having better socioeconomic outcomes in 
adulthood.  
This paper is limited in the extent to which it can provide causal evidence on the 
channels behind the persistence of spatial poverty traps. Still, it provides interesting 
findings regarding the importance of neighbourhoods on outcomes later in life in a 
large city of a developing country.  
Chapter 3 completed with Pascal Jaupart and Ying Chen, looks at the relationship 
between geography and poverty within cities from a different angle. Departing from the 
fact that populations are affected differently by the same weather variations according 
to their income and locations (Dasgupta, 2010; Burgess et al. 2017), it focuses on how 
weather shocks can affect health within urban areas.  
Climate change is expected to have a significant impact on the lives of the poor in 
the years ahead as extreme weather events such as floods, heavy precipitation and 
droughts become more frequent (Harrington et al. 2016). The question of how urban 
dwellers in developing cities are impacted by weather shocks is thus becoming 
increasingly relevant. Rapid urbanization has meant that many cities have poor 
infrastructure leaving populations vulnerable to vector-borne diseases.  
Weather shocks such as rainfall can affect health through two main channels 
(Burgess et al. 2017): direct mechanisms via increased contact with pathogens; or 
indirect ones, through the effect they may have on real incomes, i.e. the negative 
income-shock may in turn lower the consumption of health-improving goods increasing 
the exposure to pathogens. Looking at health outcomes is important. Contagion is one 
“downside of density” (Glaeser & Sims 2015). Throughout history, cities with low-
quality infrastructure and poor sanitation have been pockets of epidemics (for instance 
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19th century London or Paris, Kesztenbaum & Rosenthal 2016). Poor health and 
disease not only lower productivity in the short-term, they also hinder long-term 
economic growth (Well 2007).   
Empirical evidence is scant concerning the impact of weather shocks in developing 
country cities. This chapter makes progress on this issue by looking at the effect of 
rainfall and flooding on cholera incidence in Dar es Salaam. The empirical analysis uses 
finely disaggregated ward-level panel data containing weekly recorded cholera cases and 
weekly accumulated precipitation for all the municipalities in the city. It is therefore 
testing whether exogenous weekly rainfall variation at the ward-level affects cholera 
occurrence. We find robust evidence that extreme rainfall has a significant positive 
impact on weekly cholera incidence. The effect is larger in wards that are more prone to 
flooding, have higher shares of informal housing and unpaved roads. Remarkably, we 
find little to no spatial spillovers from precipitation in neighbouring wards. Only when 
considering the relative elevation, there is a small significant effect from precipitation in 
neighbouring downhill wards. Time-dynamic effects suggest cumulated rainfall increases 
cholera occurrence immediately and with a lag of up to 5 weeks.  
Results in the paper emphasize the key role of local infrastructure. 
Neighbourhoods with low-quality infrastructure are likely to be more exposed to the 
cholera bacteria when surfaces are washed and drains are overflown by severe 
precipitation. Vulnerable populations in these wards are also more likely to suffer from 
negative income shocks during extreme weather events. This chapter emphasizes the 
need for more evidence on large-scale policy interventions in poor urban areas to 
increase resilience and prevent contagion of treatable diseases in developing cities. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis abandons the urban-specific setting to look at inequalities 
within municipalities in one of the poorest Latin-American countries. It focuses on 
understanding how the spatial variation in economic activity may affect differently low 
and high-incomes households in contexts of labour market frictions. It does so by 
evaluating the establishment of export processing zones (EPZ) in Nicaragua. 
While having a wider reach than traditional place-based policies, EPZ programs are 
prone to have a significant influence on the local economies (Wang 2013) as they 
operate with incentives to hire and create economic activity in or near the areas where 
they locate, fostering agglomeration economies (Combes et al. 2011). Local welfare 
effects might differ from those at the aggregate level, particularly in cases with labour 
market frictions. Labour mobility and land-price responses may be such that the jobs 
created go to non-poor residents and that the gains from land prices benefit higher-
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income households (Neumark and Simpson 2014). As stressed by Kline and Moretti 
(2014) and shown by Reynolds and Rohlin (2015) for the case of US federal 
empowerment zones, positive average effects of spatially-tied policies can mask 
significant disparities in terms of the actual beneficiaries across the income distribution 
in treated areas. There are heterogeneous effects according to whether individuals are 
homeowners or renters, or more generally by skill and initial income levels, that are not 
necessarily captured by looking at the average effect on local wages (Neumark and 
Simpson 2014). In this sense, disentangling in what way the establishment of an EPZ 
profits the different segments of the income distribution within concerned areas helps 
to shed light on the mechanisms of the policy and ultimate local beneficiaries.  
In this chapter, I construct a unique municipal-level panel that allows for the 
examination of different moments of the expenditure distribution before and after the 
policy implementation. It covers five years between 1993 and 2009. By focusing on the 
aggregate outcomes at the municipal level and on levels of household per capita 
expenditures, the study captures general equilibrium effects. The analysis reveals 
interesting conclusions concerning average and distributional dynamics of EPZ policies 
at the local level. It confirms that there is a positive average treatment effect on the 
levels of real per capita expenditure in treated municipalities. It also reveals that the 
mean effect hides significant disparities across the income distribution, offering 
suggestive evidence that those at the upper-tail are the main beneficiaries of the policy 
over the period covered. The effects are however incremental in time, with median 
households benefitting after eight years of a plant establishment. Results are consistent 
with the existence of a skill-premium in the exporting sector that may be altering the 
cost of living (i.e. land price responses) in profit of the higher-skill/higher-income 
segments. I find that the average positive gains are concentrated in the high-skill 
working-age group.  
This final chapter offers some interesting insight on the importance of analysing 
trade policies at the local level, considering local labour market dimensions and 
agglomeration economies. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016) acknowledge the move 
towards this direction, and underline the interest of the empirical literature in 
influencing richer theoretical models. 
 
This thesis contributes to the better understanding of the intrinsically unequal 
relationship between space and income levels in developing countries. It provides new 
insights into how and when spatial frictions affect poor households. Labour markets, 
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public services and amenities, and infrastructure are all centrally related to the location 
decisions of poor households and the effect of distance and place on their lives, in the 
short or longer term.  
Many of the findings across these chapters highlight the importance of social 
networks. When distance matters, social networks are likely to play an important role, not 
only for jobs but also for enforcing norms and security, and providing informal safety 
nets. Gender-specific dimensions are also highlighted throughout the chapters. Males 
and females do not have the same relationships with location and distances. These 
dynamics matter for policies as poverty is rapidly urbanizing and cities are expected to 
host more than two-third of the world’s population in the next decades. 
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Chapter 1 
 
There is No Free House. 
Low-cost Housing & Labour Supply in 
Urban South Africa1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The unprecedented pace of urbanization in developing countries has raised the need 
to improve our understanding of the policies that address “the demons of density” 
(Glaeser 2011). This is particularly true about housing policies. The fast growth of cities 
places significant strain on housing and serviced land, forcing poor households to 
choose substandard housing conditions and hostile geographical environments to be 
close to economic opportunities (Galiani et al. 2016). Far from temporary (Marx et al. 
2013), informal settlements have proliferated as a direct response to the lack of 
affordable housing. Governments have often responded with relocation programs by 
which subsidized housing provision is directly allocated to eligible households through 
lotteries or waiting lists (Barnhardt et al. 2016). The success of these programs is closely 
related to the way they affect the livelihood strategies of recipients. Yet, despite 
popularity, there is still little robust empirical evidence about their benefits. Projects are 
often located at the peripheries of cities, which in contexts of low public transit 
provision may increase frictions in urban labour markets (Franklin 2017). Voluntary 
take-up may just reflect the lack of alternative options, and the costs of relocation (i.e. 
loss of social networks, higher commuting costs) may overcome its benefits (i.e. safer 
environments and improved housing).   
                                                          
1 I further thank Stuart Rosenthal for his comments that greatly improved the final version of this paper, 
as well as two anonymous referees. Conversations with Nathaniel Baum-Snow, Pascal Jaupart, Liza 
Ciriola, Simon Franklin, Vernon Henderson, Maria Moreno-Monroy and Maria Sanchez-Vidal were also 
very helpful. I thank Michael Oberfichtner, participants at the 10th meeting of the UEA, and the IV 
Workshop in Urban Economics at IEB, for their comments. I also thank Michelle Chinehma for her 
support to access secured sections of the dataset.  
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This paper makes progress on this issue by providing the first quasi-experimental 
evidence of the effect of a large public housing program on labour outcomes and living 
conditions of recipient households across main metropolitan areas of a developing 
country. It further elucidates the response mechanisms of households in the presence of 
high frictions in urban labour markets.  
The program I study here is South Africa’s national Housing Subsidies Scheme 
rolled-out at the end of Apartheid under the Reconstruction and Development Program 
(RDP). Similar to other relocation programs, it consists of one-off capital subsidies for 
the construction of free-standing housing units on greenfield developments, managed 
by local authorities and allocated to eligible households on an ownership basis. 
Allocation is done through municipal waiting lists. Since 1994, 2.8 million houses were 
built under the program across South Africa, benefitting more than 12 million 
individuals (2015). The advantage of studying this program is its large national scale, 
permitting to look for the first time across the six main metropolitan areas2 of a large 
country in sub-Saharan Africa3. A second advantage is that eligibility relies on an 
arbitrary income rule, with households earning less than R3500 per month eligible for 
free housing under the scheme. I exploit this discontinuity to estimate treatment effects 
that are as good as randomized in a neighbourhood around the discontinuity threshold. 
A final interesting feature concerns the country historical heritage. South Africa’s urban 
structures have been marked by almost half a century of Apartheid spatial planning, 
which has accentuated constraints to access labour markets for the low-income 
households residing at cities’ peripheries (Banerjee et al. 2008). Combined with very 
high unemployment rates, this issue has put housing policies at the top of the political 
agenda4.  
This study identifies the causal impact of receiving a subsidized housing under the 
RDP program by comparing households just below and above the income threshold, 
using being below the income threshold as an instrument for receiving subsidized 
housing. The probability of receiving subsidized housing decreases sharply above R3500 
among otherwise eligible households. Under the assumption of no manipulation of the 
assignment variable this fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) approach ensures greater 
internal consistency than other quasi-experimental methods, and results are (locally) 
                                                          
2 Here I look at the 6 largest metropolitan areas in South Africa, all with populations above 1 million. 
3 Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the largest share of slum population in the world (199.5 million in 
2015). It is estimated to be growing at 4.5% per year (UN-Habitat). Here I look at the 6 largest 
metropolitan areas in South Africa, all with populations above 1 million. 
4 Many argue that the housing scheme has helped reinforce the spatial logic of Apartheid by moving the 
poor to low-density areas often in old township locations (Lall et al. 2012). 
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comparable to that of randomized control trials (Lee and Lemieux 2010). I find no 
evidence of sorting at the threshold. To estimate treatment effect, I use four waves of 
panel data from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) collected between 2008 
and 2014, and documenting households’ subsidy status for obtaining their dwelling. 
Overall, my results are stable across a range of specifications, bandwidths, controls and 
sample restrictions. With regard to the external validity of the estimates, the FRD 
estimand should be interpreted as a weighted average treatment effect for the 
subpopulation affected by the instrument (Local Average Treatment Effect or LATE), 
where the weights reflect the ex-ante likelihood that the households’ income is near the 
threshold. Results are thus valid for the population induced to take-up treatment around 
the discontinuity.  
I find that in the short period of two to four years following RDP allocation, 
households are not better off on a majority of outcomes. The labour supply of recipient 
households at cutoff decreases by between half to one standard deviation. Overall, the 
decline is driven by a large drop in total weekly hours of paid work of about 30 hours, 
consistent with a reduction of the number of employed members by almost one. The 
gender decomposition shows that the reduction is larger for female members through a 
reduction at their intensive margins, but male members also experience a non-
significant drop. The share of working age members that are unemployed and 
discouraged also rises. 
I find evidence that distances to the Central Business District (CBD) and 
employment nodes increase significantly following RDP allocation by 12 to 13 km. The 
fact that I find no significant effect on the monthly share of total household revenue 
spent on transport, further suggests that households are not compensating by longer 
(more expensive) commutes, but rather choose to reduce their overall travelling. It 
follows that the reduction in the labour supply could directly result from the more 
expensive commutes, supporting the existence of high frictions in South African urban 
labour markets in line with the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Gobillon et al. 2011). 
Females could be more severely affected. There is indication that women in developing 
countries rely on fewer transport modes, and are potentially more vulnerable to distance 
(Baker et al. 2005, Venter et al. 2007).  
The decline in the labour supply could also reflect households shifting their 
livelihood strategies following the wealth shock. I explore within-household response 
mechanisms in the paper. I find no evidence that relocation severely disrupts household 
composition in terms of their labour capabilities. The age of the household head and 
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the age and number of children are insignificant, and there is no indication that less 
mobile members are being moved to the farther away house. RDP recipients display a 
54 percentage points (pp) higher likelihood of receiving additional income from rent. 
The size is large. It presumably reflects a new earning strategy in response to the 
accrued distance to jobs (i.e. plausibly by constructing and renting backyard rooms). To 
a smaller extent, it is also coherent with a pure income and price-substitution effect. 
Other methods such as larger government transfers and subsistence agriculture are 
insignificant.  
Despite the increase in distances, households that retrieve a higher utility from better 
housing may still be better-off with RDP housing. I find limited evidence in this regard. 
All characteristics of neighbourhood quality tested are insignificant. Revealing however 
is the insignificant but positive sign on the perception of insecurity which could result 
from isolation at cities’ peripheries and the disruption of social networks. The loss of 
social networks has been raised as a major limitation of this type of relocation programs 
in developed and developing countries alike (Barnhardt et al 2016; Day and Cervero 
2010; Mills et al 2006; Kling et al 2007). Conversely, I find a deterioration in housing 
amenities by half a standard deviation. This is mostly related to worse structures (fragile 
walls, number of rooms). The fact that mobile households still choose to relocate 
suggests that the improvement in housing consumption may be happening through 
intangible features of housing quality, such as increased tenure security and the 
possibility of becoming homeowners. Subjective wellbeing is an important component 
of housing policies (Galiani et al. 2016). 
Findings in this paper remain valid for a short-term period of two to four years 
following allocation. Still, they offer significant insights into the response mechanisms 
of low-income households to relocation programs, particularly by inspecting the trade-
offs they are willing to make between location-specific characteristics and housing 
quality. They suggest that in contexts of high commuting costs and high frictions to 
access urban labour markets, the location of dwellings can have a large effect on the 
wellbeing of poor families. Further, much of the effect also depends on the participants’ 
possibility to implement alternative livelihood strategies. To succeed, housing policies 
need to consider these different dimensions. 
By looking at these dynamics, the paper is closely linked to a large literature in urban 
economics that has tried to understand residential sorting within cities. These papers 
have put forward the role of commuting costs (Alonso 1964; Mills 1967 and Muth 
1969), transport mode choices (Glaeser et al. 2008), amenities (Brueckner et al. 1999; 
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Lall et al. 2008), and the proximity to economic opportunities (Kain 1968) as key 
determinants for residential location choices. The mechanisms they put forward are key 
to understanding the results in this paper.  
This study also relates to the large literature that has looked at the impact of housing 
lotteries and vouchers on the labour supply of beneficiaries in U.S. cities, with the 
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program being the most notorious. Most of these 
papers find null (Jacob 2004; Kling et al. 2007) or negative impacts on the labour supply 
of recipient households (Jacob and Ludwig 2013; Mills et al. 2006 for the first year and 
null afterwards). Only Chetty et al. (2015) find long-term improvements in children 
under 13 at the time of moving. In developing countries, there are reasons to believe 
that labour supply responses to housing subsidies are more difficult to assess. Tenure 
insecurity, the predominance of informal employment, the greater constraints on 
transport infrastructure as well as residential inequalities being more closely related to 
the spatial layouts of cities, make housing a greater complement to work. These features 
are behind the existence of greater frictions in urban labour markets of developing 
countries cities.  
In this sense, this paper adds to a nascent literature evaluating housing programs in 
cities of developing countries, which has mostly focused on titling and slum upgrading 
programs (Fields 2007, Takeuchi et al. 2008; Galiani & Schargrodsky 2010; Galiani et al. 
2016). While still focusing on slum dwellers, the exception is Barnhardt et al. (2016)5. 
They provide the first experimental evidence of a housing lottery in Ahmedabad, and 
find robust evidence that the target population was worse off in the long term (14 years) 
on a variety of socioeconomic measures, including labour supply. Two other papers 
have examined the RDP policy before. Franklin (2015) estimates the causal effects of 
the South African RDP program on labour outcomes but focuses solely on the 
population of slum dwellers in the city of Cape Town6, de facto studying the effect of 
titling on a subpopulation of the treated. Lall et al. (2012) remains relatively descriptive, 
but their exercise supports the results here. To the best of my knowledge, this is the 
first paper to estimate the effect of a large housing program for all low-income 
households across major cities of a developing country. It adds to the little evidence 
available to guide policy discussions.  
                                                          
5 Galiani et al. (2016) also mention Cattaneo et al. (2006) but I could not find the paper. He reports that 
the paper analysed the performance of the Mexican “Iniciamos Tu Casa” program, which provided new 
houses to poor inhabitants located far from the city centre. A year later, the authors found that a large 
proportion of the participants had abandoned the houses, and those who remained complained that the 
new neighbourhoods provided them with poor access to public goods and general infrastructure.  
6 Only about 50% of beneficiaries come from informal settlements (GHS 2009). 
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the 
theoretical mechanisms through which the interactions between housing, location and 
labour supply are likely to occur. Section 1.3 describes the policy setting and the 
allocation mechanism. Section 1.4 outlines the empirical strategy, discusses the data and 
the validity of the research design. Section 1.5 presents the main results of the paper. 
Finally, Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2 Housing, Location, and Labour Supply  
Many empirical and theoretical investigations have sought to elucidate the 
mechanisms by which low and high-income households sort within cities through the 
relative premiums they are willing to pay for intra-city differentials in location-specific 
characteristics (i.e. such as the level of public services and amenities, commuting times, 
housing quality, social networks, and access to employment opportunities). 
The canonical model in urban economics, the “monocentric city” model associated 
with Alonso (1964), Mills (1967) and Muth (1969) (AMM), predicts that utility-
maximizing households will sort according to their income elasticity of demand for 
housing and their opportunity cost of time (commuting costs). Spatial variation in land 
(house) prices arises out of competition for the most desirable sites which gives rise to 
an equilibrium price-gradient as well as a sorting equilibrium with low and high-income 
households living in different parts of the city. In its standard form7, the model assumes 
that higher income households prefer consuming more housing, and thus benefit from 
living farther from the CBD.  
Since AMM, different papers have put into question the dominance of the housing-
force. LeRoy & Sonstelie (1983) and Glaeser et al. (2008) build on this idea and provide 
compelling evidence that the income elasticity of marginal commuting costs exceeds the 
income elasticity of housing demand, implying an indeterminate or reverse natural 
pattern of location by income. They put emphasis on transport mode choices as key 
determinants for residential sorting; arguing that better public transit provision in 
central cities attracts lower-income households. Brueckner & Rosenthal (2009) and 
Rosenthal (2014) have also shown that the quality of the housing stock (affordable 
housing supply) is a key determinant of residential location choices, while others have 
put emphasis on amenities (Brueckner et al. 1999; Albouy & Lue 2015).  
                                                          
7 The model assumes that jobs are located in the CBD (“monocentric”), which has been one of its main 
criticisms. The main mechanism is then related to the dynamics between the cost of commuting – which 
increases with distance to CBD - and housing costs - which inversely fall with distance to CBD. 
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With this in mind, the overall effect of housing relocation programs will depend on 
the trade-offs poor households are willing to make when choosing between location-
specific characteristics (such as amenities and distance-related costs and needs) and 
housing quality. These programs usually relocate poor households to the peripheries of 
cities where land costs are cheaper. If we consider the standard AMM model the first 
order source of compensation is through a price substitution effect. Mobile households 
that choose to relocate are compensated for higher commuting costs by lowering the 
cost of housing and increasing the quality of their housing consumption. In the case of 
developing countries, we can imagine that quality also comprises security of tenure and 
healthier environments (Galiani et al. 2016). For this to hold, the structures need to be 
supported by complementary physical infrastructure and social services such as roads 
and transport services, drainage, street lighting, electricity, together with policing, waste 
disposal and healthcare (Brueckner & Lall 2015).  
This will not be true if poor households derive a higher marginal utility from being 
closer to the city centre. Distance results in higher frictions and inefficiencies in cities of 
developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2017; Franklin 
2017). Partly, these barriers result from the low provision of public services and transit, 
which exacerbates the farther away from central cities. This feature implies that poor 
households obtain a higher utility from being closer to central areas as they 
disproportionately benefit from public transit (in line with Glaeser et al. 2008). It also 
means they are more heavily burdened by living far. A large literature has put forward 
the importance of distance in creating frictions in urban labour markets (i.e. the spatial 
mismatch hypothesis; Kain 1968; Zenou 2009). The disconnect from job opportunities 
can introduce search inefficiencies either by restricting the size of the effective labour 
market or because of information distortions; it can increase reservation wages and jobs 
search costs due to high commuting costs; and employers may discriminate against 
workers living far away, as they may consider it deteriorates their productivity (Gobillon 
et al. 2011). As emphasized by Galiani et al. (2016), the emergence of slums testifies to 
the fact that the poor are willing to live in substandard housing conditions if this allows 
them to be close to employment opportunities in the city centre.  
Under these conditions, we can imagine that the effectiveness of housing relocation 
programs will be closely related to the way they affect households labour supply. In a 
context where distance-related frictions are high, labour supply will be highly elastic 
with distance; which may in turn reduce the marginal utility poor households derive 
from better housing. The inverse is likely to be true in cases where distance-related-
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frictions are low, and even when they are not, in cases in which households can easily 
adapt to residential relocation.  This can happen when entire communities are moved 
(and social networks are kept intact). Takeuchi (2008) and Barnhardt et al. (2016) point 
to the importance of social and ethnic networks for employment and social services and 
the risks of distorting close-knit communities when relocation occurs. It can also 
happen if families can easily implement alternative livelihood strategies; for instance, if 
households have the possibility of shifting intensive and extensive margins between 
members or if they can easily switch to alternative sources of livelihood such as 
subsistence agriculture, rental income or more heavily rely on government transfers. 
The time dimension plays a key role here: the effects that may be true in the short to 
medium term could no longer hold in the long term, because of heterogeneous effects 
by age (Chetty et al. 2015) or different labour supply responses to the wealth effect 
(Moffit 2002, Jacob & Ludwig 2013)8.  
In the case of the South African program, we can imagine both forces exerting a 
pull. First, the design of the program combines a fixed ceiling for the total grant and 
minimum costs for the construction of the dwelling (dictated by a fixed standard), that 
squeezes the land cost and pushes developers to build in peripheral areas with low land 
prices (Lall et al. 2012). Because of this, relocation almost always increases distance to 
jobs. Still, households that derive a higher marginal utility from housing quality may still 
be better-off (AMM). The affordable housing sector is almost inexistent outside of the 
public sector, which makes benefitting from the subsidy virtually the only way of 
obtaining tenure security and accessing home-ownership for low-income households9 
(Lall et al. 2012). Close to 50% of beneficiaries come from informal settlements10.  
On the other hand, distance-related frictions and inefficiencies are accentuated by 
the spatial layout of South African cities. Largely, this results from path dependence in 
South African city-forms. South African apartheid policies constrained non-whites to 
                                                          
8 Economic theory is ambiguous regarding the expected sign of any labour supply response to means-
tested housing programs, mainly for at least two reasons. The first one involves how the dynamics of 
these programs relate to the life cycle model of labour supply; the second relates to its in-kind nature that 
offers a ‘take it or leave it’ level of housing consumption. The effect depends on how the program 
constrains consumption and whether the subsidized good is a complement or substitute to leisure (Jacob 
& Ludwig 2013).  
9 Limited access to land and housing finance, a highly regressive land taxation, and low supply elasticity of 
subsidized housing, has made it difficult for poor (and middle class) households to enter the formal 
housing market. The informal sector housing is a response to these failures (Lall et al. 2012). RDP 
corresponds to close to 25% of the housing stock in the country and virtually all the affordable formal 
housing sector. Further, there is a very limited rental market (25% in 2011) (Rust 2006). 
10 Ownership in the informal sector does not secure tenure. However, it might de facto not imply high 
insecurity due to the limited risk of eviction in South Africa. Informal dwellers are protected by the 
Constitution and past court rulings have always been in favor of slum dwellers. 
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live at the peripheries of cities far from work opportunities, often separated by landfill 
and geographical obstacles. While land-use restrictions have been abolished since the 
early 1990s, urban fragmentation remains the norm with the former white city 
concentrating most of the formal jobs, higher quality public services and high-income 
residential areas (Rospabe & Selod 2006). Commuting times and costs are extremely 
high in South African metropolitan areas. The average commuting time for employed 
workers was 84 minutes in 2013, but was much lower for the top income quintile (30 
minutes, Kerr 2015). The latter also disproportionately reported using private vehicle 
(65% vs. 35% on average). Reflecting inadequate provision, less than 9% of commuters 
used public transport (train and buses) across urban areas, with nearly 50% choosing 
cars and minibus taxi (informal transportation). The geographical persistence of 
segregation and limited public transportation is one of the main causes behind the high 
levels of unemployment for the black population since the end of Apartheid (Banerjee 
et al. 2008).  
Further, the possibility of shifting earning and livelihood strategies may be limited. 
Unlike other countries with similar official unemployment rates, the informal sector is 
small overall, partly due to legal barriers and job search mechanisms (Kingdon and 
Knight 2006). Subsistence agriculture is also a limited resource, particularly in urban 
areas. Whether by choice or by restriction, unemployment appears to be the default 
outcome of most individuals who do not find formal sector jobs (Magruder 2010). 
Location may thus disproportionately matter for poor households in South African 
metropolitan areas. 
1.3 Policy Framework  
1.3.1 History & main elements 
South Africa’s national housing policy was formally put in place following the end 
of Apartheid, to respond to the housing needs of the until-then formally excluded 
population. In 1997, the National Housing Department estimated that 2.2 million 
households were facing severe housing requirements, and included the right to adequate 
housing in the South African constitution (Sect. 26). A long list of regulations and laws11 
further defined the building blocks of today’s housing strategy, and though the 
standards and implementation mechanisms have been revised throughout the years, the 
modality of allocation and final housing products have remained largely unchanged. By 
                                                          
11 These include the National Housing Accord and the White Paper on Housing promulgated in 1994, the 
Housing Act of 1997, the Breaking New Ground Paper (2004), and the National Housing Code, 2009.  
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2014, 2.8 million dwellings had been constructed (table 1.1), amounting to 24% of the 
formal housing stock in the country12. According to the General Household Survey 
(GHS), 15.3% of South African households lived in a RDP or state-subsidised dwelling 
in 2014. There was a substantial increase in delivery during the period of this study, the 
number going from only 5.5% in 2002 to 9.4% in 2009, and 13.5% of households 
residing in RDP in 2012. 
Its main components and the focus of this paper are the Housing Subsidy 
Schemes, popularly referred to as RDP housing projects, which provide qualifying 
households with the opportunity of owning their first house. The schemes comprise 
one-off capital subsidies13 that are used for the construction of freestanding houses in 
new developments, administered by municipalities and later transferred to beneficiaries 
on an ownership basis. The purchase of land and construction of the houses are done 
by private sector operators, hired by local authorities (Lall et al. 2012). Because of this, 
the system is based on a fixed minimum cost for the house construction (R100-150 
thousands, including land), tied to a minimum standard. Since 2009, the National 
Housing Code stipulates that all stand-alone RDP houses must at least have a minimum 
gross floor area of 40m2, two bedrooms, combined living area and kitchen, and a 
separate bathroom with a toilet14 (See Appendix A figure A1). The overall development 
needs to be 200-250m2 with paved roads and electrical connexion (Tissington 2011). 
The design of the program has thus the effect of squeezing the price of land, forcing 
developers to build in low cost areas at the peripheries of cities. 
The program uses means-testing to screen for eligible beneficiaries and allocation is 
made through waiting lists managed by municipal housing departments, ultimately 
responsible for transferring property deeds. RDP houses cannot be sold until after eight 
years since the time of procurement (Department of Human Settlements, DHS 2012). 
Since early 2000s, 6% of registered houses have been sold, but informal transactions 
(often without transferring titles) are estimated to be higher: for the period 2005-2011, 
                                                          
12 The housing backlog increased since 1994, fuelled by a reduction of the housing supply at the lower-
end of the affordable market and a rise in housing prices triggered by the high demand and the small size 
of the formal rental market (DHS 2012).  
13 There are in theory different types of subsidies through which it is possible to access subsidized 
housing (Individual subsidies, Consolidation subsidies, Institutional and Project-linked subsidies, and the 
People’s Housing Process establishment grants). In practice, they are determined according to the same 
set of criteria, and because of the limitations of the low-cost housing market, more than 90% is delivered 
as a project-linked subsidy, the ones we focus on here. The rest is classified as an individual subsidy. In 
1999 only 5% of RDP houses were in situ upgrading, the rest corresponded to greenfield developments 
(Khan and Thring 2003). Information is not available since, but conversations with officials at the 
municipality lead to believe the ratio remained largely unchanged. 
14 Before then, the typical size was a 25-35m² structure, with no separations until early 2000s, and a 
possible flush toilet (UN-Habitat 2008). 
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owners unofficially traded approximately 11% of all RDP houses (Urban Landmark 
2011).  
1.3.2 Allocation & waiting lists 
Eligibility to receiving RDP housing is determined by two categories of conditions. 
The first ones are socio-demographic criteria: the recipient must be above 18 years of 
age, married, living with a partner, or otherwise have financial dependents, be of South 
African nationality (or permanent resident), and be a first time-owner. Additionally, it 
may not have benefited from a housing subsidy in the past. The second condition is an 
income-band criterion: the monthly household income must fall below R3501, making 
the housing program a means-tested benefit. Given the socio-demographic trends in 
South Africa, I consider the income criterion to be the main condition (figure A3)15. 
Yet, even in this case, this includes a large proportion of the population. In 1994 more 
than 80% of households fell under the eligible RDP income category (≤R3501). In 
2012, the number decreased to 60% (DHS 2012). This dimension is reflected in the 
sample, overall in the period considered 45.44% of households have an income below 
R3501 (18.25% ≤R1500).  
Since 2005, there are two official income bands for receiving RDP housing. The first 
one, consists of households with monthly incomes below or equal to R1500, and 
entitles the recipient to a full subsidized house without any contribution. The second 
band concerns households with monthly incomes between R1501-3500, and stipulates a 
one-off contribution of R2479 towards the purchase price of the property, payable to 
the municipality or to the provincial Housing Department. This condition was added to 
engender a “sense of ownership” and prevent sales below the market value. In practice, 
the contribution is not enforced and was progressively abandoned due to the difficulty 
for qualifying individuals to come up with the amount required (HDA 2011). This paper 
uses the discontinuity in the income criterion to identify the causal effect of receiving 
subsidized low-cost housing (see section 1.4.2 for more details on the income measure). 
I do not distinguish between both bands and use the R3500 threshold for the 
discontinuity. The main reason for this relates to the lack of enforcement of the 
distinction between bands in the period covered. This is reflected in the data as I do not 
observe a significant jump in the probability of receiving treatment at the R1500 (figure 
A5)16.  
                                                          
15 All figures and tables referenced with A are in Appendix A. 
16 The decline is only of 2-3% at R1500. 
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Generally, three phases can be identified in the allocation process. The first phase 
concerns the completion of a form at the provincial or municipal housing department, 
during which eligible households present proof of qualification. Screening is done by 
government officials based on the documentation supplied by the potential beneficiary. 
Details are checked against the National Housing Subsidy Database (NHSDB) as 
required by the National Housing Code. This database keeps records of all subsidy 
applicants approved by provinces across the country, with the purpose of preventing 
households from receiving more than one subsidy allocation. The information is 
recorded against the ID number of each individual (SERI 2013).  
Once approved, individuals are allocated to what is commonly known as the “RDP 
waiting list” (second phase). The waiting list is the main mechanism through which 
qualifying households are granted a house. The list is administered at the municipal 
level, and allocation is made in date order of registration, as well as location, once a 
project is completed in the municipality where the application was made. Some 
municipalities have recently digitized their databases, and individuals can check whether 
they are part of one (but no information on time or rank is given). According to the 
General Household Survey, in 2009 the average time on the waiting list was 5 years. 
Because of the long waiting periods, eligibility criteria are re-assessed after successful 
allocation to a project. If still compliant, households are given a property (third phase).   
The application procedure for accessing RDP housing is often characterized as long 
and cumbersome. This is partly due to a generalized take-up, with demand far exceeding 
supply throughout the entire existence of the program. In 2009, 13.5% of households 
had at least one member on a demand database. The proportion of households from 
informal settlements with a member in the RDP waiting list is higher, at 39% for the 
same year. I discuss the implications for identification related to the allocation 
mechanism and how I deal with these in the next section. 
1.3.3 Implications for identification 
The allocation mechanism has two main implications for identification.  
The first one concerns the existence of crossovers, i.e. households benefiting from 
the program above the income cutoff. This implies that the probability of receiving 
treatment at the threshold does not jump from zero to one. One reason for this relates 
to the discretion that municipalities have in practice to allocate a proportion of the new 
houses to qualifying households from priority groups and catchment areas around the 
projects, depending on special needs (i.e. fires in informal settlement, community 
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decision)17. In principle, these will still be from the waiting list database and still in date 
order (Western Cape Government 2013), but the proportion varies by municipality and 
because of urgency, checks are not always conducted. A second reason for observing 
crossovers relates to the likelihood of subversion. The authorities have recorded 
different methods as means to ‘jumping the queue’. These include land invasions, 
protest actions and violence, as well as bribes and connexions. While potentially more 
worrisome for identification - as subversion implies selection into treatment -, random 
subversion does not compromise the validity of the RD design (Lee and Lemieux 2010). 
Further, random subversion and crossovers are easily accommodated with Wald-type 
estimators of fuzzy RD designs, as used here. There is no reason to believe systematic 
subversion through the manipulation of the income receipts exists. While incentives to 
cheat are high, the relatively low level of the threshold – with two-thirds of the income 
distribution falling within the qualifying band, reduces the probability of large 
manipulations. Evidence in the dataset supports this: I find no bunching in the 
assignment variable at cutoff. I discuss this further in section 1.4.3. 
The second implication concerns the time dimension, related to the long waiting 
period from application to assignment into new RDP houses. This can complicate 
identification in two ways. The first one through behavioural mechanisms that could 
bias the results, such as the anticipation of receiving a house in the future or the strong 
disincentive to earn above the income threshold to remain eligible once a house is 
assigned. The long waiting periods and the strong uncertainty related to actually 
benefitting from the subsidised program reduce the likelihood of an anticipation bias. 
The same logic is true with the disincentive to apply effort. The second issue with the 
time dimension is due to the fact that I do not observe the date at which households 
applied and registered in the waiting list of the housing database, and because the 
dataset is built with a 2 year-lag between observations, I do not know the exact moment 
when they move to the new house. To tackle this problem, I only use a subsample of 
the entire dataset available: I keep at baseline18 only those households who fall under the 
socio-demographic conditions to receive RDP in the subsequent time periods. This also 
supposes the exclusion of any household that received RDP by the first year (i.e. I 
exclude all households treated at baseline). I then use the lagged monthly household 
income as assignment variable to best proxy for the time of application (and moving), 
which is likely to have happened prior to the period at which I observe a change in 
                                                          
17 The proportions are ad-hoc and not publicly available. 
18 Baseline is defined as the first time a household is registered in dataset, 2008 for 92% of households. 
Only 3% in 2012.  
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RDP status. Doing this also allows me to limit any confounding effect of the policy on 
income, reducing endogeneity. As a robustness check I run regressions separately for 
households whose income during the entire period crosses-over the cutoff and for 
those whose income always remain on one side19. The proportion of income crossovers 
is small. Only 185 households cross over above the RDP threshold, among these only 
45 are RDP beneficiaries. The opposite dynamic only concerns 25 households.   
1.4 Empirical Strategy & Data 
This section presents the methods and data employed to estimate the FRD. It also 
discusses the validity of the research design, potential sources of error and their 
implication. 
1.4.1 The FRD design 
The main threat to empirically identifying the causal impact of low-cost housing on 
labour outcomes is related to the non-random selection into the program. To address 
this issue, I exploit the arbitrary discontinuity income rule with a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity (FRD) design.  
Given that I only observe the change in RDP status every two years, I use the two-
year lagged household monthly nominal income (𝑋ℎ𝑚𝑡−1) as the assignment variable to 
account for the uncertainty in the time of allocation and avoid any confounding 
problems with treatment; with X=3500 at cutoff (c). If common RD assumptions hold, 
and all and only eligible households before the cutoff obtained RDP housing, then the 
causal effect of subsidized housing would be given by the difference in outcomes 
𝑌ℎ𝑚𝑡 between those with an income just above and just below R3500: 
lim
𝑥→𝑐−
𝐸[ 𝑌ℎ𝑚𝑡|𝑋ℎ𝑚𝑡−1 = 𝑐] −  lim
𝑥→𝑐+
𝐸[ 𝑌ℎ𝑚𝑡|𝑋ℎ𝑚𝑡−1 = 𝑐] = 𝐸[𝑌ℎ𝑚𝑡1 − 𝑌ℎ𝑚𝑡0|𝑋ℎ𝑚𝑡−1 = 𝑐]     (1.1) 
In the case considered here, receiving a subsidy 𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑡 is not deterministically related 
to crossing the threshold. For reasons discussed (i.e. crossovers), the jump in the 
probability of treatment at c does not go from zero to one (figure 1.1). In this ‘fuzzy’ 
RD setting, the causal effect is retrieved by dividing the jump in the relationship 
                                                          
19 Results are unchanged in terms of sign of the point estimates but statistical power is significantly 
reduced when partitioning the sample. These results should be considered with caution as I impose 
selection into the sample and could potentially be excluding households that are better off as a result of 
treatment. They were circulated in an earlier version and are now available upon request. 
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between 𝑌ℎ𝑚𝑡 and the assignment variable  𝑋ℎ𝑚,𝑡−1  at c by the fraction induced to 
take-up the treatment at the threshold (Hahn et al. 2001) 20 : 
𝑇𝐹𝑅𝐷 =
𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑥→𝑐−
𝐸[ 𝑌ℎ𝑚𝑡|𝑋ℎ𝑚𝑡−1 = 𝑐] − 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑥→𝑐+
𝐸[ 𝑌ℎ𝑚𝑡|𝑋ℎ𝑚𝑡−1 = 𝑐]
𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑥→𝑐−
𝐸[ 𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑡|𝑋ℎ𝑚𝑡−1 = 𝑐] −  𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑥→𝑐+
𝐸[ 𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑡|𝑋ℎ𝑚𝑡−1 = 𝑐]
      (1.2) 
 
The ratio (1.2) can be estimated using both parametric and non-parametric Wald-
type estimators as long as the order of polynomial in the forcing variable and the data 
window are the same for the first and second stage outcomes. I estimate (1.2) by two-
stage least squares, with the basic reduced-form and first-stage estimating equations 
respectively given by: 
𝑌ℎ𝑚𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1. 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤ℎ𝑚𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑠. (?̃?ℎ𝑚𝑡−1)
𝑠
𝑠
𝑠=1
+ 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤ℎ𝑚𝑡−1. ∑ 𝜋𝑠
𝑠
𝑠=1
. (?̃?ℎ𝑚𝑡−1)
𝑠+𝑣ℎ𝑚𝑡 
(1.3) 
𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1. 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤ℎ𝑚𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑠. (?̃?ℎ𝑚𝑡−1)
𝑠
𝑠
𝑠=1
+ 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤ℎ𝑚𝑡−1. ∑ 𝛾𝑠
𝑠
𝑠=1
. (?̃?ℎ𝑚𝑡−1)
𝑠+𝜀ℎ𝑚𝑡 
 (1.4) 
 
where, (as in the above) h indexes for households in metro-area m (1…6) at period t 
(1…4). The forcing variable is now  ?̃?𝑖𝑚ℎ𝑡−1 - the normalized value of the lagged 
monthly income with respect to the cutoff – so that the discontinuity occurs at zero; the 
variable Below is a dummy variable equal to one when the household is below the 
threshold in the previous period. I include s-th order polynomials in the assignment 
variable, and I allow the relationship between  𝑌ℎ𝑚𝑡 and ?̃?ℎ𝑚𝑡−1 to have different 
slopes on either side of the discontinuity. Other parameters are as previously defined. 
Following Gelman and Imbens (2014), I focus on first and second order polynomials in 
?̃? in the main specifications21. To avoid extrapolation bias in these global polynomial 
regressions, I restrict the sample by trimming off the tails of the income distribution (at 
1 and 5 percent). Baseline estimates include time and metropolitan-area fixed effects, 
and I test the results to the inclusion of standard controls. These include the gender, 
                                                          
20 They show that the FRD can be conceptualized as a local IV, and that the interpretation of the ratio for 
a causal effect requires the same assumptions as a regular IV at the local threshold, i.e. monotonicity and 
excludability. 
21 The Akaike information criteria (AIC) confirms that linear and second order polynomial are the best 
specifications at nearly all bandwidths considered. Results using larger order polynomials are available 
upon request. 
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age, ethnic group and education level of the household head, the number of members 
below 14 and above 68 years old. I cluster standard-errors at the household level.  
As is best-practice, I also compute (1.2) using a non-parametric local linear 
regression specification with rectangular kernel weights and smaller bandwidths about 
the discontinuity22. For these, the property of the estimator depends crucially on the 
choice of bandwidth. I use both Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Cattaneo et al. 
(2014) bandwidths. These results are provided in section A.III of the online appendix. 
Since compliers are not located very near the threshold, the global polynomials 
approximations are my preferred estimates. The median income of compliers in the 
sample at baseline is R2435 and only 5.8% of compliers are within 10% of the income 
threshold. Including more observations below the cutoff reduces asymptotic size 
distortions (see figure A6 for estimates sensibility to the choice of bandwidths).   
1.4.2 Data   
This study utilizes data drawn from the first four waves (2008, 2010, 2012, and 
2014) of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) panel, conducted by Southern 
Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape 
Town23. The panel collects information on demographic characteristics, dwellings, 
income, employment, health and wellbeing of the respondents. A two-stage cluster 
sample design was used to randomly select near 7300 households across 400 primary 
sampling units for the first wave, stratified by district council.  
NIDS is a panel of continuing sample members (CSMs, i.e. individuals that were 
residents in participating households in wave 1); co-residents from wave 2 onwards are 
also re-interviewed if they do not abandon the household. Attrition is moderate for 
continuing sampling members (19% from wave 1 to 2 and 16% from wave 2 to 3), with 
the primary reason for no response being refusal and no contact. Tables A1 and A2 
show the original sample of households’ residents, and the redefinition of the sample 
with respect to the socio-demographic qualifying criteria of the RDP policy, as well as 
to all urban areas in the six largest metropolitan areas for which I conduct the analysis.  
                                                          
22 Lee and Lemieux (2010) argue that ultimately there is no much difference between both methods, as 
they both have their source of bias and the best fit ultimately depends on the data. Here, I do not weight 
the data differently according to distance from the discontinuity, using rectangular kernels for the non-
parametric estimations. The setting justifies this approach, as 25% of RDP recipients have an assignment 
variable below R1500. 
23 Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit. National Income Dynamics Study 2008-
2014, Waves 1 to 4 [dataset]. Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, 2016 
[producer]. Cape Town: Data First [distributor], 2016. 
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These are the city of Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, eThekwini, Johannesburg, Nelson 
Mandela Bay, and Tshwane (see figure A4). These cities are the only cities with 
populations above 1 million (Census 2011). The choice of restricting the analysis to 
these large urban areas is made for simplicity reasons. Firstly, the mechanisms are likely 
different in rural zones with different commuting behaviours and a higher likelihood of 
home agricultural production. Second, it would be very difficult and time consuming to 
obtain information on employment nodes and calculate distances from the home 
addresses to CBD for every secondary city in the sample. South Africa’s six principal 
metro areas amount to 40% of the working age population, and receive more than 50% 
of RDP housing subsidies (Urban Landmark 2011). It is nonetheless important to keep 
in mind that results may well differ in other contexts.  
My final sample is at the household level24. It leaves me with a total of 2,984 
observations. I use this level of analysis given that the treatment occurs at the 
household level. Further, members’ decisions to participate in the labour market are 
collective family decisions and possible shifts in livelihood strategies may occur 
following relocation. Relatedly, I use households’ self-reported income as the forcing 
variable. This measure reflects regular nominal income received by all household 
members on a monthly basis, net of taxes. It includes both formal and informal 
incomes such as income received from helping friends, self-employment or subsistence 
agriculture25. Using this measure has the advantage of capturing all types of income of 
households. Drawbacks are discussed in the next section. 
Information on whether a household received RDP housing in any of the 
subsequent periods is derived from the Household Questionnaire, which asks 
households if they received a government-housing subsidy to obtain the dwelling at 
each wave of NIDS. To correct for possible measurement error, I further refine 
recipients by crosschecking with the reported estimated subsidy amount and the 
estimated market value of the dwelling. I exclude those that report the market value of 
the dwelling above R300-450 thousands depending on district councils’ differences in 
the distribution of housing prices26. The official estimated value of RDP houses is R200 
                                                          
24 I consider a household to be the same across time when the household head does not change, or when 
after they die, their spouse becomes the new head. Given this, I construct household identifiers that are 
unique in time by keeping unchanged the identifiers of the first wave when this condition holds. Using 
different household identifiers every year slightly changes the standard errors but estimates remain 
unchanged. 
25 In cases of non-responses standard imputations were made. Refer to NIDS User Guides Public Release 
2008-2014 for details. 
26 The benchmark is the value for the 75th percentile in the housing price distribution in each district 
council, as declared by households. 
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thousands, though in practice they can sell at 10% of that value. While the upper-end of 
the ‘affordable’ housing market in South Africa is capped at dwellings below R250 
thousand, and some noise may exist from the larger ceiling chosen, it also prevents 
Type II errors (i.e. the exclusion of treated observations due to misreported households’ 
estimations). As discussed, RDP eligibility is derived at the baseline. Nearly 15% of 
households in my final sample received RDP housing following the baseline period, in 
line with national averages. The proportions are stable across years. 
Distance to the CBD and employment nodes are calculated as simple Euclidean 
distances between the household’s address and the CBD or the main economic nodes’ 
centroids. In the absence of supply-side data across cities, I use the 2013 South African 
National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) to identify main employment nodes by 
metropolitan area. The survey is designed to assess travel patterns in South Africa by 
Transport Analysis Zones (TAZ)27. I identify the main economic nodes by the density 
of daily commutes to each TAZ by metro area. I then create the weighted average 
distance to the primary (65%) and secondary (35%) ‘destination for work’ TAZ. I use 
the same weights across all metros, except for eThekwini where three nodes have the 
same weight as per the more polycentric nature of the city.  
Table 1.2 contains basic summary statistics of households’ socio-demographic and 
residential characteristics. Worth mentioning is the fact that most residential 
characteristics reflect the higher living standards of large urban areas, with 88% of 
households having access to electricity, and only 13% lacking weekly refuse collection. 
Housing informality is high and in line with national averages with close to 30% of 
dwellings identified as informal (it includes backyard dwellings). The same can be said 
for distances to CBD in minutes by mode of commute28 and km (26.35 km).  
Table 1.3 displays outcome means at baseline. I consider as employment any type of 
paid work (30% of the employed have no written contract and can be considered 
informal). Less than 50% of working age individuals are employed per household, 
which is also reflected in the low weekly labour hours (30 hours on average). This is not 
surprising given South Africa’s high unemployment (25% across metro areas in the 
period) and relatively low labour force participation (55% in 2010). Only 7% of 
households report engaging in subsistence agriculture, and 35% receive a type of 
                                                          
27 These were defined by Statistics South Africa as relevant travel micro-areas, and are created from the 
aggregation of census EAs (2011). 
28 I proxy time of commute by the average minutes per km of the main mode of transport used at 
corresponding TAZ of the household’s residence, conditional on the household head’s ethnic group and 
income-decile. 
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government grant. Regarding composition, 40% of households have children younger 
than 10 years old. 
I follow Barnhardt et al. (2016) and group outcomes into thematic indices (table 
A3): labour supply and labour supply cost, amenities and neighbourhood quality. Each 
index is the simple average of the z-scores of their respective components. The labour 
supply cost index aims at quantifying the cost for households to participate in the 
labour market. The measure is imperfect, but the sign of the estimated coefficient will 
give an idea of the commuting burden following the assignment to an RDP dwelling. I 
will focus on actual distances and times in the analysis. The housing amenities index is 
computed to understand additional wellbeing dynamics related to low-cost housing. On 
average, the number of rooms per household is 3.6 and households rate their dwellings 
as structurally sound but requiring maintenance; 77% of households have access to 
flush toilets. Neighbourhood quality is defined by dummies of functioning streetlights 
and regular refuse collection, as well as a measure on the frequency of robberies and 
thefts. 71% of urban households declare having functioning streetlights and half of 
households perceive thefts as being ‘common’ in their neighbourhoods. 
1.4.3 Discussion of validity 
Identification requires three conditions. First is the absence of manipulation of the 
assignment variable around the cutoff, which can be formally tested by examining the 
density of its distribution about the discontinuity. Figure 1.2 shows the McCrary density 
plots (McCrary 2008) for wave one and subsequent waves of the panel. The test runs 
kernel local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides of the 
threshold. I find no evidence of sorting, with the discontinuities statistically 
insignificant. Further, I compute local polynomial density estimates (Cattaneo, Jansson 
and Ma 2015) to test for the null hypothesis that the density of the assignment variable 
is continuous at cutoff. I confirm that there is no evidence of manipulation (table A4). 
Appendix Box A.1 addresses concerns regarding the fact that the assignment variable 
relies on self-reported income data. Even absent intentional misreporting or 
manipulation, self-reported income data is noisy and it is important to discard biased 
estimates that could result from bunching in the assignment variable due to its self-
reported nature, i.e. it is easier for individuals to round the income they report (Barreca, 
Lindo and Waddell 2015). I find no evidence of systematic bunching at round numbers.  
The second related key condition of a valid RD design is that ‘all other factors’ are 
continuous with respect to the threshold. If there was non-random sorting, we could 
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expect some of these characteristics to differ systematically between households 
immediately above and immediately below a given income threshold. Graphical tests 
using local linear polynomial regressions on lagged household characteristics are 
supportive of the identifying assumption (figure 1.3). Dashed lines show 95% 
confidence intervals, each point plots an average within a bin. I conduct a formal 
balance test by replacing the dependent variable in equations (1.3) and (1.4) with 
relevant observed lagged households’ characteristics. The results indicate that these are 
well balanced on both sides of the cut-offs. The coefficients on below are typically small 
and statistically insignificant, with the few exceptions notably on informal dwelling 
which I include as control in relevant specifications. 
Third, identification requires a strong relationship between the assignment and 
treatment variables, i.e. the conditional probability of receiving treatment should change 
discontinuously at the threshold. I examine graphically the first-stage relationship 
between being below the threshold and receiving RDP housing. Figure 1.1 shows local 
averages and linear fits at narrow bandwidths to plot RDP assignment in t against the 
monthly household income in t-1. I do not include controls or fixed-effects to 
transparently display the raw data. The likelihood of obtaining RDP decreases 
discontinuously at zero. Table 1.5 displays strong first-stage estimates for the preferred 
specifications, with F-Stats of up to 30.26. Figure 1.4 graphically explores the reduced-
forms of selected outcome variables repeating the exercise done for assessing the 
continuity of control variables.  
Some limitations of the identification strategy deserve discussion. As with many RD 
studies statistical power is an issue and weak identification when decreasing the sample 
size remains a problem due to the loss of efficiency and asymptotic size distortions in 
the standard errors (Marmer et al. 2014). While the presence of crossovers is well 
accommodated with the fuzzy design, it weakens the power of the identification with 
non-parametric estimates at narrow bandwidths. Figure A6 plots estimated non-
parametric coefficients for different bandwidths: asymptotic size distortions are 
graphically visible but signs and sizes are consistent. Because of these limitations, I 
consider non-parametric estimates to be robustness checks. A second limitation 
concerns the external validity. As is the case with LATE, the estimated effects are based 
on compliers at cutoff and results are valid for the subpopulation affected by the 
instrument.  
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1.5 Results 
 
1.5.1 Households labour supply  
The paper’s main findings concern the effects of obtaining RDP housing on the 
labour supply of households. Tables 1.6 and 1.7 contain these results. Each row reports 
estimates of equation (1.2) using parametric regressions and a polynomial of degree two. 
For robustness, I report estimates with linear polynomials (see section A.II in appendix 
A) and non-parametric local linear regressions (section A.III in appendix A). For 
guidance, OLS results and baseline means can also be found in appendix A, section A.I. 
The same applies for subsequent outcome variables. 
Table 1.6 is divided in two parts. The first part (columns 1 to 3) contains the results 
on the labour supply index and its components, measured as standard deviations. 
Columns 4 to 9 display estimated coefficients on individual variables. I begin by 
examining the latter. I find a large decline in total hours of about 30 hours per week in 
treated households for the period considered. The sign and size are robust across 
specifications, with statistical significance ranging between 10 to 5% levels in parametric 
regressions. This is consistent with a decline in the overall number of employed 
household members (column 7) by almost one member, statistically significant at 5% 
level. The labour supply index reflects the same negative effect. Calculated as the 
average of the z-scores of weekly labour hours and the number of employed per 
working age members, it shows that households receiving RDP see their overall labour 
supply decline by almost one standard deviation. Point estimates are statistically 
significant at 10% level and driven by the negative effect on the intensive margin.  
I also study the variation in impact across household members by gender (columns 
5-6 for females and 8-9 for males). These regressions are identical to the pooled sample 
except that they now control for male and female working age members. The estimates 
reveal that most of the decline in labour supply happens through a reduction of total 
female hours. The effect is also larger (twice or three times as large) for females on the 
extensive margin but never statistically significant. While insignificant, male coefficients 
are also always negative. 
Table 1.7 contains the results on unemployment. I use both a strict (columns 4 to 6) 
and large definition (columns 1 to 3). The strict measure excludes discouraged 
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searchers, meaning that it only includes those actively looking for a job. The coefficients 
for the total number of unemployed (large) are positive but non-significant across 
specifications; strict unemployment shows opposite signs but the same statistical 
insignificance. The size of both coefficients fails to compensate for the overall decline 
in labour supply. Still, their opposite dynamic suggests that the reduction in labour 
supply is more likely to end up in discouraged unemployment than in active search. The 
number of unemployed per working age member does register an increase of 0.26 pp 
for households below the threshold, statistically significant at 10% level. Despite the 
small size, it suggests that previously employed members are dropping out of the active 
labour market. 
These findings are in line with Barnhardt et al. (2016). They also align with the 
conclusions of the U.S. literature that finds temporarily negative or no effect on the 
labour market outcomes of households benefitting for public housing programs (Mills 
et al 2006; Ludwig and Jacob 2012). As previously discussed, several hypotheses could 
explain the reduction in labour supply following relocation to RDP houses. The first 
possibility relates to the existence of high frictions in urban labour markets, which are 
exacerbated by moving farther away from city-centres. This could be amplified in cases 
where shifts in the livelihood strategies of families are limited. The fact that the bulk of 
the negative effect is driven by the reduction in the intensive margin of female members 
is telling. It could reflect both, the higher burden of distance on females (that might 
depend more on walking or social networks for work), or presumably also because of 
increased distance, a within household re-organization of the labour supply of members 
that pushes females to home-based work.   
The alternative hypothesis is a price substitution or income effect arising from the 
wealth shock as predicted by standard labour supply models. According to the basic 
AMM model, the first order source of compensation for households choosing to 
relocate is through lower housing costs. Renters will presumably benefit the most from 
a potential income effect in the short-term. 74% of households at baseline pay rent 
(65% among dwellers of informal settlements). If this effect dominates, the re-allocation 
of female work to within the household may reflect South African social values. Caution 
is warranted when considering a possible income effect on labour supply here. Non-
linearities may result from the in-kind nature of housing subsidies in the budget 
constraint (Moffit 2002). For instance, for many households relocating to RDP houses 
implies de facto higher levels of consumption of housing, as they now have to pay for 
utilities such as water and electricity. Because of this, while the income effect may 
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dominate in the short-term, it might not hold in the medium to long-term, and will 
depend on the differential between both past and present costs. I explore these 
alternative hypotheses further in the following sections.  
1.5.2 Urban distances & commuting costs 
Next, I examine the impact of obtaining RDP housing on commuting distances 
measured in time of commute (minutes)29 and kilometres to CBD and main 
employment nodes. As discussed in previous sections, RDP houses are generally built at 
the peripheries of cities. On average, in the province of Gauteng where three of the 
metropolitan areas in the study are located, RDP houses were between 10 to 45 km 
from employment centres (figure A2). Average distance to CBD at baseline was already 
very high (26.8 km) so that any increase would potentially amplify distance-related 
frictions for relocating households.  
Table 1.8 reports coefficients from equation (1.2) using global quadratic polynomial 
specifications on different measures of distance and commuting. Metropolitan-area and 
time fixed-effects should absorb any differences and changes in infrastructure and city-
structures that are likely to affect commuting patterns. Column 1 contains the results 
for a composite index, resulting from the average of z-scores of distances to CBD in km 
and minutes and household monthly expenditure on transport. Columns 2 to 5 display 
estimated coefficients on each initial variable. I focus my analysis on the latter.  
Overall, I find a large and positive increase in distances to CBD and employment 
nodes in kilometres and time of commuting. The surge in distances from work 
opportunities is large even for South African standards, between 12 to 13 km for 
households below the threshold. This surge is statistically significant at one percent 
level. The increase in commuting times is commensurate (close to 35 minutes), and 
close to 10% statistical significance. The sign and size are robust across global 
specifications, but double in size in nonparametric estimates suggesting some level of 
measurement error when reducing the sample size30. These positive values are translated 
into half a standard deviation increase of the composite index (labour supply cost), 
significant at 10% level. I find no effect on the monthly share of household revenue 
                                                          
29 As explained earlier, to obtain the time of commute I proxy the household mode of transport by the 
preferred mode in the travel zone (TAZ) of the household residence, conditional on their monthly 
income and ethnic group. While it may seem a rough approximation, 71% of public transport users 
commute using minibus taxis across South Africa (Kerr 2015). I observe an extremely small variability in 
terms of choice by ethnic group, irrespective of their income. For instance, white South African 
disproportionately prefer to drive, while black South Africans predominately use minibus taxi.  
30The small sample size prevents me from running the regression with distance stratifications. 
Approximations show no difference between groups originally further or closer to employment nodes. 
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spent on transport, and estimated coefficients are fairly small. The fact that increased 
distances do not translate into larger monthly expenses on transport suggests that 
households are not compensating by longer (more expensive) commutes, but rather 
choose to reduce their overall traveling.  
These large and statistically significant increases in distance to city-centres suggest 
distance-related frictions might be an important factor behind the reduction of the 
labour supply of households. As postulated in the spatial mismatch hypothesis, the 
spatial disconnect between places of residence and the location of economic 
opportunities can increase search frictions and information distortions that rises both 
search costs for the unemployed, and reservation wages for the employed. This is 
consistent with findings in section 1.5.1. On the other hand, the reduction in the labour 
supply could also be indirectly related to distance, as households shift their earning 
strategies in response to the increased barriers to access labour markets. Both channels 
would explain the larger effect on the intensive margins of females. A nascent literature 
has shown that in poor settings the cost of commuting is higher for females who 
disproportionately choose to walk, limiting the size of their accessible labour market 
(Baker et al. 2005)31. Females might also depend more strongly on social networks, 
which may be disrupted with relocation. Due to increased commuting costs, it might 
thus be cheaper for women to stay at home, with households shifting their livelihood 
strategies in response. I explore this possibility next. 
1.5.3 Family shifts in livelihood strategies 
As discussed in section 1.5.2, in the presence of distance-related frictions, 
households may still be better-off when relocating if they can adapt their livelihood 
strategies. This section explores this hypothesis. 
Table 1.11 reports estimated coefficients of equation (1.2) using global quadratic 
parametric specifications on different measures of the age composition of households. 
In the South African context, some papers have found that social benefits do alter 
household dynamics (Ardington et al. 2009). Examining the effect of RDP on overall 
household structures would go beyond the scope of this paper. Here, I rather focus on 
understanding whether household compositional changes in response to the increase in 
distances might be biasing the results on labour supply. This could arise in cases were 
                                                          
31 Again, the small size of the sample prevents me from carrying a stratified analysis by gender without 
losing the first stage. At baseline, there are no indications that female-headed households face 
significantly longer distances and commute compared to male-headed households. On average distance to 
CBD for female vs. male headed households was 0.6 km higher (26.62 km), reflected by 5 minutes longer 
daily commuting times (120.44 minutes). 
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less mobile members (senior, children or disabled) are relocated to public housing while 
more mobile members remain in previous dwellings. Summary statistics do not suggest 
large differences in household composition for RDP-recipients and non-RDP recipients 
at baseline. The exception is the larger proportion of dependents and female-headed 
households in future RDP households, which reflects the policy of favouring vulnerable 
populations, and is the reason I include the gender of the household head and the 
proportion of members below 15 and above 68 years old as basic controls in all 
specifications.  
Overall, I find no important changes on household composition when estimating 
LATE on dependency ratios (columns 1 and 2), the age and number of children living 
at home (columns 3, 4 and 7), the age of the household head (column 6), and the 
number of adults above 68 years old (column 5). The latter is the only statistically 
significant coefficient at 10% level, but displays a negative sign, in line with that of the 
aged dependency ratio. The interest of looking at dependency ratios is that they inform 
on overall changes in household members’ age and indirect labour market abilities. 
None is statistically significant.  
These results do not support the hypothesis according to which less mobile 
members are disproportionately relocated to RDP houses in response to accrued 
distances. Further, it does not support the possibility of women dropping out of the 
labour market because of pregnancy and having a larger number of young children. 
While some degree of household reconfiguration may still exist, they do not concern the 
overall age and work abilities of households, at least in the medium term considered 
here.  
Table 1.12 explores alternative shifts in livelihood strategies. Columns (1) to (3) 
report point estimates of equation (1.2) with global quadratic polynomial specifications 
on three possible coping mechanisms: rental income, government transfers and 
subsistence agriculture. Only rental income is positive and statistically significant at 10% 
level. The size of the coefficient is large, with households below the threshold exhibiting 
an increase of 54 pp in their likelihood of receiving rental income. This result is 
interesting and should be considered carefully. There are two main ways through which 
low-income households in RDP houses could be extracting rental income. The first one 
is through the practice of backyard rooms, a distinct South African phenomenon by 
which low-income households build informal rooms in their backyards to rent to family 
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members or other individuals32. This is coherent with a change in income-generating 
strategies in response to relocation. The second is through the rental of their previous 
informal property. 20% of households in the sample report ‘owning’ their house in 
informal areas. These households could choose to relocate without giving up their 
previous dwelling. Lall et al. (2012) find evidence of very active informal housing 
markets in South African metropolitan areas. In this case, the decline in labour supply 
can presumably result from the price substitution and income effects. Unfortunately, 
the small size of the sample does not allow me to disentangle this channel further.  
1.5.4 Amenities & neighbourhood quality 
An important component to understand the overall effect of housing relocation 
programs is the actual quality of the new houses consumed. Despite the increase in 
commuting times and distances, households could still be better off when relocating if 
they derive a higher marginal utility from consuming more housing (AMM) or in this 
case, better housing (related to the possibility of home-ownership and tenure security, 
as well as less harmful geographical environments). Yet, for this condition to hold, the 
structures need to be supported by complementary physical infrastructure and social 
services such as roads and transport services, drainage, street lighting, electricity, 
together with policing, waste disposal and healthcare (Brueckner & Lall 2015).  
To test if households are better-off in terms of living conditions, table 1.9 replicates 
the above regressions on an index of neighbourhood quality. The index is calculated as 
the average of the z-scores of three characteristics of neighbourhood quality: the 
perceived frequency of robberies, functioning street lighting and weekly refuse 
collection. These are partial measures of neighbourhood quality, but are still indicative 
of the general environment in relocation projects. Unfortunately, distances to bus and 
train stops were only collected at baseline and cannot be used to infer the effect of the 
policy on accessibility to public transport. Coefficients in columns (2) to (5) control for 
households previously living in informal housing. 
Overall, I find no effect on neighbourhood quality, and none of its components are 
statistically significant. There are, however, telling differences regarding their signs, 
which suggest a consistent improvement in refuse collection across specifications 
(column 5). The effect on functioning street lights is ambiguous across specifications, 
and large standard-errors do not allow me to draw any conclusive remark. More 
                                                          
32 For anecdotal and visual evidence see: http://informalcity.co.za/learning-from-backyard. (last visited 
May 17th 2017). 
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interesting, pulling the average in the other direction, is the steady perceived increase in 
thefts and robberies of about half a standard deviation (column 3). Though 
insignificant, the perception of security matters. The deterioration is revealing of the 
higher insecurity that may result from isolation, but also from the disruption of social 
networks in close-knit communities. While the evidence here is insufficient, part of the 
decline in labour supply could be related to the loss of informal business partners, day-
care providers and security mechanisms put in place in previous locations. The loss of 
social networks is one of the main constraints on these types of relocation programs in 
both developed and developing countries (Barnhardt et al. 2016; Day and Cervero 2010; 
Field et al. 2008; Mills et al. 2006; Kling et al. 2007).  
Table 1.10 presents the results of obtaining RDP housing on a housing amenities 
index. The index is calculated as the average of the normalized values of four measures 
of housing quality: the number of rooms, access to electricity, a categorical variable of 
dwelling quality and the type of toilet facility33. Results for the overall index are in 
columns (1) and (2), with the different components in columns (3) to (6). Columns (2) 
to (6) additionally control for the informal nature of the previous dwelling. 
Counterintuitively, I find a decline in housing amenities for households below the 
threshold of up to 0.68 standard deviations, statistically significant at 5% levels. While 
all coefficients in columns (3) to (6) have a negative sign, only the number of rooms and 
the perceived quality of the structure are statistically significant at 10% level.  
Two remarks can be derived from these findings. First, while surprisingly negative, 
results on housing amenities are in line with anecdotal evidence. Officially, 14.5% of 
RDP residents have complained about the quality of the walls, while 13.9% regard the 
roofs as weak or very weak (GHS 2014). The negative perceptions are higher in press 
reports. Khan & Thring (2003) report that peripheral sites often fail to include the range 
of necessary public facilities and amenities. The high cost of services, which many RDP 
recipients previously did not pay, has also led to cases of up to 80% non-payment where 
entire projects have been disconnected from electricity grids (SERI 2013). Short-term 
mechanisms could also be at play by which delays in servicing in recently constructed 
areas or expectations about the new dwelling negatively bias perceptions. Still, the fact 
that RDP houses and informal shacks show no significant difference in terms of their 
valuation is indicative (Lall et al. 2012). It suggests the quality of amenities do not 
compensate for distance.  
                                                          
33 A measure of access to water sources would have been ideal but the variable in the NIDS panel is 
highly imprecise. 
 43 
 
 
 
43 
The second remark concerns the hypothesis tested here. It is not clear that despite of 
the bad quality of the housing good, intangible quality has not increased. For a large 
majority of households, RDP housing offers the only option for becoming a 
homeowner and obtaining tenure security. In line with this, Galiani et al. (2016) find 
positive effects on subjective wellbeing for slum upgradings in South America. While I 
cannot measure subjective appreciation for tenure and ownership in the dataset, the 
mechanism may still explain why households choose to relocate despite not being 
better-off in terms of tangible quality and facing increased frictions to access labour 
markets.  
To approximate a measure of subjective wellbeing, I test the effect of RDP on the 
household head’s preference to continue living in the current area. Overall, the 
preference to stay is statistically significant and negative below the threshold (column 5). 
Families have an 88 pp higher preference to leave their current location at cutoff, 
significant at 10% level. However, when grouping the results by age groups (columns 6 
and 7) it becomes clear that the preference to leave is only driven by heads aged 30 or 
below, for which point estimates are large, consistently negative across specifications 
and statistically significant at 10% levels. These results could suggest that older 
individuals obtain a higher marginal utility from ownership and security of tenure with 
respect to young adults, for whom the disutility of being far from economic 
opportunities dominates. In their paper, Barnhardt et al. (2016) find suggestive evidence 
that greater average distances to employment opportunities discourage adult children 
from staying in their parents’ household. In the relatively short-term period analysed 
here, one could imagine similar dynamics.  
1.6 Conclusions 
This study has focused on identifying the reduced-form impacts of a large public 
housing program on the labour supply and living conditions of beneficiary low-income 
households across South Africa’s six largest metropolitan areas. Albeit incomplete, 
findings here provide compelling causal evidence about a controversial type of housing 
policy and contribute to the better understanding of the response of low-income 
households to housing policies in developing countries. 
Overall, I find that in the medium to short-term (two to four years) following the 
relocation to RDP housing, households are not better-off on several outcomes. Their 
labour supply is reduced at cutoff both in terms of hours and participation. The effect is 
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mostly driven by a reduction at the intensive margin of female members, though male 
members also experience a non-significant reduction. The share of working age 
members that are unemployed and discouraged also rises, suggesting members are 
dropping out of the active labour market. The surge in distances from the CBD and 
employment nodes of up to 12 to 13 km, offer a possible explanation for the negative 
impact on labour outcomes. It supports the existence of high frictions in South Africa 
urban labour markets that are amplified by distance. I find suggestive evidence that 
households may be shifting their livelihood strategies in response to the accrued 
distance, by increasing their rental incomes. This could also result from a price-
substitution effect. 
Whether the labour supply decline is due to the direct or indirect effect of longer 
distances is impossible to tell in the current setting. Still, both possibilities underline one 
of the main policy conclusions of the paper: location matters. Poor households are 
highly penalized in contexts of low public transit provision and inefficient labour 
markets as is often the case in most developing country cities. Under these conditions, 
housing policies should prioritize the reduction of distance-related frictions that push 
households to having to choose between housing quality and proximity to employment 
opportunities. Many options exist: relocation programs could be accompanied by 
complementary connectivity policies; local authorities could prioritize in-situ upgradings 
(Takeuchi et al 2008); or include monetary compensations (Lall et al. 2012). The 
possibility to implement alternative livelihood strategies in response to relocation is also 
important. This can be better achieved when social networks are not disrupted 
(Barnhardt et al. 2016).  
An additional interesting finding of the paper concerns housing amenities and 
neighbourhood quality. Overall, I find a deterioration of the former and no effect on 
the latter. At first, this seems counterintuitive and contrary to the predictions of the 
standards monocentric model of urban economics, with households not being 
compensated by the increase in distance by a higher consumption of housing. The fact 
that mobile households still choose to relocate suggests that the improvement in 
housing consumption happens through intangible features of housing quality, such as 
increased tenure security and the possibility of becoming homeowners. Subjective 
wellbeing has been found to be an important component of housing policies (Galiani et 
al. 2016). This dimension adds to the complexities of the design of such policies, and 
the need to continue understanding household responses to different housing policies 
in developing countries. The difference between short and long term effects should also 
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be a priority for further research, as dynamics could well differ in the long run, 
particularly when considering the effect on young children and possible positive 
externalities on health outcomes.  
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1.7 Tables & Figures 
Figure 1.1. First Stage 
  
Notes: Each point plots an average value within a bin. The solid line plots a quadratic fit on the right-quadrant 
and a linear fit on the left-quadrant. Dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. McCrary Density Tests of Non-Manipulation of the Assignment Variable  
  
Notes: Nominal Household Income, Wave 1 on the right quadrant. All other waves in left quadrant. The d. 
estimate fails to reject the null hypothesis of non-discontinuity at cutoff. Generated using the Stata program 
developed by McCrary (2008) 
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Figure 1.3. Balance Checks (t-1) 
(a) Female head 
 
(b) Age head 
 
(c) Years of education head
 
(d) Head not white 
 
(e) Amount spent on transport 
 
(f) Informal dwelling 
 
 
(g) HH pays rent 
 
 
(h) HH receives pension 
 
 
Notes:  Each point plots an average value within a bin. The solid line plots local polynomial fits of degree 2. 
Controls and fixed-effects have been partialed out.  Dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. For 
variables definitions see table 2. All variables are lagged household characteristics. 
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Figure 1.4. Reduced Forms 
(a) Labour Supply Index 
 
(b) Weekly hours of Females 
 
(c) Housing Amenities Index 
 
 
(d) Neighbourhood Quality Index 
 
 
(e) Young children (<10 years) 
 
 
(f) Receives Rental Income 
 
(g) Unemployed (wam) 
 
(h) Preference to Stay (<30 years) 
 
 
Notes: Each point plots an average value within a bin. The solid line plots local polynomial estimates. 
Controls and fixed-effects have been partialed out. Dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. For 
variables definitions see table 3. 
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Table 1.1 RDP Houses Delivered since 1994 
Period Houses/Units Completed 
1995-2000 870,629 
2000-2005 745,023 
2005-2010 756,119 
2011-2014 463,504 
Total 2,835,275 
Notes Data from National Department of Human 
Settlements (2014). 
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Table 1.2. Summary Statistics at HH Level, All waves 
 
Mean Std. Dev. N 
I. Households Socio-Demographics 
   
Female head  0.438 0.496 2,984 
Age Head 46.863 14.782 2,984 
Household Size 3.555 2.614 2,984 
Head Not White 0.863 0.344 2,984 
Head Completed Matric  0.336 0.472 2,984 
Proportion of children (<15 years old) 0.197 0.221 2,984 
Proportion of senior members (>68 years old) 0.054 0.177 2,984 
Dependency ratio 0.477 0.627 2,984 
Dependency ratio children 0.413 0.576 2,984 
Dependency ratio - aged 0.065 0.228 2,984 
Fraction of employed HH members 0.472 0.405 2,984 
Received Housing Subsidy (RDP)* 0.142 0.364 2,180 
Receives Government Grant 0.405 0.491 2,984 
HH monthly expenditure (nominal Rands) 6,492 12,277 2,984 
HH engages in non-commercial agriculture 0.041 0.198 2,029 
 
II. Residential Characteristics (Households)    
Refuse Collection 0.879 0.327 2,454 
Access to Electricity  0.875 0.331 2,430 
Informal Dwelling (large definition) 0.278 0.448 2,566 
Not Common to have thefts in neighbourhood 0.494 0.500 2,434 
Amount Spent on Transport in last 30 days (% of total) 0.070 0.102 1,180 
Time taken to nearest bus by foot (wave 1) 13.331 17.960 602 
Time taken to nearest mini taxi by foot (wave 1) 10.159 8.564 602 
Average Distance to CBD (km) 26.347 16.237 1,793 
Average Distance to CBD (min. by mode of transport) 117.943 63.586 1,793 
Average Distance to Main Employment Nodes(km) 27.286 15.713 1,793 
Pays Rent    0.340 0.474 1,986 
Has a Home Loan 0.104 0.306 2,245 
        
Notes: Descriptive statistics for final subsample of RDP eligible households in urban areas for which the 
assignment and treatment variables are not empty.  The proportion of children and senior members is 
calculated as their share over the household size.  RDP excludes wave 1. Government grants include all 
kind of grants from disability to child support. Electricity refers to access to electricity in the dwelling. 
Refuse collection refers to having weekly removal by local authorities. I use the large definition of 
informal dwelling that includes backyard-living. Average distance to CBD in minutes is calculated 
proxying the mode of transport by the preferred mode used in the area by race and income level 
according to the National Travel Survey 2013.  All distance variables are only available for period 1-3. 
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Table 1.3. Summary Statistics - Main Outcomes (Baseline) 
    Mean Std. Dev. N 
I. Household Labour Supply       
Number of employed HH members 0.815 0.776 723 
Fraction of employed over wam 0.410 0.381 723 
Fraction of female employed 0.465 0.601 723 
Fraction of male employed 0.493 0.566 723 
Weekly labour hours (per household) 30.311 34.310 723 
Weekly labour hours per working age member 25.724 15.571 723 
Weekly labour hours for female members 13.541 22.924 723 
Weekly labour hours for male members 16.770 25.396 723 
Adult Labour Supply (index) 0.098 1.000 692 
Number of unemployed 0.472 0.776 723 
Fraction of unemployed over wam 0.179 0.287 723 
Number of unemployed (strict) 0.316 0.643 723 
Fraction of unemployed over wam (strict) 0.117 0.224 723 
II. Other Outcomes       
Adult Labour Supply Cost (index) -0.082 1.000 692 
Average distance to CBD (km) 26.823 16.897 723 
Average distance to CBD (min) 116.370 64.580 723 
Average distance to Employment Nodes (km) 27.809 16.389 723 
Amount spent on transport last 30 days  0.108 0.136 366 
Street Light    0.714 0.452 723 
Refuse Collection 0.777 0.417 723 
Not Common to have thefts in neighbourhood 0.570 0.495 723 
Access to Electricity    0.847 0.361 723 
# of children   0.962 1.327 723 
# of adults > 68 years old 0.118 0.366 723 
HH has children younger than 10 years old 0.399 0.49 723 
HH engages in non-commercial agriculture 0.070 0.256 723 
HH receives rental income 0.072 0.258 723 
HH receives government grant  0.355 0.479 723 
HH head prefers to stay at current location 0.666 0.472 723 
Happier than 10 years ago  0.442 0.497 723 
Notes: This is the final subsample of RDP eligible households in urban areas in period 1. Employed 
correspond to the large definition that considers any type of paid work outside of the home. It includes 
informal work. Unemployed strict excludes discouraged individuals, and only includes those actively looking 
for a job. Wam stands for working age members, as those between 15 and 68 years old. The Adult labour 
supply index and Labour Supply Cost index are as define in table A.3 in Appendix I. Average distances to 
CBD and main employment nodes are calculated as Euclidean distances. Average distance to CBD in 
minutes is estimated by proxying the time taken by the preferred mode of transport in the commuting zone 
of the household residence, conditional on income and ethnic group. Amount spent on transport is 
calculated as a share of total monthly expenditures. These have been extracted from the National Travel 
Survey 2013. Variables of neighbourhood amenities and government grant are as defined in table 2. 
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Table 1.4. Balance of Households Characteristics  
in the preceding years of RDP allocation 
 
Global Polynomials 
Local Polynomials 
 
Linear Quadratic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Each Baseline Characteristics Separately 
  
  
 Age of head  -0.21 -0.81 -1.60 0.15 
 
(0.72) (0.76) (1.14) (1.03) 
Head Not White -0.02 0.084 -0.059 -0.079 
 
(0.03) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10) 
Head years of Education -1.48 1.37 1.97 5.81 
 
(1.07) (3.40) (3.78) (5.15) 
Female head 0.25 -0.31 -0.11 -0.47 
 
(0.23) (0.36) (0.42) (0.54) 
Informal dwelling 0.42* 1.00** 0.23 -0.13 
 
(0.23) (0.44) (0.39) (0.45) 
Female members (total) -0.33 -0.60 -1.01** -1.58 
 
(0.33) (0.43) (0.59) (1.08) 
Amount spent on transport (monthly) 0.11 0.45 0.25 0.06 
 
(0.09) (0.34) (0.80) (0.21) 
Number of Adults>68 years -0.31 -0.09 -0.07 -0.31 
 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.30) (0.42) 
Number of children living at home -0.45* -0.60* -0.43 -0.67 
 
(0.25) (0.35) (0.46) (0.59) 
Household Pays Rent -0.49 -0.56 0.01 -0.73 
  (0.31) (0.44) (0.54) (0.65) 
Time &City fixed-effects Y Y Y Y 
First Stage F-Statistic 28.84 14.84 9.66 9.95 
Bandwidth         
IK (2012)     √   
CCT (2014)       √ 
Obs. 1,946 1,946 1,040 498 
Notes: This table contains parametric and nonparametric regression discontinuity estimates to assess the 
difference of baseline characteristics of RDP eligible households. Panel A evaluates separately each 
characteristic. Informal dwelling includes backyard dwellings. The monthly amount spent on transport is a 
share of monthly income. All outcomes are lagged characteristics. Robust standard errors clustered at 
household level in parenthesis. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 1.5. First Stage 
HH Level dependent variable is RDP 
 
Global RD Local RD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HH income≤3500 in t-1, [Below]  0.1662*** 0.1654*** 0.1658*** 0.2141*** 
(0.0425) (0.0301) (0.0539) (0.0662) 
First Stage F-Statistic 15.86 30.26 9.46 10.46 
Polynomial Order 2 1 1 1 
Time & City fixed-effects Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,960 1,960 1,041 489 
Notes: The table reports the estimated discontinuity (2SLS) first stage. The dependent variable is a 
dummy for allocation of RDP to the household. Below is an indicator equal to one if the household 
nominal income is below the threshold in t-1. The regression also includes in columns 1 and 2, the 
interaction of below and the assignment variable. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in 
parentheses. Controls include age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, 
as well as the proportion of adults>68 & children <14.  *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 1.6. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Main Labour Market Outcomes (1) 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Labour Supply Index  Main Outcomes 
 
Composite 
Index 
Employed 
per wam 
Weekly 
hours per 
wam 
Weekly 
Total Hours 
Weekly 
Hours  
Female 
Weekly 
Hours  Male 
Employed 
Members 
Employed  
Females 
 Employed 
Males 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
RDP -0.94* -1.09 -0.76* -33.35* -26.97** -6.04 -0.96** -0.76 -0.21 
  
(0.5255) (0.7534) (0.4475) (19.2935) (13.3795) (15.0422) (0.4353) (0.4942) (0.3390) 
First Stage F-Statistic 15.86 15.86 15.86 15.86 15.86 15.86 15.86 10.91 12.42 
Polynomial Order 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Time & City fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,728 1,819 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimated coefficients of the effect of RDP subsidies on labour market outcomes of beneficiary households. Dependent variables are measures of the 
labor supply of households. Columns (1) to (3) contain the labour supply index and its two components, measured as z-scores. All intensive measures are weekly total hours by 
household members, and extensive margins are the number of employed members. Wam stands per working-age members. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy equal 1 for being 
below the assignment threshold.  All regressions control for a quadratic polynomial of the assignment variable and its interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at household 
level in parentheses. All regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as well as the proportion of adults>68 years old & 
children <14 years old. Columns (4) and (5) control for the number of working age members in the household, while columns (6) to (9) control for the number of female and male 
working age members in the households, separately. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 1.7. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Main Labour Market Outcomes (2) 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Unemployed 
Members 
Unemployed 
Members 
Unemploye
d per wam 
Unemployed  
- strict 
Unemploye
d - strict 
Unemployed 
per wam- 
strict 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RDP 0.67 0.49 0.26* -0.53 -0.41 -0.08 
  (0.3744) (0.4001) (0.1358) (0.3904) (0.4346) (0.1589) 
First Stage F-Statistic 15.86 15.32 15.86 15.86 15.32 15.86 
Polynomial Order 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Time & City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,960 1,501 1,960 1,960 1,501 1,960 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimated coefficients of the effect of RDP subsidies on labour market outcomes 
of beneficiary households. Dependent variables are measures unemployment. Columns (1-3) include 
discouraged members, while the reminder is only strict unemployment defined as those actively looking for a 
job. Wam stands per working-age members. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy equal 1 for being below 
the assignment threshold. All regressions control for a quadratic polynomial of the assignment variable and its 
interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All regressions control 
for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as well as the proportion of 
adults>68 years old & children <14 years old. In columns (1) and (3) I control for the number of working age 
members in the household. Results in columns (2) and (5) I control for female working age members. *p<0.10; 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 1.8. Discontinuity Effect of RDP  
on Household Commuting Distances & Time 
  Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Composite 
Index 
Distance 
(km) to 
CBD 
Distance 
(km) to 
main nodes 
Distance 
(min) to 
CBD 
Amount 
spent on 
transport 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RDP 0.53* 13.41*** 12.19*** 34.72 0.041 
  (0.272) (4.417) (4.285) (22.972) (0.476) 
First Stage F-Statistic 12.43 12.43 12.43 12.43 12.84 
Polynomial Order 2 2 2 2 2 
Time & City fixed 
effects 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 2,741 2,741 2,741 2,741 736 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimated coefficients of the effect of RDP subsidies on elements related to 
the labour supply cost of households. Dependent variables are measures of the labour supply cost of 
households, with in column (1) the labour supply cost index. Columns (2-4) are the components of the 
index, and column (5) contains the monthly amount spent on transport as a share of monthly 
expenditures. Very few households have answered this question, limiting the sample size. Distance to 
CBD and main nodes are Euclidean distances to CBD (and the secondary node) from the suburb's 
centroid of the household residence. Distances measured in time of commute are calculated using the 
time of the most frequently used mode in the commuting area of residence, conditional on income and 
population group. Column (1) is an average of the normalized values of columns (2) and (4). Here I 
display the non-normalized value to provide the explicit km and minutes. The first stage instrument Z is 
a dummy equal 1 for being below the assignment threshold.  All regressions control for a quadratic 
polynomial of the assignment variable and its interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at 
household level in parentheses. Due to limitations to access secure address identifiers, these regressions 
are run on a different sample - i.e., for periods 1-3 only. They control only for household size.  *p<0.10; 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 1.9. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Wellbeing (1):  
Neighbourhood Quality 
  Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Composite 
Index 
Composite 
Index 
Robberies 
uncommon 
Street Light 
Refuse 
collection  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RDP -0.32 -0.16 -0.50 -0.25 0.19 
  (0.3932) (0.3517) (0.5864) (0.5858) (0.5344) 
First Stage F-Statistic 12.72 14.38 14.38 14.38 14.38 
Polynomial Order 2 2 2 2 2 
Time & City fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,947 1,947 1,947 1,947 1,947 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimated coefficients of the effect of RDP subsidies on measures of urban 
wellbeing. Dependent variables include the neighbourhood quality index and its components in columns 
(3 to 5). All variables are measured as z-scores. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy equal 1 for being 
below the assignment threshold.  All regressions control for a quadratic polynomial of the assignment 
variable and its interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All 
regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as 
well as the proportion of adults>68 years old & children <14 years old. Columns 2-5 also include a 
dummy variable for living in informal dwelling in the previous period. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 1.10. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Wellbeing (2): Housing Amenities 
  Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Composite 
Index 
Composite 
Index 
# of 
rooms  
Dwelling 
Quality 
HH has 
electricity 
Toilet 
inside  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RDP -1.06** -0.68* -0.85* -1.21* -0.31 -0.32 
  (0.5140) (0.3816) (0.5181) (0.6314) (0.6396) (0.5324) 
First Stage F-Statistic 14.74 15.86 15.86 15.86 15.86 15.86 
Polynomial Order 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Time & City fixed 
effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimated coefficients of the effect of RDP subsidies on measures of urban 
wellbeing. Dependent variables include a housing amenities index and its components in columns (3) to 
(6). All variables are measured as z-scores. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy equal 1 for being below 
the assignment threshold.  All regressions control for a quadratic polynomial of the assignment variable 
and its interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All 
regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as 
well as the proportion of adults>68 years old & children <14 years old. Columns 2-6 also include a dummy 
variable for living in informal dwelling in the previous period. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 1.11. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Household Shifts Strategies (1): Compositional Changes 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Dependency 
Ratio Children 
Dependency 
Ratio Aged 
# Children 
living at 
home 
Young 
Children 
# of >68 
years old 
Age of Head 
Age of 
children 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
RDP 0.19 -0.07 0.21 -0.20 -0.10* 0.08 2.63 
  
(0.2879) (0.0969) (0.2728) (0.2757) (0.0535) (0.6256) (3.2253) 
First Stage F-Statistic 13.09 13.09 14.44 14.44 14.44 14.44 14.44 
Polynomial Order 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Time & City fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,914 1,914 1,949 1,949 1,949 1,949 1,949 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimated coefficients of the effect of RDP subsidies on household shifts strategies. Dependent variables are 
measure different measures of household composition. Columns (1) and (2) are dependency ratios calculated as the share of aged <14 & >68 
over the working age members. Young children is a dummy variable for household with children below the age of 10. Columns (6) and (7) are the 
average age of children and the age of the household head, respectively. All regressions control for a quadratic polynomial of the assignment 
variable and its interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All regressions control for the age, 
population group, education level and gender of the household head. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 60 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.12. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Household Shifts Strategies (2):   
Coping Mechanisms & Preferences 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Coping Mechanisms Preferences 
 
HH Receives 
Rental Income 
Government 
Grant 
Non-commercial 
Agriculture 
Happier than 
10 years ago 
HH  
prefers to 
stay 
HH  prefers 
to stay 
(age<30) 
HH  prefers 
to stay  
(age>30) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
RDP 0.54* -0.09 0.11 -0.82* -0.82* -0.67* -0.18 
  
(0.2966) (0.2743) (0.1205) (0.4329) (0.4618) (0.3990) (0.3571) 
First Stage F-Statistic 15.86 14.44 14.20 11.56 9.86 9.86 9.86 
Polynomial Order 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Time & City fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,960 1,949 1,909 1,824 1,612 1,612 1,612 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimated coefficients of the effect of RDP subsidies on household shifts strategies. Dependent variables are different measures of 
household related to possible coping strategies and preferences.  Government Grand in column (2) is a dummy variable for receiving any type of government 
grant, including disability grants. Non-commercial agriculture is a dummy variable equal to one if households participated in agricultural activities without 
monetary compensation. While the remainder variables are dummy variables for expressing happiness with respect to 10 years ago, and preference to stay in the 
current place, by age of the household head. Column (5) is the average of columns (6) and (7). All regressions control for a quadratic polynomial of the 
assignment variable and its interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All regressions control for the age, population 
group, education level and gender of the household head, as well as the proportion of adults>68 years old & children <14 years old. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01 
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Chapter 2 
 
Is there one Ghetto University? 
Neighbourhoods & Opportunities in a 
Developing City1. 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Neighbourhoods where children grow up can play a significant part in shaping their 
opportunities later in life (Glaeser & Cutler 1997; Oreopoulos 2003; Chetty et al. 2015). 
Growing up in deprived or ‘bad’ neighbourhoods, i.e. areas with high levels of 
unemployment, poverty, criminality, and low-quality local public goods, can be 
detrimental in adulthood (Case & Katz 1991; Crane 1991). How they affect 
socioeconomic mobility is central to understanding the persistence of inequality over 
time (across generations) and space (poverty traps). This question is particularly relevant 
in developing countries, where cities display high levels of income inequalities, 
emphasized by stark spatial differences in the access to public services, formal housing, 
formal jobs, and consumption amenities. There is extremely little empirical evidence of 
neighbourhood effects in this context. This paper addresses this gap, by using the quasi-
natural social experiment of apartheid in South Africa to measure the effects of growing 
up in disadvantaged neighbourhoods or ghettos2. It also provides suggestive evidence 
on the main channels through which some neighbourhoods may be better than others 
for the life trajectories of children.  
                                                          
1 I am thankful for discussions with Thomas Piketty, Yanos Zylberberg, Pascal Jaupart, Ana Moreno-
Monroy, Felipe Carozzi, and Nicola Branson, as well as participants at LSE seminars. I also thank 
Timothy Brophy and Daniel de Kadt for assistance with geo-located census data, and the Municipality of 
Cape Town for granting me access to their library and data on apartheid in the city.     
2 I understand ghettos here as disadvantaged residential urban areas that are enclaves of high poverty and 
have a high concentration of ethnic minority (Zenou 2009b). In the case of South Africa, paradoxically, 
black/Africans are the majority of the South African population (80.8% in 2016, according to mid-year 
population estimates by Statistics South Africa (SSA)). In Cape Town, they are the second ethnic group 
after coloured (42%), at (38%) in the census 2011. They are nonetheless the most disadvantaged ethnic 
group in terms of socioeconomic outcomes.  
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Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot real earning trajectories and completed years of formal 
education of young adults in the analysis sample by age, sorted by the former apartheid 
designation of their neighbourhood of residence. Both outcomes differ significantly 
across areas: at 30, residents of former black and coloured-only areas earn well-below 
residents of former white-only neighbourhoods. They also complete fewer years of 
formal education. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 repeat the exercise across black ghettos only. To a 
lesser extent, the trajectories also differ by neighbourhood. In this paper, I focus on the 
latter and ask whether observable differences in ghetto characteristics can explain 
divergent life trajectories for children growing up in these areas (i.e. specific ghetto or 
neighbourhood effects).  
The geographic variation in social mobility and the persistence of pockets of high-
poverty within cities could be driven by two very different sources. The first, is that 
neighbourhoods have causal effects on economic and social trajectories of residents. 
That is, someone growing up in a completely different area would have a very different 
life outcome. Location-specific social determinants can include the quality of schools, 
social networks and peer-effects (Durlauf 2004). Another possibility is that the observed 
differences in neighbourhoods are due to residential sorting, i.e. differences in the types 
of people living in each area. In this case, ‘bad’ neighbourhoods may just reflect the 
spurious correlation induced by the likelihood that the same factors that lead to a given 
location choice also lead to certain socioeconomic outcomes. Disentangling these two 
dynamics has been one of the main difficulties of this literature. 
To address this fundamental problem, the analysis uses the quasi-exogenous 
allocation of households to ethnic specific residential areas during apartheid in South 
Africa. Following the Group Areas Act (1950), ethnic groups3 were allocated to specific 
urban spaces separated by buffer-zones to create physical barriers between them. City 
centres and inner suburbs were zoned for the dominant white group. Apartheid 
considerably limited the mobility of non-whites through aggressively enforced 
legislation and spatial planning. Here I focus on compliers in black ghettos only; that is 
black children in families living in black-only residential areas (townships) by 1991 
(when residential segregation was formally lifted)4. I provide strong evidence that for 
this group of young adults, residential decisions were exogenous and sorting is very 
limited. The dataset is compiled from different sources, including various census 
                                                          
3 The main ethnic groups were the white, black, Indian and coloured populations. In the Group Areas 
Act, the latter corresponded to those ‘neither white nor black’. In practice, coloured are mixed-race 
individuals with European, black and Asian ancestry. Indians comprised most Asian populations.  
4 Apartheid officially ends with the advent of democracy in 1994.  
 64 
 
 
 
64 
datasets and historical archives. The main observations come from a panel of young 
adults aged 14 to 22 at baseline and residing in the city of Cape Town. It covers 5 
periods of the child’s life between 2002 to 2009. I mostly look at labour, education and 
behavioural outcomes computed across the span of the panel. This is intended to give 
an overview of life trajectories by the time children are between 21 and 30 years old. 
Children, parental and household characteristics are generally balanced across ghettos at 
baseline. The metropolitan area of Cape Town is the second largest city in South Africa. 
It was one of the least segregated cities in the early 20th century but became the most 
segregated by 1991, with only 5.7% of residents living outside their designated area (8% 
national average) (Christopher 2001). It thus offers a particularly interesting setting to 
measure neighbourhood effects in the absence of residential sorting for the subset of 
compliers.  
I find evidence of heterogeneous neighbourhood effects across ghettos. That is, not 
all ‘bad’ neighbourhoods have the same impact on outcomes in adulthood. Most 
differences concern labour and educational outcomes. Residents in ghettos that are 
closer to the Central Business District (CBD) and relatedly also closer to former white-
only neighbourhoods, benefit from a better access to jobs and public amenities 
(including better schools). Children that grew up here achieve on average 30% higher 
real earnings in adulthood, are 15 percentage points (pp) more likely to work and 15 pp 
less likely to be idle. They also do better in school, completing on average 0.8 more 
years of education and being 11 pp more likely to attend college. These children are also 
more likely to work in semi-skill jobs compared to other ghettos, where low-skill work 
is dominant. 
These average differences mask some gender disparities. Differences across ghettos 
tend to be more prevalent for young women. One possible explanation is the strong 
gender-segmentation of labour markets (Magruder 2010). Under such conditions, 
discrimination and red-lining may be stronger and similar for males across ghettos. 
Negative peer effects and gang affiliations may also deter young boys earlier from 
pursuing education (Freeman 1999), later penalized in job markets. While evidence is 
limited, this hypothesis underlines the importance of better understanding behavioural 
and social norms and institutions in explaining neighbourhood effects.  
When I examine the main neighbourhood characteristics associated with better 
outcomes in adulthood, I confirm that proximity is positively correlated with both better 
labour and educational outcomes. Access to better schools plays a significant part. 
Children attending former black-only schools are associated with on average 16% lower 
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earnings in adulthood. Longer distance to former white or coloured-only schools is 
correlated with higher delays in graduating their grade. Further, ethnic networks also 
seem to be important. A one percent increase in the black population of the 
neighbourhood is associated with a lower probability of being unemployed (6 pp) and 
fewer months spent searching for jobs (approx. 3.5 fewer on average). Results suggest 
that the positive effect of location is conditional on the human capital composition of 
the neighbourhood.  
Several theories attempt to explain how neighbourhoods influence the life 
trajectories of children. Recent work by Chetty et al. (2014) and Chetty & Hendren 
(2016) have put forward the causal effect of place for intergenerational upward mobility 
and the life opportunities of children, with evidence across U.S cities. They have also 
underlined the fact that the time of exposure to a neighbourhood matters. While other 
empirical work is more mixed (Katz et al. 2001; Oreopoulos 2003; Ludwig e al. 2013; 
Gibbons et al. 2013), the question is important because of its relationship with the 
persistence of inequality in certain areas within cities (Piketty 2000; Durlauf 2004). Poor 
neighbourhoods can become spatial poverty traps (Kilroy 2007; Marx et al. 2013). This 
issue is even more relevant in developing countries where cities display high levels of 
income segregation and housing informality. Further, understanding the reach of local 
determinants of social upward mobility has important implications for policy (i.e. 
investment in local schools, place-based policies, mobility policies). 
A related literature has examined the question of racial segregation and how it 
affects adults and children outcomes across cities. Racial segregation shapes the 
socioeconomic make-up of local communities. Prior research has typically proposed 
two set of explanations that could account for how racial context may affect someone’s 
socioeconomic outcomes (Cutler & Glaeser 1997). The first mechanism relates to the 
neighbourhood effects literature. The costs of racial segregation being the same as those 
put forward for growing up in ‘bad’ neighbourhoods. The second however puts forward 
the benefits of ethnic density in creating group-specific networks that benefit from an 
income-mix (Cutler et al. 2008). Again, empirical evidence is mixed (Cutler & Glaeser 
1997; Edin et al. 2003; Cutler et al. 2008; Ananat 2011; Bayer et al. 2014; Shertzer & 
Randall 2016), but some papers find that segregation impacts youths the most. Since 
Kain (1968) an empirical literature has also explored the question of segregation and 
access to jobs, putting forward the hypothesis that worse labour market outcomes in 
deprived neighbourhoods are driven by the lack of accessibility to jobs, related to the 
spatial mismatch between poor residential areas and job locations (Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist 
1998; Gobillon et al. 2007; Zenou 2009). 
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All these bodies of research matter for this work. Deprived neighbourhoods 
analysed here are not only disadvantaged residential urban areas with higher poverty 
incidence, a lower quality of public amenities, schools, and higher crime and 
unemployment. They are also ethnic enclaves – paradoxically not of minorities, but still 
of the most socioeconomically disadvantaged ethnic group in the country. The 
influence of apartheid spatial planning on Cape Town’s urban form and the low 
provision of public transport reinforces the separation of jobs from the residential areas 
of the poorest dwellers. The hypotheses put forward in this paper relate to the spatial 
mismatch literature but go further in suggesting proximity also matters in terms of 
access to public amenities (particularly, higher quality schools). Poor households in 
developing country cities are more vulnerable to distances. The under-provision of 
infrastructure and public transport, the sprawling nature of the largest agglomerations, 
housing and labour informality, increase frictions related to space. Social networks, as 
imperfectly measured here, also seem to be an important factor. These two factors are 
likely to be related. In cities where distance matters, social networks play an important 
role, not only for jobs but also for enforcing norms and security. 
Evidence of neighbourhood effects for developing countries remains largely 
qualitative and descriptive. This paper is to the best of my knowledge, the first to 
provide empirical evidence on the question of neighbourhood effects and the 
persistence of spatial inequality in this context. Identification benefits from the quasi-
exogenous allocation of households across black townships during Apartheid. The main 
caveat remains the small number of ghettos, which limits the reach of the conclusions. 
While I cannot be definitive about what makes a ghetto better in the setting here, results 
provide compelling evidence on the importance of childhood neighbourhoods on 
outcomes later in life in a large city of a developing country. They contribute to the 
growing literature in development economics looking at the issues affecting poor urban 
dwellers. Understanding the local determinants of social mobility in emerging cities will 
be key to inform policy in the years ahead. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the South 
African context and discusses the policy used for identification. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 
present the data and the empirical strategy, respectively. The main results are discussed 
in Section 2.5, while Section 2.6 looks at the channels. Section 2.7 concludes. 
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2.2 South Africa’s Apartheid Heritage 
The context for this paper is South Africa (RSA), and specifically the Cape Town 
metropolitan area. Both the country and the city have been severely marked by the 
policy of racial segregation put in place during most of the 20th century. RSA remains 
one of the most unequal countries in the world5. Cape Town had a Gini coefficient of 
0.67 in 2011, higher than that of the most unequal U.S. cities. Income inequality has a 
racial dimension: the annual average income of black South Africans was half the 
national average in 2011, while it was more than three times higher for whites (census 
2011)6. The persistence of inequalities across social and ethnic groups is also mirrored in 
space (Turok et al. 2017). The make-up of cities often reflects the heritage of apartheid’s 
spatial planning. Urban areas have remained profoundly divided along income and racial 
lines (Pieterse 2009). This paper directly contributes to the understanding of the spatial 
persistence of inequality and the long-term effect of place on opportunities later in life. 
With this aim in mind, I discuss relevant institutional aspects next. 
The formal enactment of apartheid took place in 19487. All South Africans were 
officially classified according to skin colour, history, and language by the 1950 
Population Registration Act. In the same year, the Group Areas Act (GAA) established 
spatial segregation by race. The apartheid system was put in place with the objective of 
reducing to a minimum the interactions between whites and other ethnic groups, 
particularly blacks (Turok 2012). There were three spatial levels of segregation during 
apartheid. First, the Grand Apartheid recognised ten homelands or Bantustan, where all 
Africans were supposed to live. These were considered independent8, but were not 
recognized outside of South Africa. The second was urban apartheid: race-based 
residential segregation that allocated population groups into specific urban spaces 
separated by buffer-zones to create physical barriers between the different racial groups 
(Figures 2.5 & 2.6; Figure B1 & B2). City centres and inner suburbs were zoned for the 
dominant white group. The different black townships were created as need arose for 
                                                          
5 See discussion in Piketty 2015 Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture. 
6 This is despite the large-scale expansion of social policies, including welfare grants, access to education, 
health facilities and basic services (Armstrong and Burger 2009). 
7 While the elections in 1948 marked the official start of apartheid, segregation had started in the late 19 th 
century. The Natives Land Act of 1913 and the Natives Urban Act of 1923 were the first pieces of the 
legislation; the first one restricted the ownership of land to whites while the second ordered the removal 
of African from city centres to ‘outside locations’ (i.e. townships). A system of permits was then put in 
place. 
8 The Bantu Authorities Act (1951) created separate government structures for black and white citizens. 
Bantustan were consolidated native reserves in rural areas. Several acts later devolved administrative 
powers to the areas and removed the South African citizenship to residents. These areas suffered from 
severe underinvestment and widespread poverty that fuelled rural migration (Turok 2012). 
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cheap labour. Langa was the first black township in Cape Town formally created in 
19219, followed by Nyanga (1945), Gugulethu (1958), Khayelitsha (1983) and lastly, 
Mfuleni in 1990. Last, was the separation to access public and private amenities (i.e. 
buses, shops, entrances, etc.)10. The latter included schools. School systems were 
completely separated in infrastructure and curricula by ethnicity, with each ethnic group 
represented by its own education department. White schools, and to a minor extent also 
coloured schools, had significantly more resources than black schools (Case & Deaton 
1999; Kallaway 2002).  
Identification of neighbourhood effects in this paper relies on the compliance of 
ethnic groups to reside within their designated areas. Compliance needs to be virtually 
perfect and residential choices must be severely constrained to be able to rule out 
residential sorting and with it, the spurious correlation induced by the likelihood that 
location choices also lead to certain socioeconomic outcomes (see discussion section 
2.4.2). Several aspects of the legislations and policies during apartheid suggests this is 
virtually true. Lack of mobility was consciously built into the system. Until the 1980s, 
legislation enabled the resettlement, expropriation and forced removal of individuals to 
their designated urban area and rural homelands. Only blacks with formal jobs could 
officially reside within cities and towns, mostly as temporary migrants, and in clearly 
designated townships. Slum clearance, the prevention of land invasions, and widespread 
evictions were used to brutally resettle populations to their ethnically-designated 
townships (Turok 2012). Figure 2.7 supports an almost total compliance with this policy 
for black South Africans in Cape Town. Using 1985 census microdata, I plot the 
percentage of a neighbourhood’s ethnic group (black in the upper-left quadrant) against 
the distance in km to former black townships. There seems to be virtually full 
compliance with the GAA. Coloured and Indian communities were less aggressively 
persecuted and residential compliance is much lower (Christopher 1997). Traditionally, 
these areas were more mixed with a minority of whites and blacks residing here. To 
limit selection-bias, the analysis is done using Cape Town’s former black townships 
only. The late 1980s saw a progressive abandonment of these practices and more 
flexibility was introduced. In 1991, the GAA was repealed and the end of apartheid was 
officially achieved with the advent of democracy in 1994.  
By the end of apartheid, the result was almost total segregation. Cape Town, one of 
the least segregated cities before 1923, became the most segregated one by 1994, with 
only 5.7% of residents living outside their designated area (8% national average). The 
                                                          
9 Some back track its origin to 1903 when Africans were forced to live there during the bubonic plague. 
10 Regulated by the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act. 
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great majority of those contravening zoning legislations were servants living on the 
properties of their employees or Africans living in barracks (Christopher 1997, 2001). 
After more than 20 years from the end of apartheid, urban areas remain deeply divided 
by the inherited patterns of racial segregation. Population densities within cities are 
extremely uneven. In Cape Town, the average density in 2009 was 39 persons per 
hectare, varying between 100-150 in former townships and 4-12 in former white 
suburbs. The total population of the former white southern and northern suburbs 
combined was less than either of the two largest former coloured and black-only 
townships (Sinclair-Smith & Turok 2012). Further, racial segregation remains high: 
dissimilarity indices between black and white, and coloured and white were all above 0.7 
in 2001 for both Cape Town and South Africa (Christopher 2001). Fragmented urban 
forms impose unequal access to jobs, amenities and public services. Former townships 
suffer from higher levels of unemployment, crime and worse socioeconomic conditions 
(Turok et al. 2017).  
This paper focuses on the life trajectories of young adults. 37% of the working-age 
population in South Africa is between 15-34 years old (2011). This age cohort is 
particularly affected by unemployment. On average, youth unemployment was 36% in 
2011 – ranging from 11.6% for white South Africans to close to 40% for blacks and 
33% for coloured. Cape Town displays the same levels and ranges. A series of reasons 
have been put forward to explain these differences, including inequalities in schooling 
systems, resulting skills mismatches (Turok et al. 2017) and spatial mismatch (Banerjee 
et al. 2008). Apart from these, community, household, and personal factors also drive 
youth unemployment (Graham & Mlatsheni 2016). All these factors are related to the 
effect of place on social upward mobility.  
2.3 Data 
I draw information from several datasets. This section describes the different 
sources and key variables definitions. It also provides some descriptive statistics and test 
for balance across the different neighbourhoods of analysis. 
2.3.1 Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) & sample definition 
The Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) contains information on 4,758 randomly 
selected young adults aged 14-22 at baseline (2002) and living in the Cape Town 
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metropolitan area. At baseline 46% identify as black or African11. These young adults 
were interviewed in 2002 and re-interviewed four times after that (2003-2004, 2005, 
2006 and 2009)12. The panel is a stratified random sample that was collected by the 
University of Cape Town, jointly with the University of Michigan for the first three 
waves13.  
I focus the analysis on compliers. That is, those young adults that in 2002 resided in 
previously designated black apartheid locations and identify as black or African. Further, 
I only keep in the sample those that were living in their neighbourhood of residence by 
1991, the year at which residential restrictions was formally lifted (845 young adults at 
baseline). While apartheid ended in 1994, 1991 marks the repeal of the GAA. It is 
unlikely that major shifts occurred within cities between 1991-1994, but using 1991 as 
the cutoff removes selection-bias related to the fact that after that year blacks were free 
to choose where to reside. Figure 2.8 repeats the exercise of Figure 2.7 using the final 
sample of analysis and provides visual evidence of almost perfect residential compliance 
with the GAA. Using the same dataset, I regress living in former black and coloured-
only apartheid areas on the probability of being black or coloured using the baseline 
year in the sample (Table 2.1). The positive and highly significant relationship is much 
larger for blacks; it is also larger for those living in the area by 1991, when residential 
choice was officially constrained. By restricting the analysis to this group, I can assume 
the allocation to ghettos was almost as good as random, allowing me to identify the 
effect of growing up in deprived neighbourhoods on outcomes in adulthood. The trade-
off is that the final sample is much reduced to between 782 and 2,039 young adults 
depending on outcomes and data availability.  
I look at two types of outcomes. The first ones (Table 2.2) are computed across the 
span of the panel, and intend to give an overview of the trajectory of young adults 
through labour, education, and behavioural outcomes. Monthly earnings equate to the 
                                                          
11 I use these two interchangeably in the paper as per the official statistical definition. 
12 For this successive second wave, a subset was interviewed in 2003 (1,360) with the remainder re-
interviewed in 2004.  
13 The Cape Area Panel Study Waves 1-2-3 were collected between 2002 and 2005 by the University of 
Cape Town and the University of Michigan, with funding provided by the US National Institute for Child 
Health and Human Development and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Wave 4 was collected in 2006 
by the University of Cape Town, University of Michigan and Princeton University. Major funding for 
Wave 4 was provided by the National Institute on Aging through a grant to Princeton University, in 
addition to funding provided by NICHD through the University of Michigan. Wave 5 was collected in 
2009 by the University of Cape Town. Major funding for Wave 5 was provided by the Health Economics 
& HIV/AIDS Research Division (HEARD) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, with additional funding 
from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the European Union and the NICHD. 
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last monthly real earning14 (2009) when youths are between 21 and 30 years old. 
Monthly earnings in the past 5 years are a measure of the average last observed real 
earning in 2006 and 2009. Both, months worked and months looking for work in 2009 
measure the number of months for the activity during the entire lifespan of the panel 
up until 2009; while similar measures ‘since last in school’ are calculated from the last 
period at which the young adult was enrolled in any educational institution. The three 
measures of education include total years of completed education, a dummy for ever 
having attended college, and the total number of years delayed from graduating from 
high school. To measure the latter, I use a 2-year window from the expected age of 
graduation for the last observed grade (i.e., the last grade for which the young adult was 
enrolled). Finally, behavioural outcomes relate to smoking, consuming alcohol, or drugs 
in 2009, as well as ever having reported a live birth for females.  
The second set of outcomes are the pooled cross-section of outcomes (Table 2.3). I 
follow Chetty et al. (2015) here. To avoid measuring earnings when children are still in 
school or tertiary education I only include observations in which a child is 20 or older, 
and not enrolled in school. This measure is thus relatively different from the above, for 
which I impose no schooling restriction. Here I look at labour outcomes: monthly 
earnings (constant), and dummy variables for doing any paid work (formal or informal), 
being unemployed (for more and less than 2 months), and being idle (i.e. neither 
working or in school).  
Overall, summary statistics in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that young adults in the 
sample are quite economically disadvantaged. The average real monthly earnings 
oscillate always close to 2,200 Rands, which is well below the average real monthly 
earnings for the period 1995-2005 (R2,870). The strong link with employment is 
reflected in both the low number of average months worked for the entire period (15) 
and since leaving school (2.2); and the large number of average months looking for 
work (10-12 months). Only 30% are working between 2004 and 2009, and more than 
40% are idle. Education levels are relatively high, with most children completing 11 
years of formal education. Fewer are those that pursue a tertiary education: only 3% on 
average.   
The CAPS dataset can be matched with the national registry of schools (SRN) in 
2000. Doing this gives information on the school each matched individual in the sample 
attended at baseline. Because both datasets are geo-located I can also calculate the 
                                                          
14I use the CPI index from World Development Indicators (World Bank) to compute real earnings; base 
year is 2010.  
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average characteristics of the closest schools for each neighbourhood. During the first 
wave, a standardized test of literacy and numeracy was carried out for all children in the 
sample. The test was administered in English and Afrikaans and therefore indirectly 
penalises Xhosa speakers. Nonetheless, it provides a proxy for controlling for individual 
‘aptitude’ in the absence of individual fixed effects conditional on the language spoken. 
I use the numeracy and overall tests scores as controls in the final specifications. 
A final issue for identification concerns attrition. Attrition is a problem in the panel 
due to the migratory behaviour of these young adults. There is a risk that I am 
observing the outcomes of those that do not move and thus introduce selection bias. 
While I use sampling weights that adjust for young adults’ non-response across waves15, 
I cannot completely exclude this possibility. The most common cause for attrition 
among black African for the entire period was moving within South Africa (about 30 to 
40% of the attritions by wave). Attrition is much higher for whites (44% lost by 2005) 
than for African and Coloured (20-23% in wave 4, and 25-30% in wave5). Movers that 
are successfully re-interviewed remain within the same neighbourhoods. The sign of the 
bias can go both ways:  results could be upward biased if those remaining are exerting 
less effort to find jobs or complete their education; they could be downward biased if 
those leaving, on the contrary, use migration as an exit strategy from failing to find jobs 
and completing school in Cape Town. Both mechanisms are likely here. The city 
attracts significant migration from other Southern African countries. Competition for 
low and semi-skill jobs could be higher, and young adults failing to find jobs often 
choose to migrate. At the same time, the city is a regional hub with most economic 
opportunities in the Eastern Cape concentrated here. 
2.3.2 Census data 
This paper also uses census data to obtain general characteristics of neighbourhoods 
for the available years preceding baseline, notably 1985, 1996 and 2001 census datasets. 
These censuses are identified at the Enumeration Area (EA) level16. I aggregate this data 
to the neighbourhood level (2015 definitions by the City of Cape Town) and GAA 
zoned-areas for each ethnic group, see discussion below (Table 2.4). Caution is 
warranted with respect to the 1985 census dataset, since it was carried out before the 
end of apartheid and measurement error is high for blacks (Christopher 2001). These 
                                                          
15 The results are generally unchanged when excluding sampling weights. 
16 I obtained EA identifiers for the census 1985 from Daniel de Kadt. He uses these in his paper with 
Melissa Sands, How Segregation drives voting behaviour: New theory and evidence (2015). I only use EA 
falling completely within neighbourhood boundaries and GAA areas. 
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three census years provide useful information on ghetto characteristics during the first 
10 to 15 years of life of the young adults in the sample.  
2.3.3 Apartheid locations 
Former apartheid locations in Cape Town as designed by the GAA (Figure 2.5) 
were digitized from planning maps obtained at the library of the Municipality of Cape 
Town (Figure 2.6). These historical maps provided fine detailed demarcation of black, 
coloured, Indian/Asian and white segregated areas by streets. I attribute to each of 
Cape Town’s neighbourhoods (smaller areas in Figure 2.6) their former GAA 
designation if they fall 90% within the area. Overall, 49 neighbourhoods fall within 
former black-only areas. I exclude townships for which I unfortunately do not have 
enough observations of young adults (N<30)17. There are four former black townships 
in the final sample (Langa, Nyanga, Gugulethu and Khayelitsha) composed of 19 
neighbourhoods. It follows that the neighbourhoods of residence of the young adults in 
the CAPS sample are split into these former apartheid locations. These disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods are the four ghettos18 or ‘treatment arms’.  
Table 2.4 provides summary statistics for each of them in 1985, 1996 and 2001. On 
average, all the areas are predominantly populated by black Africans (>98%) across the 
period. There is some heterogeneity in terms of the proportion of working age 
individuals and the proportion of adults born in Bantustan Republics in 1985. These 
reflect the larger share of single male migrant workers in locations that were specifically 
conceived as dormitories (i.e. Langa and Nyanga). The specificity dissipates 
progressively in 1996 and 2001, when areas are balanced in terms of age, gender and 
ethnic origin. Differences remain nonetheless (see discussion below). Further, they all 
vary in area and population sizes, partly reflecting the different periods at which they 
were formally designated.  
Table 2.5 complements the summary statistics from the census datasets with 
descriptive characteristics obtained from CAPS and alternative sources. There are large 
differences in terms of distance to the CBD19 and access to formal jobs20. Table 2.6 tests 
                                                          
17 This only applies to Mfuleni. This area was also the last black-only township to be created in 1990. 
18 As previously defined, I understand ghettos here as disadvantaged residential urban areas that are 
enclaves of high poverty and have a high concentration of ethnic minority (Zenou 2009b). In the case of 
South Africa, the paradox is that Africans are the most the South African population (80.8% in 2016, 
according to mid-year population estimates by Statistics South Africa (SSA)). In Cape Town, they are the 
second ethnic group after Coloured (42%), at (38%) in the census 2011. They are nonetheless the most 
disadvantaged ethnic group in terms of socioeconomic outcomes.  
19 Distance to CBD is measured as the Euclidean distance in Km from the centroid of the young adults’ 
neighbourhood of residence and Cape Town’s CBD. 
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for balance of these characteristics across former GAA locations. All tested variables are 
statistically significant except for attending a school previously under the Black 
Department of Education (or DET). Largely, it is to be expected that children in the 
sample predominantly attend these schools located in former black-only locations (see 
discussion in section 2.6). Langa is a clear outlier here with a larger proportion of young 
adults attending former coloured or white only schools.  
Overall, the following patterns emerge in terms of township specificities concerning 
neighbourhood characteristics (Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6). Langa and Gugulethu are both 
closer to the CBD (10.5 km and 15.2 km vs 20 km on average, respectively) and to 
former coloured townships. Relatedly, they both display better accessibility to jobs and 
to former white or coloured only schools. On the opposite side, Khayelitsha - by far the 
largest black township in the city-, is located 25 km from the CBD. This reflects the fact 
that it was one of the last townships to be established in what was then vacant land at 
the periphery of the city. Access to jobs across periods is consequently the lowest. 
Former coloured or white only schools are the least accessible for Nyanga residents. But 
differences are small. In terms of the level of education in the census dataset, Gugulethu 
and Nyanga have the most adults with no formal education (13-14% in 2001), with 
Khayelitsha and Langa in the opposite of the spectrum (7-8%). Nyanga stands out in 
terms of insecurity. It displays the highest murder rates in 2007 (13.8%); it also registers 
the highest number of serious crimes and assaults committed in school premises in 
1999. This reflects the fact that it is considered one of the most dangerous places in 
South Africa (and the world) with high levels of gang criminality. Housing informality is 
above 60% for all but Gugulethu where only half the residents report living in shacks.  
To summarize these in a comparable way, I create an index of ‘ghetto quality’ 
(Tables 2.7 & B1 in Appendix B21). There is a limited use for this index in the analysis 
here, but it gives the reader an idea of rank between the different areas considered using 
census data characteristics. The index is the simple average of the z-scores of the 
characteristics in the table. They encompass measures for housing amenities, location, 
education, and poverty levels. Overall, Gugulethu ranks first and Langa second. Both 
driven by different dynamics: the first one because of better amenities (i.e. access to 
electricity and water) and housing conditions; the second one because of higher levels 
                                                                                                                                                                    
20 Accessibility to jobs is measured by the number of jobs in all neighbourhoods in Cape Town weighted 
by the inverse of their distance from the centroid of the neighbourhood of residence in km. Definition 1 
uses the percentage of formal firms’ turnover as a proxy for jobs. Definition 2 uses the number of 
employed in formal firms as a proxy for jobs. Data for 2001 and 2005 was obtained from Sinclair-Smith 
& Turok (2012). Data for 2009 was obtained from the Geospatial Analysis Platform (GAP) of the South 
African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).  
21 All tables numbered B# are in Appendix B. 
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of human capital, lower murder rates and accessibility to schools and the CBD. At the 
bottom are Nyanga and Khayelitsha. The first one ranking lower in all categories but 
centrality; in return, while still ranking at the bottom, Khayelitsha ranks first for access 
to housing amenities, and second after Langa for human capital.  
The heterogeneity in terms of observable characteristics is key for the identification 
of neighbourhood effects: not all of the deprived neighbourhoods considered here are 
equal, largely as a result of historical paths, and I consider each ghetto as a different 
‘treatment arm’. Whether these differences are enough for children growing up in these 
areas to have different life trajectories is not straightforward. Certain areas may be 
better for social upward mobility and opportunities later in life than others (Figures 2.3 
& 2.4), but overall children growing up in ‘worse’ environments may still be all similarly 
negatively affected through discrimination, red-lining, and lower social conditions 
(Figures 2.1 & 2.2). Understanding how these differences matter permits to better 
appreciate the mechanisms behind the spatial persistence of poverty. 
Finally, Tables 2.8 and 2.9 report balance tests for selected baseline characteristics of 
children, parents, and households across areas. The idea here is to test for the absence 
of residential sorting in the sample, despite GAA locations differing on observables 
characteristics due to their history. Given that the sample of young adults was randomly 
selected to be representative at the city level, we can expect balance at baseline across 
ghettos if the randomization was successful and residents could not choose their 
location at the time of moving (prior to 1991). This should be the case under the 
apartheid setting described, and for our sample of compliers22.  
The condition is largely fulfilled. Children’s characteristics are balanced at baseline 
in all but English and Xhosa as the main languages spoken in their households. These 
differences can reflect the geographical heterogeneity within families due to migration 
behaviour from Bantustan areas to Cape Town. I control for preferred spoken language 
in all specifications. The large majority of parental and household characteristics are also 
balanced at baseline. The exception concerns the higher percentages of uneducated 
parents in some areas, the number of members in the household at baseline, and 
growing up in informal areas. Differences are relatively small. Again, I control for these 
characteristics in all specifications. The general balance in baseline characteristics for 
children, parents and households in the sample validates the identification strategy. This 
allows me to test for neighbourhood effects and ghetto heterogeneity on a random 
                                                          
22 Also, note that the age distribution of young adults in the pooled-cross section (waves 1 to 5) follows a 
normal distribution that is similar and balanced across ghettos (Figure B3). 
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sample of individuals that did not choose their place of residence. The main assumption 
is that allocation is almost as good as random across these different ghettos. This 
heterogeneity allows me to further investigates the channels through which some 
neighbourhoods may be better than others for social mobility.   
2.4 Empirical Strategy 
2.4.1 Methodology 
This paper provides reduced-form evidence of neighbourhood effects for complier 
children growing up in former black-only apartheid ghettos. In the core analysis, I 
estimate the effect using OLS regression specifications of the form: 
𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑔 =  𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑔. 𝐺ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑔
𝐺
1 + 𝑋′𝑖. 𝛾1 + 𝑊′ℎ . 𝛾2 + 𝜇𝑖ℎ𝑔    (2.1) 
where Ghetto are dummy variables equal to one for residing in one of the three ghettos 
(Khayelitsha is the excluded one)23 and  𝛽𝑔 are the coefficients of interest; 𝑋𝑖 is a vector 
of individual characteristics and 𝑊ℎ is a vector of household baseline characteristics. All 
of the regressions are weighted to adjust for differences in sampling probabilities across 
sites and over time. I cluster the standard errors by household (allowing for common 
error components across siblings) because residential designation occurred at the family 
level and the number of neighbourhoods in the sample is too small to cluster at this 
level (N<30).  
 I systematically include the following individual and household characteristics: age, 
age squared, gender, and language spoken in the household. I also include dummy 
variables for the level of education of parents, the household size at baseline and a 
dummy variable for having grown up in an informal area. These last characteristics were 
unbalanced at baseline. I also test the sensitivity of the findings to the inclusion of the 
normalized result of the numerical test, as a proxy for general individual aptitude. I 
include the latter for precision as doing so does not alter the results. 
 Equation (2.1) measures childhood neighbourhood effects on outcomes in 
adulthood, i.e. outcomes defined for the lifespan of the panel (Table 2.2). I use an 
alternative specification that includes year fixed-effects to estimate the same effect for 
outcomes across the pooled cross section of young adults for the period after baseline 
(2004-2009), (Table 2.3). The intention is to measure outcomes in adulthood controlling 
                                                          
23 Tables in section B1 of Appendix B display the result of the above specifications regressing outcomes 
on each ghetto separately (against all others). 
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for different year-specific shocks in the fashion of Chetty et al. (2015). The standard 
errors, which are clustered by original household (i.e. family), allow for common error 
components across siblings and adjust for the repeated observations of each child.   
2.4.2 Main assumptions & limitations 
The main strategy I employ for estimating how childhood neighbourhoods affect 
outcomes in adulthood relates to the assumption that children could not choose their 
neighbourhood of residence due to limited residential mobility during apartheid (Case & 
Deaton 2002). Because of this, I focus my analysis on compliers. That is, I only 
compare black children that grew up in different ‘bad’ or deprived neighbourhoods, all 
of which were designated as black-only areas during apartheid, and who were living in 
these areas by 1991. As discussed, apartheid severely constrained the residential choice 
of black South Africans, much more so than for any other ethnic group.  
Another assumption behind identification here is that families could not choose 
between ghettos. This is not entirely true. On the one hand, it depends on the time their 
first relative started living in Cape Town, as black ghettos were progressively created as 
the need for low-skill workers arose. The larger concentration of working age males in 
Langa in 1985 is an example of this. Still, removals and the forced relocations of 
trespassers and informal settlements randomly assigned people to ghettos as capacity 
allowed24. This lessens residential sorting between ghettos. Supportive of this, I find that 
parental and household characteristics at baseline are mostly balanced (Table 2.9). 
Possible sorting is further mitigated by the focus on young children who did not choose 
their neighbourhood of residence (Cutler & Glaeser 1997; Dujardin et al. 2008). This 
setting allows me to assume that designation to one of the ‘treatment arms’ was almost as 
good as random.  
Comparing children growing up in different black ghettos has the advantaged of 
answering two questions. Are there neighbourhood effects of growing up in a deprived 
neighbourhood? Second, are these effects different across ghettos (i.e. is there one 
‘ghetto university’)? What makes a deprived neighbourhood better? Comparing black 
children growing up outside of the black-only designated area would have also allowed 
me to understand if life trajectories diverge from ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ neighbourhoods. 
Unfortunately, selection-bias prevents me from looking at this question here. Parents 
sorting outside of their designated racial area could have done so to provide their 
children with better life opportunities (Noah 2016). These parents may also support 
                                                          
24 South African History Online (SAHO). Online public library documenting the history of Apartheid. 
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their children in other unobservable ways. Further, discrimination in white or coloured 
areas could also bias the results.  
A final assumption relates to the relevance and permeability of neighbourhoods. As 
underlined by Oreopoulos (2003), for interactions to matter at the neighbourhood level 
(or ghetto here), social contacts must depend significantly on where an individual 
resides, and neighbour relationships must be important enough to influence individual 
decisions. Further, many of these areas are relatively close to each other, sometimes 
bordering, and it is hard to imagine that they are fully self-contained administrative 
units. Any significant social interaction would violate the stable unit treatment value 
assumption (SUTVA). The design of apartheid mitigates the risk of large spillovers 
from other areas. Apartheid defined-ghettos were often separated by physical barriers 
and buffer zones, not only to avoid contact between ethnic groups but between them to 
limit the risk of uprisings (Figures B1 & B2). Further, apartheid reinforced township 
identities (Noah 2016). These large neighbourhoods are strongly associated with 
identities through religious, language and traditional practices, as is the case in Cape 
Town (Bekker & Leildé 2006).  
This paper provides reduced-form evidence on neighbourhood effects and ghetto 
heterogeneity on complier children using the quasi-natural experiment of apartheid. The 
evidence here is conditional on the assumptions above holding. As discussed, several 
factors mitigate selection-bias and possible SUTVA violation. Only under these 
maintained assumptions, the main results can be considered as causal estimates. 
2.5 Estimation Results  
2.5.1 Education  
Table 2.10 presents estimates of heterogeneous ghetto effects on children’s overall 
education in adulthood, that is by the last period in the panel (2009) when children are 
between 21 and 30.  They include all controls except the standardized results of the 
numerical aptitude test to avoid introducing endogeneity. The excluded ghetto here and 
in subsequent regressions is Khayelitsha, the one with the higher number of 
observations.   
I begin in column (1) which shows the estimated effects on the total years of formal 
completed education. These include all possible levels from primary to tertiary and 
technical. The average years of formal education reached in adulthood is almost one 
year longer for children growing up in Langa (at 5% significance level) with respect to 
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those in Khayelitsha. Table B2 in Appendix B supports these findings against all other 
ghettos (panel 1). In contrast, the probability of attending college (column 2) is 
statistically significantly higher for children growing up in all ghettos other than 
Khayelitsha, by between 5 to 11 percentage points (pp). They are the largest in Langa. 
Separate regressions in Table B2 confirm that overall, children growing up in 
Khayelitsha are 6 pp less likely to attend college.  
Table 2.11 presents estimates on the same outcomes when splitting the sample by 
sex. There is no strong evidence of any specific conditional effect here. The exception 
concerns girls growing up in Gugulethu and Langa, which are between 6 to 21 pp more 
likely to attend college than girls growing up in Khayelitsha, respectively. These are 
significant at 10% level.  
Neighbourhoods do seem to matter for overall educational achievement in 
adulthood. Overall, children growing up in Langa display better achievements in 
education. Girls here are also more likely to attend college, substantially more so than in 
any other township (21 pp). In contrast, Khayelitsha is distinctively a worse place to 
grow up for the levels of education achieved in adulthood. These results are consistent 
with Langa boasting the highest human capital levels (i.e. the highest percentage of 
adults with at least secondary diplomas); but also, its proximity to better schools, at least 
when proxying quality by schools previously reserved to white or coloured children (see 
discussion in section 2.6). The negative results for Khayelitsha are more puzzling. It is 
second to Langa in terms of human capital levels. Yet, despite this, it displays the largest 
share of employed adults in construction, a sector with a smaller premium on education. 
It is also the ghetto where distances to schools are the largest. These factors are possible 
explanations. 
The small gender heterogeneity in college attendance may reflect the general trend 
of young women achieving higher levels of education than their male counterparts, 
which manifests in neighbourhoods with better access to higher quality schools. 
However, it may also suggest that differences across ghettos might be less marked for 
young men. There are many possible explanations for this. Institutional perceptions and 
norms may be playing a part. Boys could be more affected than girls by negative peer 
effects (for instance they could be more pressured to join gangs, to skip school, etc.). 
While, both male and females are generally similarly distributed across sectors of 
occupation in the sample (Figure B4), there are marked gender-differences in terms of 
the skill levels of occupations in Langa (Figure B5). Young women here are over-
represented in higher-skill occupations with respect to males, despite having the lower 
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proportion of women in this sector across ghettos. As education is determined earlier in 
lifer, the differences found here may be reflected in labour outcomes. Evidence while 
still incomplete, suggests female and males are affected differently by neighbourhood 
effects.  
2.5.2 Labour outcomes in adulthood 
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 present estimates of heterogeneous ghetto effects on labour 
outcomes in adulthood. Table 2.12 displays estimates of ghetto effects on real earnings 
and employment outcomes more generally across the period 2004-2009. These 
regressions are estimated with one observation per year per child. The standard errors, 
which are clustered by family, adjust for the repeated observations for each child. Table 
2.13 only shows measures of real earnings and job search by the last period in the panel 
(2009) when children are between 21 and 30. They include all controls.    
I begin in Table 2.12. Overall, children that grew up in Langa and Nyanga are 15 pp 
less likely to be idle with respect to Khayelitsha, and by the same magnitude are more 
likely to be working in young adulthood. Statistical significance is much higher for 
Nyanga at 1% level. However, it only holds for Langa when excluding all other ghettos 
(Table B4). There are no significant differences on real earnings or long term 
unemployment for the pooled cross section. Children growing up in Gugulethu are 
however 7 pp more likely to be unemployed for at the last 2 months before the survey. 
This is significant at 10% level.  
Results in Table 2.13 complete the picture. Column (1) shows the estimated effects 
on average real earnings for the last two periods in the panel. Notably, only children 
growing up in Langa display 30% higher earnings in adulthood with respect to 
Khayelitsha, significant at 10% levels. Consistent with results in Table 2.12, column (3) 
shows that children in this former black township worked longer since leaving school; 
coefficients are not statistically significant but close to 10% levels. The largest difference 
with respect to the other ghettos concerns job search. That is, children that grew up in 
Langa had to spend substantially less months searching for jobs overall (columns 4 & 
5). This is statistically significant at 5 and 10% levels. Other patterns that emerge are 
more mixed. Both the two other ghettos, display between 4 to 5 months longer search 
periods for jobs than Khayelitsha and double the number with respect to Langa. These 
differences are statistically significant at 1 and 5% levels. Only, children growing up in 
Nyanga worked significantly more months overall in adulthood (5 months) with respect 
 81 
 
 
 
81 
to Khayelitsha, significant at 5% level. The number of months is substantially smaller 
since leaving school (column 3), suggesting it reflects part-time employment.   
Tables 2.14 and 2.15 repeat the above exercises but again I separate the sample by 
sex. In both tables the first panel displays the results for young women. Interesting 
patterns emerge here. First, the differences related to outcomes in adulthood (Table 
2.15) indicate almost no differences across ghettos for males. This is consistent with 
findings on educational outcomes. The exceptions are the longer search months for 
boys growing up in Gugulethu of up to 7 months. Focusing on the first panel of the 
same table, we see that the pooled results on earnings for Langa may be driven by the 
effect on young women. They have on average 53% higher earnings in adulthood than 
girls in the omitted ghetto. They also display lower search periods with respect to all 
other ghettos. This is again in line with findings on educational achievements25. This 
gender heterogeneity seems to hold only for Langa. Outcomes in Table 2.14 show that 
for Nyanga the effect is even for both boys and girls. These overall patterns are largely 
unchanged when I run regressions for each ghetto separately in Tables B6 and B7.  
There are three key facts that emerge from the analysis of labour outcomes. The 
first concerns the fact that differences across ghettos are small, with only Langa 
standing out in terms of better earnings, a higher likelihood of working, and lower 
search periods for jobs. Gugulethu, which was ranked first in terms neighbourhood 
quality, does not seem to display any specific differences for labour outcomes, and if 
anything, young adults suffer relatively more from shot-term unemployment. This 
finding supports differential effects being driven by exposure to higher levels of human 
capital (Cutler & Glaeser 1997), higher educational achievements and possible networks 
associated with it (Magruder 2010). Second, the almost inexistent differences across 
ghettos for young men together with the distinct differences for young women in 
Langa, are suggestive of gender-specific mechanisms in labour and educational 
achievements. A possible explanation concern higher levels of discrimination for males 
in highly gender-segregated jobs (Magruder 2010). Alternatively, social norms might be 
more penalizing for males through negative peer-effects already in school. Because of 
worse educational outcomes they may be later penalized in job markets. Finally, Nyanga 
shows interesting dynamics given how bad the ghetto ranked in terms of basic 
observable characteristics. The fact that young adults that grew up here show longer 
working periods overall (but not since finishing school), and a higher likelihood of 
                                                          
25 Tables B13 and B16 contain the results of equation (2.1) on outcomes in tables 2.12 to 2.15, 
conditional on years of education. Controlling for education introduces endogeneity concerns and these 
tables are indicative. While coefficients vary slightly, results are unchanged. 
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working in adulthood is counterintuitive. Possible explanations could relate to a higher 
prevalence of informality or youths choosing gang-related activities as an alternative to 
formal employment (Freeman 1999).  
To some extent, results in Tables 2.16 support these findings. Here, outcomes 
variables are dummy variables equal to one if young adults are employed in high, semi 
or low-skill occupations26. Because of the small sample size (i.e., only employed adults 
each year), I only look at the pooled cross-section across 2004-2009. Youths in Langa 
seem to have a 17 pp higher likelihood of working in a semi-skill occupation, compared 
to Khayelitsha, and almost 10 pp higher with respect to youths in Nyanga. Children that 
grew up in the latter and Gugulethu seem more likely to be in employed in low-skill 
occupations by between 7 to 8 pp. When running separate regressions however (Table 
B8), both youths in Langa and Nyanga seem overall more likely to work in semi-skill 
occupations; but those in Langa twice as much.  
2.5.3 Behavioural Outcomes 
I next examine the effects on basic behavioural and health-related outcomes in 
Table 2.17. Specifications are as before. Columns (1) to (3) measure the probability of 
engaging in the behaviour at endline, that is consuming alcohol, drugs or smoking when 
reaching adulthood. Only children growing up in Gugulethu are more likely to both 
drink alcohol and smoke in adulthood when compared to children growing up in 
Khayelitsha. They are 15 pp more likely to engage in these behaviours in adulthood, 
with coefficients statistically significant at 1 and 5% levels. There are no differences in 
the probability of consuming drugs (defined as cannabis and other illegal drugs). In 
column (4) I study the fertility behaviour of females but find no differences between 
women growing up in different areas. There is little that can be concluded from 
Gugulethu’s specificity in terms of alcohol and drugs consumption. The similar fertility 
behaviour for young females supports the idea of the persistence of certain institutional 
norms and behaviours that are likely to be gender-biased.  
 
                                                          
26 The definition is from Statistics South Africa. They define in South Africa as skilled (or high-skilled) 
occupations in standard occupations codes (SOC) 1-3, i.e. managerial, professionals and technicians; as 
semi-skilled (or medium-skilled) as those working in SOC 4-7, i.e. clerks, sales and services, skilled 
agriculture, crafts, and machine operators; low-skilled are elementary occupations and domestic workers 
(SOC 8). Here I include in column (4) a broader definition of unskilled because of the lack of precision in 
CAPS. It includes ‘armed forces and others’; while in column (3) it is only composed of those employed 
in elementary occupations.  
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2.6 When Are Ghettos Better? 
This section investigates the main channels that could explain the differences in 
outcomes. If not all deprived neighbourhoods have the same effect on lifetime 
opportunities, then what makes a ‘bad’ neighbourhood better? Understanding why 
children may have better labour outcomes in adulthood and achieve better education in 
certain ghettos opens the door to having a better grasp of the mechanisms behind the 
spatial persistence of poverty. 
2.6.1 Setting  
I look at this question by creating variables at the neighbourhood-level within 
ghettos. Doing this allows me to increase the ‘treatment’ variation27 without 
compromising too much on the quasi-random allocation of households across areas. 
Sorting across neighbourhoods within ghettos is highly likely. While households were 
allocated to particular townships, they were free to move within these, and the SUTVA 
is probably violated. However, neighbourhoods within ghettos are relatively 
homogenous. There is no evidence to support they have different identities, or should 
be considered as anything more than just smaller administrative sub-divisions28. Despite 
these mitigating factors, results here are descriptive findings; they provide a useful start 
into the discussion of poverty traps and the spatial transmission of poverty.  
To this aim, I generally estimate the following equation using an OLS specification 
of the form: 
𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑛 =  𝛿 + 𝑍′𝑛. 𝜌𝑛 + 𝑋′𝑖. 𝜋1 + 𝑊′ℎ. 𝜋2 + 𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑛    (2.2) 
Where 𝑍𝑛 are neighbourhood-level characteristics described below, and 𝜌𝑛 are the 
coefficients of interest. All other parameters are specified as in equation (2.1). The 
regressions are weighted to adjust for differences in sampling probabilities across sites 
and over time, and I also cluster the standard errors by household (allowing for 
common error components across siblings). I focus on three sets of channels.  
First, social channels. For this I use the percentages of ethnic composition of the 
neighbourhood in 1996 and 2001, from census data. I exclude 1985 due to the 
limitations of the census (see data section). I use the percentage of black and coloured 
                                                          
27 There are 19 neighbourhoods overall in the final sample. Langa and Gugulethu, which are small 
townships are comprised only of one neighbourhood. 
28 See anecdotal evidence here: http://mapping.wm.edu/2014/01/04/post-apartheid-identity-in-cape-
town-townships/ (last accessed August 7th 2017).  
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in the neighbourhood only, since the percentage of whites is almost zero in former 
black-only areas. The idea here is to measure the degree of ethnic concentration with a 
straight-forward statistic. Cutler & Glaeser (1997) stressed the advantage that ethnic 
concentration may have by fostering social networks that provide access to jobs. They 
find that the impact is highly correlated with the group’s average human capital (Cutler 
et al. 2008). Social networks could also help ‘minorities’ through community enforced 
norms. Here this could happen through security mechanisms to guard informal houses 
for instance. Using the same dataset Magruder (2010) finds that networks are important 
job allocation mechanisms in Cape Town. The measure of work here includes any type 
of paid-work (i.e. including informal), and social networks could be particularly 
important for low-skill jobs.  
Second, I look at measures of accessibility to jobs. As explained before I use three 
indices (see footnote 21) that compute the number of jobs accessible from one’s 
neighbourhood of residence to all other neighbourhoods in the city, weighted by the 
inverse of their distance from the centroid of the neighbourhood of residence. I use 
data on employment for 2001, 2005 and 2009 (i.e., the baseline, midline and endline 
years of the CAPS panel). I also use a measure of distance to the CBD, calculated as the 
Euclidean distance in km from the centroid of the neighbourhood of residence. In 
2009, 27% of jobs in Cape Town were within 10 km from the CBD, down from 30% of 
formal jobs in 2001. Centrality is likely to be correlated not only with better access to 
jobs but also amenities. These different accessibility measures test for the spatial 
mismatch hypothesis. Banerjee et al. (2008) underlined the importance of this 
mechanism in explaining youth unemployment in South Africa. The long and costly 
commuting trips in South African cities illustrate two of their major problems: urban 
sprawl and a high level of segregation of population groups. Rospabe & Selod (2006) 
have documented the problem for the city of Cape Town, finding evidence that the 
disconnect between jobs and residential locations are one of the main problems behind 
blacks’ high unemployment.  
Finally, I look at the quality of education. This mechanism has been widely 
considered in the neighbourhood effects literature (Durlauf 2004). Early models by 
Benabou (1996) show that segregation tends to amplify future human capital inequality. 
The fiscal channel is one of the main reasons for this, when funding for education 
comes from endogenous community decisions about how much fiscal revenues to 
allocate to schools (given that the quality of education is directly related to funding) 
(Piketty 2000). It is not the case in post-apartheid South Africa. In this context, the 
main differences across areas are due to the legacy of the apartheid system of education 
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that allocated different funding across ethnic groups. Black-only school were controlled 
centrally by a separate Department of Education and Training (DET) and had a 
separate budget. There were marked discrepancies in educational funding per pupil 
across racial groups and places of residence. Funding levels per pupil for whites, 
coloured, and blacks were, respectively, 1.85, 1.59, and 0.74. The curricula and standards 
were also different (Case & Deaton 2002). I include different measures that consider the 
quality and accessibility to schools. The distance in km from the neighbourhood’s 
centroid to the closest school and to the closest former white or coloured-only schools; 
as better access to the latter may allow children living in former black townships to have 
access to better schools. I also include dummy variables for the former department of 
education of the school of each young adult (being a former black or coloured/white 
school). This measure may introduce bias since parents choosing to put their children in 
‘better’ schools may also be different in other unobserved characteristics (i.e., for 
instance the amount of support they give to their children). They remain informative to 
understand how much education is central to explain the findings here. Finally, I also 
include a dummy variable for whether the school of the child offered transport 
subsidies. I ignore the pupil to teacher ratio since it has very little variation between 
areas. 
2.6.2 Results 
Tables B10-B12 in Appendix display the results from estimating the relationship of 
each channel separately, on the labour and educational outcomes of young adults. In 
Tables 2.18-2.20 I include the most relevant channels for each of these three categories 
together. The sample remains unchanged and is always of black compliers only. 
Looking at which channels remain significant when including them all in the 
regressions is a more relevant exercise. I focus on these results. Table 2.18 examines 
educational outcomes. Here two main channels are associated with attaining a better 
education in adulthood: accessibility to jobs and the quality of the schools. The access 
index is positively associated with both the number of years of education completed and 
the probability of ever attending college. This relationship could reflect the endogenous 
mechanism between accessibility to jobs and employment, or the mechanical 
relationship between accessibility and closeness to the CBD, and with this to many 
other amenities. A school providing transport subsidies is also positively related to 
achieving more years of formal education. Finally attending a former black-only school 
is negatively related with the years of completed education. The coefficient is small but 
significant at 5% level.   
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Table 2.19 and 2.20 examine labour outcomes in adulthood. The percentage of 
blacks in the neighbourhood (1996) is correlated with lower job search and relatedly 
both a lower likelihood of long and short-term unemployment. These are significant at 
5% level. The positive association is consistent with the importance of social networks 
for findings jobs in Cape Town (Magruder 2010). They support the theoretical models 
that put forward the positive effects of segregation. The fact that Langa and Nyanga 
have one of the largest share of black residents across census years, and both had the 
largest share of Bantustan migrants in 1985 (Table 2.4) could be a factor in explaining 
the better labour outcomes in adulthood. Accessibility also seems to matter. I use the 
(log) accessibility in 2009 since it is the most precise of the three accessibility indices. 
Both the probability of working and being idle are, respectively, positively and 
negatively related to access. These relationships are significant at 1% level. They give 
weight to the spatial mismatch hypothesis as a key factor behind higher unemployment 
in former townships. Langa is the most central of all four ghettos (the others were 
established much later). Finally, school quality and access measures seem to matter less. 
Only in Table 2.19, coefficients on earnings are negatively associated with attending a 
former black-only school and statistically significant. Only 13% of children in the 
sample attend other schools, but they do disproportionately so in Langa (30%).  
Overall, these results are indicative of the importance of location. Ghettos that 
display closer proximity to jobs and presumably access to better public amenities (by 
being closer to former coloured and white only areas), are also better for the 
opportunities and outcomes of children in adulthood. This hypothesis relates to the 
spatial mismatch literature. It goes further here in that results offer suggestive evidence 
of the relationship of proximity and public amenities (such as schools) with lifetime 
trajectories of disadvantage children. Poor households in developing country cities are 
more vulnerable to distances. The under-provision of infrastructure and public 
transport, the sprawling nature of the largest agglomerations, housing and labour 
informality, increase frictions related to space. In contrast, private amenities such as 
better housing and public services do not seem to improve outcomes in adulthood (i.e. 
Gugulethu). Social networks, as imperfectly measured here, also seem to matter. These 
two factors are likely to be related. In cities where distance matters, social network play 
an important role, not only for jobs but also for enforcing norms and security.  
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2.7 Conclusions 
This paper uses a unique dataset to provide evidence on neighbourhood effects in a 
large city of a developing country. The quasi-random allocation of families across 
former black-only townships during apartheid provides a natural experimental setting to 
study the heterogeneous effects of ghettos on compliers.  
I find that not all ‘bad’ neighbourhoods are equal in how they influence the life 
trajectories of children. Differences are salient in both labour and educational 
outcomes. Ghettos that are closer to the CBD and relatedly, closer to former white-only 
areas, have better access to jobs and public amenities (including better schools). 
Children that grow up here achieve on average 30% higher real earnings in adulthood, 
are 15 pp more likely to work and 15 pp less likely to idle. They also do better in school, 
completing on average 0.8 more years of education and being 11 pp more likely of 
attending college. Proximity to jobs and better schools is not all that matters. Results are 
suggestive on the positive effect being conditional on the human capital composition of 
the neighbourhood. Further, ethnic networks seem to also be important channels.  
I find that differences across ghettos are more marked for young women (in all but 
fertility). A possible explanation relates to the importance of social norms and 
institutions. Discrimination, red-lining, and peer-effects may work more negatively for 
males in gendered-segmented labour markets. Criminal and gang-related activities are 
male-dominated, and young boys could be deterred from pursuing education (Freeman 
1999), later penalized in job markets. While I cannot be definitive with the evidence 
here, this hypothesis underlines the importance of better understanding behavioural and 
social norms in explaining neighbourhood effects. They have a strong policy dimension 
in that, if true, local public policies need to address social constructions to succeed. 
They also need to take into account specific gender dimensions.  
This paper is limited in the extent to which it can provide causal evidence on the 
channels behind the persistence of spatial poverty traps. Still, it provides strong 
evidence regarding the heterogeneity of ghetto effects and the importance of 
neighbourhoods on outcomes later in life in a large city of a developing country. There 
is not one ‘ghetto university’. Further research is needed to understand the factors 
behind the spatial persistence of poverty within cities, particularly in rapidly growing 
cities in emerging countries.  
2.8 Tables & Figures
Figure 2.1 Total monthly earnings by age and former apartheid designation of
neighbourhood
Notes: Plot of monthly earnings for youths in the analysis panel for ages between 22 and 30. The aver-
ages are computed according to the former apartheid designation of their neighbourhood of residence.
For instance, former black apartheid neighbourhoods stand for neighbourhoods that were black-only
before 1994. All earnings are in 2010 South African Rands.
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Figure 2.2 Years of completed education by age and former apartheid designation of
neighbourhood
Notes: Plot of total years of education achieved for youths in the panel dataset for ages between 22 and
30. The averages are computed according to the former apartheid designation of their neighbourhood
of residence. For instance, former black apartheid neighbourhoods stand for neighbourhoods that were
black-only before 1994.
Figure 2.3 Total monthly earnings by age for former black-only neighbourhoods
Notes: Plot of monthly earnings for youths in the analysis panel for ages between 22 and 30. The
averages are computed across former black-only ghettos (townships). All earnings are in 2010 South
African Rands.
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Figure 2.4 Years of completed education by age for former black-only neighbourhoods
Notes: Plot of total years of education achieved for youths in the analysis panel for ages between 22
and 30. The averages are computed across former black-only ghettos (townships).
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SFigure 2.5 Maps of Group Areas Act 1950 in Cape Town.
[on personal website version of the paper]
Notes: Maps obtained from the library of the Municipality of Cape Town. These maps show the divi-
sion of neighbourhoods in Cape Town according to different ethnic groups defined by the Group Areas
Act.
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Figure 2.6 Digitized Map of Group Areas Act in the City of Cape Town
Notes: Digitized version of the maps in Figure 5 for the entire City of Cape Town by 1991. White,
Coloured, Indian and Black areas were specifically designated areas where these ethnic groups could
reside. Outside refers to areas that were not ethnically defined.
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Figure 2.7 Compliance with Apartheid Designation, Census 1985
Notes: The dots are neighbourhood averages of the proportion of the ethnic group (y-axis), plotted
against the distance in km to areas designated as black-only during Apartheid (x-axis). The averages
are calculated using the Census 1985. The figure plots white, black and coloured ethnic groups, clock-
wise.
Figure 2.8 Compliance with Apartheid Designation in the sample (by 1991)
Notes: The figure is as figure 7. Here, the averages are calculated using the analysis dataset, restricting
the sample to those younths that reside in the area by 1991. The figure plots white, black and coloured
ethnic groups, clockwise.
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Table 2.1: Ethnic Groups & Former Apartheid Locations
Black Apartheid Ghetto Coloured Apartheid Ghetto
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All sample By 1991 All sample By 1991
Black 0.814*** 0.902***
(0.012) (0.012)
Coloured 0.443*** 0.510***
(0.016) (0.020)
N 3913 2166 3913 2166
R-squared 0.685 0.822 0.273 0.315
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics: Main Outcomes (by 1991 sample, Compliers)
Young Adult Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Monthly earnings 2455 1718 277 11470 356
Average monthly earning in the past 5 years 2116 1651 14 11470 526
Months worked by 2009 15.028 17.754 0 82 782
Months working since last in school 2.228 6.704 0 36 657
Months looked for work by 2009 10.853 13.503 0 68 782
Months looked for work since last in school 12.428 13.565 0 63 559
Years of education completed 10.392 1.906 3 16 773
Ever attended college 0.028 0.165 0 1 782
Years delayed from graduating grade 3.903 3.352 0 14 497
Smokes cigarettes 0.194 0.396 0 1 660
Consumes alcohol 0.325 0.469 0 1 659
Consumes drugs 0.050 0.218 0 1 660
Ever reported a live birth∗ 0.390 0.488 0 1 410
Notes: Main outcomes variables are computed across the years in the panel dataset (2002-2009). All
earnings are in 2010 South African Rands; average monthly earnings in the past 5 years corresponds
to the average of the last observed earning between 2009 and 2006; all variables measured by 2009 are
the # of months up until 2009 and thus across the period of the panel, and all variables ”since left
school” are the # of months since last attended any formal education institution; idle corresponds to
not working nor in school; total years delayed from graduation are calculated using the upper-bound
(+ 1 year) of the grade expected age of graduation for the last grade attended; ever reported a live
birth is calculated for females only.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics: Outcomes 2004-2009 (By 1991 Sample, Compliers)
Young Adult Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Monthly earnings 2232 1784 19 20950 849
Currently working (paid) 0.313 0.464 0 1 2039
Idle 0.424 0.494 0 1 2039
Unemployed - job search < 2 months 0.177 0.381 0 1 2039
Unemployed - job search > 2 months 0.231 0.422 0 1 2039
Notes: Main outcomes variables for all young adults (YA) older than 20 years old and not enrolled
in school between 2004 and 2009. Currently working is a dummy variable if YA answers receiving
payment for his work; monthly earnings are in 2010 South African Rands.
Table 2.4: Ghetto Characteristics (Census datasets)
Ghetto Gugulethu Khayelitsha Langa Nyanga
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1985
Black 0.983 0.996 0.991 0.996
Male 0.528 0.491 0.586 0.508
No Education 0.201 0.274 0.218 0.275
Working Age [15-65] 0.697 0.592 0.74 0.636
Bantustan birth 0.270 0.381 0.409 0.590
Population(thousands) 63.89 3.53 22.99 148.88
1996
Black 0.978 0.989 0.983 0.983
Male 0.508 0.487 0.497 0.493
No Education 0.104 0.128 0.103 0.149
Speaks Xhosa 0.970 0.972 0.513 0.964
Population(thousands) 79.16 180.29 46.88 142.28
2001
Black 0.988 0.995 0.997 0.991
Male 0.485 0.480 0.497 0.477
No Education 0.133 0.073 0.079 0.142
Working Age [15-65] 0.824 0.803 0.821 0.805
Speaks Xhosa 0.957 0.968 0.978 0.965
Informal Dwellings 0.518 0.639 0.665 0.633
Employed 0.315 0.344 0.357 0.295
Employed in manufacturing 0.089 0.101 0.127 0.098
Employed in Construction 0.071 0.126 0.096 0.137
HH below poverty line 0.673 0.706 0.754 0.773
Access to electricity 0.611 0.767 0.508 0.580
Population (thousands) 74.16 323.79 49.67 96.37
Population Density (tho. per km2) 13.29 10.10 13.17 6.47
Area (km2) 5.58 32.07 3.77 8.09
Murder rate (2007) 0.076 0.085 0.029 0.138
Notes: Data from Census 1985, 1996 and 2001 (Statistics South Africa). Poverty line defined
as less than 20 thousands rands per year. Murder rate obtained from the City of Cape Town
Crime Statistics Report (2007).
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Table 2.5: Descriptives Ghetto Characteristics (Sample)
Gugulethu Khayelitsha Langa Nyanga
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance to CBD (km) 15.214 25.382 10.456 17.181
Distance to closest school (km) 0.183 0.431 0.247 0.230
Distance to closest coloured or white school 1.666 2.342 1.574 3.084
# of assault on school premises (1999) 11.571 4.753 5.917 16.175
# of serious crimes on school premises (1999) 1.00 1.079 0.273 1.259
Pupil to teacher ratio 60.00 51.589 60.00 47.013
Access to Employment (definition 1, 2001) 0.084 0.048 0.163 0.074
Access to Employment (definition 1, 2005) 0.107 0.064 0.182 0.098
Accesss to Employment (definition 2, 2009) 0.120 0.077 0.136 0.115
% of jobs within 5km (2009) 0.058 0.034 0.105 0.060
N 139 457 28 158
Notes: Data on schools was obtained from SNR 2000; Access to employment is measured as the number
of jobs in all other neighbourhoods in Cape Town weighted by their distance from the neighbourhood’s
centroid in km (2001 and 2005 use definition 1 - where jobs are proxied with the percent of firm’s turnover;
2009 uses definition 2 where jobs are proxied by the number of employed by firm.)
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Table 2.6: Balance Tests of Ghetto characteristics [CAPS Sample]
Gugulethu Khayelitsha Langa Nyanga Overall p-values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to Coloured Ghetto (km) 2.000 4.672 2.000 4.557 4.078 0.000
(0.000) (0.060) (0.000) (0.072) (0.054)
% African-Black (2001) 0.990 0.994 0.997 0.992 0.993 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
% Coloured (2001) 0.009 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Distance to CBD (km) 15.214 25.683 10.456 17.184 20.068 0.000
(0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.014) (0.056)
Acces to employment (def 1, 2001) 0.084 0.048 0.164 0.074 0.064 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Acces to employment (def 1, 2005) 0.107 0.064 0.182 0.098 0.083 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Acces to employment (def 2, 2009) 0.120 0.077 0.136 0.115 0.095 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Schools former black DOE* 0.547 0.536 0.500 0.576 0.545 0.805
(0.042) (0.023) (0.096) (0.039) (0.018)
Schools former white or coloured DOE* 0.094 0.066 0.179 0.139 0.090 0.013
(0.025) (0.012) (0.074) (0.028) (0.010)
Distance to closest school (km) 0.183 0.431 0.247 0.230 0.340 0.000
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010)
Distance to closest no-black school 1.666 2.342 1.574 3.084 2.344 0.000
(0.000) (0.091) (0.000) (0.049) (0.057)
Pupil to teacher ratio (YA school)* 64.273 54.063 64.273 48.058 55.030 0.000
(0.000) (0.442) (0.000) (0.804) (0.360)
N 139 457 28 158 782
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values of joint-orthogonality test of treatment arms. *1999
from SNAPS dataset, former black, coloured and white DOE refers to DET, HOR and HOA schools
during Apartheid. Distances are calculated as Euclidean distances from the centroid of an individual
neighbourhood of residence.
97
Table 2.7: Ghetto Quality Index 2001, by components (z-scores)
Gugulethu Langa Khayelitsha Nyanga
Amenities 0.570 -0.726 0.604 -0.448
Formal dwellings 1.465 -0.788 -0.385 -0.293
Households above poverty line 1.181 -0.609 0.445 -1.018
Human capital -0.109 0.710 0.677 -1.277
Inv. Km to CBD 0.302 1.050 -1.344 -0.008
Inv. Km to non-black schools 0.687 0.820 -0.153 -1.354
Inv. Murder rate 0.137 1.182 -0.062 -1.257
Total Index 0.605 0.234 -0.031 -0.808
Total Rank 1 2 3 4
Notes: All variables are standardized census variables from the 2001 census. Amenities
include the proportion of households (HHs) with access to electricity, water inside their
dwelling and refuse collection. HHs above the poverty are HHs with annual incomes above
20 thousands current Rands (2001). Human capital includes the proportion of adults that
have at least some years of formal education, and the number of adults with higher education
more than secondary (Matric). Km to CBD are the Euclidean distances to CBD from
each neighbourhood centroid, Km to non-black schools are the Euclidean distances to the
neighbourhood centroid to the closest white or coloured school. Both are the inverse distances
so that proximity is considered as positive. The final variable is the inverse of the murder
rate so that the higher values are attributed to the lowest murder rates. The higher the
index the better the neighbourhood in terms of these characteristics.
Table 2.8: Balance Test of Youth Characteristics
Gugulethu Khayelitsha Langa Nyanga Overall p-values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year of birth 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 0.690
(0.219) (0.123) (0.489) (0.192) (0.090)
Male 0.482 0.484 0.500 0.437 0.471 0.815
(0.043) (0.023) (0.096) (0.040) (0.017)
First Move (if not always) 1990 1990 1991 1991 1990 0.345
(0.581) (0.206) (0.522) (0.296) (0.160)
Speaks English 0.020 0.006 0.000 0.009 0.014 0.019
(0.014) (0.004) (0.000) (0.009) (0.005)
Speaks Xhosa 0.960 0.978 0.929 0.955 0.963 0.042
(0.020) (0.008) (0.071) (0.020) (0.008)
Speaks Afrikaans 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.009 0.007 0.641
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.009) (0.003)
Speaks Other 0.020 0.009 0.071 0.027 0.017 0.357
(0.014) (0.005) (0.071) (0.015) (0.005)
N 139 457 28 158 782
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values of joint-orthogonality test of treatment arms.
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Table 2.9: Balance Test of Parental and Household Characteristics
Gugulethu Khayelitsha Langa Nyanga Overall p-values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother:
No education 0.035 0.083 0.000 0.043 0.067 0.078
(0.017) (0.014) (0.000) (0.017) (0.009)
Secondary incomplete 0.561 0.482 0.679 0.543 0.518 0.160
(0.047) (0.025) (0.090) (0.043) (0.018)
Secondary completed - Matric 0.096 0.063 0.071 0.058 0.068 0.765
(0.028) (0.012) (0.050) (0.020) (0.009)
Father:
No education 0.052 0.159 0.050 0.122 0.139 0.086
(0.029) (0.022) (0.050) (0.035) (0.016)
Secondary incomplete 0.345 0.377 0.350 0.333 0.356 0.728
(0.063) (0.029) (0.109) (0.050) (0.022)
Secondary completed - Matric 0.172 0.091 0.200 0.144 0.122 0.139
(0.050) (0.017) (0.092) (0.037) (0.015)
Household:
YA co-resident with a parent 0.628 0.674 0.704 0.713 0.673 0.712
(0.046) (0.025) (0.090) (0.041) (0.018)
Parent resident if < 22 yrs 0.719 0.812 0.750 0.766 0.783 0.198
(0.038) (0.018) (0.083) (0.034) (0.014)
HH size at baseline 7.590 5.835 6.107 6.937 6.357 0.000
(0.298) (0.108) (0.510) (0.256) (0.099)
Connected to electricity 0.956 0.954 0.963 0.975 0.960 0.879
(0.019) (0.011) (0.037) (0.014) (0.008)
Grew up in formal urban 0.870 0.353 0.857 0.841 0.556 0.000
(0.029) (0.023) (0.067) (0.029) (0.017)
Brackets of HH income 15.440 14.631 16.778 15.552 15.044 0.011
(0.339) (0.199) (0.845) (0.329) (0.150)
N 139 457 28 158 782
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, p-values of joint-orthogonality test of treatment arms.
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Table 2.10: Results I: Education in young adulthood.
Years of education Ever attended college Delay in graduating grade
(1) (2) (3)
Gugulethu 0.316 0.047* -0.216
(0.280) (0.026) (0.374)
Langa 0.791** 0.112* 0.093
(0.381) (0.067) (0.652)
Nyanga 0.299 0.056* -0.062
(0.240) (0.029) (0.350)
All Controls Y Y Y
R-squared 0.001 0.041 0.018
N 600 592 600
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; the excluded ghetto is
Khayelitsha. Outcome variables in column (1) is a dummy variable for YA not working and not
studying in 2009, years of education (2) is the total years of formal education attained by the end
of the period, ever college (3) is a dummy variable for ever attending college over the years in the
panel, and delay in graduating grade is the delay in years for completing last observed high-school
grade against an upper bound (+1 year) of expected age of graduation. The main explanatory is
a dummy variable for the ghettos of residence. Controls include age, age square, dummy variables
for the education of mothers (secondary complete, primary and no education, with one excluded
category), language spoken (English, Xhosa and Afrikaans, with one excluded), the type of place
where YA answers ’spending most of their lives (formal and informal urban, formal and informal
rural, with one excluded). The sample is only compliers - i.e. YA residing in a former Apartheid
Black ghetto who moved to their neighbourhood of residence before the end of Apartheid’s Group
Areas Act removal (1991); blacks only. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.11: Results II: Education in young adulthood by sex.
Years of education Ever college Delay in graduating grade
(1) (2) (3)
Females:
Gugulethu 0.517 0.061* -0.868*
(0.348) (0.037) (0.450)
Langa 0.818 0.212* 0.265
(0.616) (0.117) (0.970)
Nyanga 0.225 0.058 -0.607
(0.261) (0.039) (0.447)
R-squared 0.016 0.021 0.324
N 319 323 183
Males:
Gugulethu 0.033 0.035 0.653
(0.423) (0.039) (0.576)
Langa 0.706 -0.010 -0.297
(0.463) (0.022) (0.826)
Nyanga 0.354 0.055 0.782
(0.408) (0.044) (0.532)
R-squared 0.030 0.006 0.222
N 273 277 157
All Controls Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; the excluded
ghetto is Khayelitsha. Outcome variables in column (1) is a dummy variable for YA not
working and not studying in 2009, years of education (2) is the total years of formal education
attained by the end of the period, ever college (3) is a dummy variable for ever attending
college over the years in the panel, and delay in graduating grade is the delay in years for
completing last observed high-school grade against an upper bound (+1 year) of expected
age of graduation. Controls are Table 10 (excluding sex). The sample is only compliers -
i.e. YA residing in a former Apartheid Black ghetto who moved to their neighbourhood of
residence before the end of Apartheid’s Group Areas Act removal (1991), these are Black
only. Regressions are run separately by sex. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.12: Results I: Labour Outcomes across period 2004-2009.
Earnings (log) Working Idle Unemployed (ST) Unemployed (LT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gugulethu -0.046 0.011 -0.014 0.074* 0.058
(0.093) (0.050) (0.050) (0.044) (0.043)
Langa 0.146 0.156* -0.157* -0.008 -0.061
(0.166) (0.090) (0.090) (0.068) (0.075)
Nyanga 0.023 0.133*** -0.153*** 0.019 -0.021
(0.083) (0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.046)
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.129 0.069 0.072 0.010 0.005
N 711 1251 1251 1251 1251
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; the excluded ghetto is
Khayelitsha. Outcome variables in column (1) are log monthly earnings, in column (2) working
is a dummy variable for having any paid work, columns (3) and (4) measure short term (ST) and
(LT) unemployment defined as not employed and looking for a job below and above 2 months,
respectively. Outcomes are observed across the period 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009 for YA above 20
years old and not enrolled in school.The main explanatory is a dummy variable for the ghettos
of residence. Controls include age, age square, dummy variables for the education of mothers
(secondary complete, primary and no education, with one excluded category), language spoken
(English, Xhosa and Afrikaans, with one excluded), the type of place where YA answers spending
most of their lives (formal and informal urban, formal and informal rural, with one excluded)
and the results of an aptitude quantitative test administered on year one of the survey to all
participants. The sample is only compliers - i.e. YA residing in a former Apartheid Black ghetto
who moved to their neighbourhood of residence before the end of Apartheid’s Group Areas Act
removal (1991); blacks only. . *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.13: Results I: Labour outcomes in young adulthood.
Earnings
(log)
Months
worked
Months
worked since
school
Months
search
Months
search since
school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gugulethu 0.075 0.618 -0.089 4.929** 5.594***
(0.100) (2.130) (0.758) (1.991) (2.036)
Langa 0.290* 4.855 3.496 -5.150** -4.257*
(0.175) (4.464) (2.220) (2.021) (2.282)
Nyanga 0.013 5.134** 0.491 3.935** 4.548***
(0.088) (2.052) (0.888) (1.730) (1.684)
R-squared 0.094 0.216 0.008 0.115 0.112
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
N 446 590 543 590 538
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; the excluded ghetto
is Khayelitsha. Outcome variables in column (2) and (4) are defined as the total over the entire
period, in columns (3) and (5) the same variables are defined since last enrolled in a formal
education institution, earnings corresponds to average log monthly earnings for the last two
periods. The main explanatory is a dummy variable for the ghettos of residence. Controls and
sample are as in Table 12. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.14: Results II: Labour outcomes across period 2004-2009 by sex.
Earnings (log) Working Idle Unemployed (ST) Unemployed (LT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Females:
Gugulethu -0.145 0.042 -0.050 0.033 0.012
(0.123) (0.071) (0.070) (0.056) (0.058)
Langa 0.222 0.202 -0.202 0.020 -0.050
(0.202) (0.125) (0.125) (0.093) (0.091)
Nyanga -0.036 0.133** -0.155** 0.011 -0.005
(0.104) (0.067) (0.066) (0.049) (0.056)
N 361 678 678 678 678
Males:
Gugulethu 0.049 -0.022 0.025 0.128* 0.109
(0.108) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.072)
Langa 0.034 0.120 -0.124 -0.042 -0.072
(0.189) (0.140) (0.140) (0.103) (0.129)
Nyanga 0.034 0.133* -0.153** 0.037 -0.037
(0.107) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.073)
N 350 573 573 573 573
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; the excluded ghetto is Khayelitsha.
Outcome variables in column (1) are log monthly earnings, in column (2) working is a dummy variable for
having any paid work, columns (3) and (4) measure short term (ST) and (LT) unemployment defined as not
employed and looking for a job below and above 2 months, respectively. Outcomes are observed across the
period 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009 for YA above 20 years old and not enrolled in school. Sample and controls are
the same as in Table 12. Sex is excluded as regressions are run separately by sex. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 2.15: II: Labour outcomes in young adulthood by sex.
Earnings
(log)
Months
worked
Months
worked since
school
Months
search
Months
search since
school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Females:
Gugulethu 0.038 -2.659 0.551 3.737 4.285*
(0.142) (2.864) (1.079) (2.601) (2.489)
Langa 0.531** 6.650 5.870 -6.305*** -5.955**
(0.226) (7.023) (3.923) (2.120) (2.644)
Nyanga -0.017 5.998** 1.421 4.305** 5.146***
(0.118) (2.831) (1.281) (1.944) (1.870)
N 224 317 295 317 289
Males:
Gugulethu 0.119 3.665 -0.721 6.295** 6.972**
(0.124) (3.007) (1.001) (3.012) (3.098)
Langa 0.002 2.857 0.922 -3.834 -3.040
(0.135) (5.130) (1.751) (3.534) (3.506)
Nyanga 0.019 4.029 -0.758 3.403 3.658
(0.122) (3.244) (1.152) (3.022) (3.037)
N 222 273 248 273 249
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; the ex-
cluded ghetto is Khayelitsha. Outcome variables in column (2) and (4) are defined as
the total over the entire period, in columns (3) and (5) the same variables are defined
since last enrolled in formal education institution, earnings corresponds to average
log monthly earnings for the last two periods. The main explanatory is a dummy
variable for the ghettos of residence. Controls and sample are the same as in Table
12, sex is excluded as regressions are run separately by sex. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 2.16: Results I: Skill Sectors across period 2004-2009.
High-skill Med-skill Low-skill Low-skill(b)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gugulethu -0.020 0.010 0.081** 0.112***
(0.027) (0.045) (0.037) (0.040)
Langa -0.041 0.178** 0.086 0.087
(0.032) (0.079) (0.075) (0.076)
Nyanga -0.013 0.086** 0.071* 0.078*
(0.023) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043)
All Controls Y Y Y Y
Time fixed-effects Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.005 0.035 0.037 0.030
N 768 768 768 768
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parenthe-
ses; the excluded ghetto is Khayelitsha. Outcome variables are dummy
variables for working in a high-skill occupation (column (1), medium
skill occupation (column (2)), and low-skill occupations (columns (3)
and (4)). The skill level of occupations is defined according to SSA def-
initions. Low-skill in column (4) also include armed forces and others.
Outcomes are observed across the period 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009 for YA
above 20 years old and not enrolled in school. Controls and sample are
the same as in Table 12. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.17: Results I: Health & behavioural outcomes in young adulthood.
Cigarettes Alcohol Other drugs Ever Pregnant
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gugulethu 0.152*** 0.158** 0.006 -0.071
(0.055) (0.067) (0.026) (0.075)
Langa -0.030 -0.022 0.007 -0.011
(0.073) (0.087) (0.052) (0.136)
Nyanga 0.063 0.120** 0.015 -0.027
(0.044) (0.052) (0.030) (0.075)
All Controls Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.218 0.201 0.041 0.164
N 535 534 535 317
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; the ex-
cluded ghetto is Khayelitsha. Outcome variables in columns (1) to (3) are dummy
variable equal to one if YA smokes, drinks alcohol and consumes drugs in the last
period. Ever pregnant is a dummy variable if the YA was ever pregnant in the period
studied (for females only). Sample and controls are as in Table 12. *** p<0.01,
**p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.20: Results III: Channels, on Education in young adulthood (all)
Years of education Ever college Delay in graduating grade
(1) (2) (3)
% Black 1996 0.141 -0.023 0.355
(0.185) (0.020) (0.300)
Access Index 2009 0.339** 0.045*** -0.052
(0.141) (0.016) (0.216)
Former black school -0.491** -0.003 -0.146
(0.234) (0.028) (0.315)
Km to white or coloured school 0.019 0.004 0.188**
(0.079) (0.006) (0.083)
Subsidy Transport 0.350* 0.012 -0.128
(0.196) (0.020) (0.314)
R-square 0.090 0.004 0.202
N 393 397 271
All Controls Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Outcome variables
in column (1) is a dummy variable for YA not working and not studying in 2009, years of
education (2) is the total years of formal education attained by the end of the period, ever
college (3) is a dummy variable for ever attending college over the years in the panel, and delay
in graduating grade is the delay in years for completing last observed high-school grade against
an upper bound (+1 year) of expected age of graduation. Controls are as in Table 12. The
sample is only compliers - i.e. YA residing in a former Apartheid Black ghetto who moved to
their neighbourhood of residence before the end of Apartheid’s Group Areas Act removal (1991),
these are Black only. Regressions are run separately by sex. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3 
 
Cholera in Times of Floods1 
Weather Shocks & Health in Dar es Salaam 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Climate change will have a significant impact on the lives of the poor in the years 
ahead as extreme weather events such as floods, heavy precipitation and droughts are 
expected to become more frequent (Harrington et al. 2016). Populations at different 
stages of development are affected differently by the same weather variations 
(Dasgupta, 2010; Burgess et al. 2017). As cities in developing countries continue to 
urbanize at an unprecedented pace, the question of how their urban dwellers are 
impacted by weather shocks is becoming increasingly relevant. On the one hand, urban 
residents may seem better prepared than their rural counterparts against weather 
extremes; their livelihoods are for instance less dependent on weather phenomena. Yet, 
rapid urbanization has often led to unplanned cities with poor infrastructure, limited 
public service provision, and with large segments of the population living in informal 
settlements.  
Empirical evidence is scant concerning the impact of weather shocks in developing 
country cities. This paper tries to make progress on this issue by looking at the effect of 
rainfall and flooding on cholera incidence in Dar es Salaam. Looking at health outcomes 
is important. Contagion is one “downside of density” (Glaeser & Sims 2015). 
Throughout history, cities with low-quality infrastructure and poor sanitation have been 
pockets of epidemics (for instance 19th century London or Paris, Kesztenbaum & 
                                                          
1 This research has benefited from valuable comments and conversations with Gharad Bryan, Ed Glaeser, 
Vernon Henderson, Aurélie Jandron, Henry Overman, Olmo Silva, as well as seminar participants at the 
LSE, the 7th European meetings of the UEA, and the 2017 Columbia University Ph.D. Workshop in 
Sustainable Development. We are also grateful to Mark Iliffe and Tanner Reagan for sharing datasets, and 
the Tanzanian Regional Medical Officers and Municipal Officers for assistance with accessing 
confidential cholera datasets, specifically Ndeniria Swai, Alex Mkamba, Michael Gweba, and Lawrent 
Chipatta, as well as Theophil Malibiche. Joshua Chipman and Claire Lwehabura were also very helpful 
during the process of this research.  
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Rosenthal 2016). Poor health and disease not only lower productivity in the short-term, 
they also hinder long-term economic growth (Well 2007).  
We examine this question in the context of a cholera outbreak in Dar es Salaam in 
2015 and 2016, during which almost five thousand cases were recorded. Cholera is a 
water and food-borne disease and its transmission is closely linked to inadequate access 
to clean water and sanitation facilities. Weather shocks such as rainfall can affect health 
through two main channels. The first one is related to direct mechanisms operating via 
human physiology and disease. In this case, heavy rainfall and floods can increase 
exposure to vibrio cholera bacteria, which survives better in wet environments (Lipp et 
al. 2002, Osei et al. 2010). Droughts have also been linked to cholera outbreaks, as 
population use unfit water for their needs (Sasaki et al. 2008, Taylor et al. 2015). The 
second sets of mechanisms are indirect ones, through the effect weather shocks may 
have on real incomes. In the case considered here, there are many ways through which 
floods and rainfall can reduce accessibility to work. The resulting lower income may in 
turn lower the consumption of health-improving goods (i.e. safe drinking water, 
medicines), increasing the exposure to the bacteria.  
Our empirical analysis uses finely disaggregated ward-level panel data containing 
weekly recorded cholera cases and weekly accumulated precipitation for all the 
municipalities in the city. We are therefore testing whether exogenous weekly rainfall 
variation at the ward-level affects cholera occurrence. Sorting between neighbourhoods 
is taken care of with ward-fixed effects. The short timeframe considered excludes any 
concern related to changes in sorting patterns. The use of high-frequency data and the 
fine geographical detail allow us to estimate with precision our relationship of interest. 
We focus on reduced-form specifications; different spatial and time-lag models support 
our choice. We complement our data with ward-level infrastructure characteristics (i.e. 
roads, footways, drains, water wells and housing informality) to understand the 
relationship between infrastructure quality, precipitation, and cholera. Dar es Salaam is a 
city of more than 4 million people where close to 70% of its residents live in informal 
settlements. Access to improved sanitation is very low and only 37% of the city has 
regular refuse collection (World Bank 2017).  
We find robust evidence that weekly accumulated rainfall and flooding leads to 
higher ward-level cholera occurrence. On average, a 10 mm increase in weekly 
accumulated precipitation leads to an increase of between 1.5% to 3.5% of weekly 
recorded cholera cases, significant at 1% level. The effect is found to be much larger 
when considering a more flexible quartile specification. On average, a single additional 
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week of rainfall falling above the 75th percentile of the total rainfall distribution (extreme 
rainfall), increases the number of effective cholera cases by up to 20.3% relative to a 
week with very light rain (<0.30 mm). Further, we find that the impact of heavy rainfall 
(>75th percentile) is close to 20 percentage points higher in wards at greater risk of 
flooding (i.e. higher flood-prone area), all else equal. A dry week (0 mm rainfall) is also 
positively related to cholera incidence, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
These findings are consistent with the direct and indirect mechanisms put forward 
earlier. Particularly, the inundation of drains, water systems, and pit latrines greatly 
enhances the risk of exposure to contaminated water and food. These results are robust 
to alternative estimators and specifications, including an instrumental variable strategy 
and controlling for the spatial autocorrelation of standard-errors.  
Remarkably, we find little to no spatial spillovers from precipitation in neighbouring 
wards. Only when considering the relative elevation of contiguous wards there is a small 
significant effect from precipitation in downhill wards. That is, a 10 mm increase in 
weekly accumulated rainfall in downhill neighbouring wards increases cholera cases in 
the ward by 0.01% to 0.03%. This finding is consistent with water source 
contamination. In contrast, our results reveal moderate time-dynamic effects. Using a 
distributed lag model, we find significant positive effects of past rainfall on cholera 
incidence to up to five preceding weeks. Contemporaneous rainfall remains the largest 
determinant, with a stable size close to 3% and statistical significance at or above 5% 
level. All lags decrease in size the farther in time.   
We explore the non-linear relationship of rainfall and cholera incidence with respect 
to various ward-level infrastructure characteristics as well. We find the effect of weekly 
rainfall on cholera cases to be consistently higher for wards with larger shares of 
informal housing and a higher density of footways (i.e. informal roads). These results 
are consistent with the two possible mechanisms outlined earlier. Neighbourhoods with 
limited access to sanitation and low-quality infrastructure are likely to be more exposed 
to the cholera bacteria when surfaces are washed and drains are overflown by severe 
precipitation. Vulnerable populations in these wards are also more likely to suffer from 
negative income shocks during extreme weather events.  
Our findings relate to three different bodies of research. The first one is a large 
economics literature looking at weather shocks and economic events mostly in 
advanced economies (Munshi 2003; Miguel et al. 2004; Barrios et al. 2010), and 
including health outcomes of human populations (Deschenes & Greenstone 2007; 
Deschenes & Moretti 2009; Burgess et al. 2011; Deschenes 2011). Our paper follows 
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their empirical methods (for a review see Dell et al. 2014). The second is the large 
literature in development economics and public health studying policy interventions, 
mechanism of transmission and health outcomes in developing countries (Banerjee et al. 
2004; Miguel & Kremer 2004; Dunkle et al. 2010; Penrose et al. 2010; Devoto et al. 
2012). Here, we contribute to that literature by focusing on urban areas and by studying 
general mechanisms beyond specific policy interventions. Our findings use robust 
econometrics techniques to discern the relationship between disease, infrastructure, and 
weather shocks. Finally, we particularly contribute to the nascent literature in urban 
economics studying the effects of weather phenomena on urban areas in developing 
country cities (Kocornik-Mina et al. 2015; Glaeser & Henderson 2017; Henderson et al. 
2017). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically study the 
effect of weather shocks on disease transmission within a city of a developing country. 
Our findings have important policy implications as extreme weather events become 
more frequent in the next decades. Cities in developing countries need to address 
infrastructure gaps to contain the risk of recurrent epidemic outbreaks in vulnerable 
populations and neighbourhoods. Investing in resilient infrastructure, with the proper 
servicing of informal settlements or related measures such a regulating waste dumping 
may prove to be more beneficial in the long-term than the use of short-term palliative 
measures during outbreaks. Evidence on large-scale policy interventions in urban areas 
is still limited and more is needed to understand how to prevent contagion of treatable 
diseases in developing cities.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section formalizes the relationship 
between health and weather shocks, specifically here cholera and rainfall in cities. 
Section 3.3 describes the context of Dar es Salaam, the cholera disease, and the data. In 
section 3.4 we present our empirical strategy. Section 3.5 presents the estimates of the 
effect of rainfall and flooding on cholera incidence and different extensions and 
robustness checks. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework: Weather & Health 
In this section, we describe a simple theoretical framework to examine the various 
channels through which weather shocks (i.e. here, heavy precipitation) can affect 
cholera incidence in an urban setting. It relies on endogenous health models in a 
simplified fashion (for more details see Becker 2007; Deschenes 2012; Burgess et al. 
2017).  
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Cholera is an acute diarrheal infection caused by ingestion of food or water 
contaminated with the bacterium vibrio cholera. It can affect both children and adults 
and can kill within hours if left untreated. The main reservoirs of the cholera bacterium 
are people and warm salt water bodies such as estuaries and coastal areas. Cholera 
transmission is closely linked to inadequate access to clean water and sanitation facilities 
(WHO 2017)2. Here we assume that weather shocks such as extreme rainfall, droughts 
and flooding can affect human health (i.e. cholera prevalence) both directly (through 
higher exposure to the bacteria, for instance), and indirectly (due to the negative 
income-shocks that may arise through the weather shock).  
Consider a city with a large number of agents indexed by i. Agents seek to maximize 
their lifetime utility 𝑢𝑖  depending on consumption 𝑐𝑖𝑡  and health status ℎ𝑖𝑡 . These two 
are complements. This city is partitioned into several neighbourhoods and each agent 
lives in a given neighbourhood (or ward) indexed by n. We assume that agents are 
exogenously allocated to neighbourhoods with different characteristics such as better 
infrastructure, and the latter are exogenously determined. It follows that agents have 
limited scope for affecting local infrastructure, as well as other public goods and 
services, and take these as given (mobility is limited in the short-term scenario 
considered here).  
Agent i’s health status, resident of neighbourhood n at time t, (ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑡), is thus 
determined by her consumption 𝑐𝑖𝑡 and random health shocks  𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡 . We do not specify 
a precise relationship between health outcomes and consumption, but it is assumed that 
an individual can improve her health by increasing her consumption, particularly by 
purchasing health-improving goods. All told, the agent’s health status is thus given by: 
ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑡 = ℎ𝑖(𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡) (3.1) 
where ℎ𝑖 (∙)  is increasing in 𝑐𝑖𝑡 and decreasing in 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡  (adverse health shocks). The 
function ℎ𝑖  is unrestricted and can differ across heterogeneous individuals. The vector 
𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡  includes weather-shocks 𝑤𝑡  such as flooding, droughts, and heavy rainfall or 
temperature extremes. We assume further that the effect of the weather shock is 
conditional on the quality of local neighbourhood infrastructures (𝑞𝑛 ) such as access to 
drinking water and waste water systems, or road and pavement material. The adverse 
health shock is thus a function of the weather shock that varies with local infrastructure, 
 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡 (𝑤𝑡 (𝑞𝑛)). 
                                                          
2 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs107/en/, accessed on 28 June 2017. 
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Consumption3 𝑐𝑖𝑡  is financed through labour income in period t, which depends on 
the agent’s productivity 𝑎𝑖𝑡 . Productivity is agent-specific but also depends on weather 
shocks  𝑤𝑡 : 
𝑎𝑖𝑡  =  𝑎𝑖(𝑤𝑡)    (3.2) 
Here the effect on productivity can stem from the weather shock’s impact on 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡, 
hampering the agent’s ability to work efficiently, or deter accessibility to jobs or other 
factors of production (i.e. machinery, location)4. A given weather shock 𝑤𝑡  thus affects 
an agent’s health status through both consumption (via productivity) and health 
idiosyncratic shocks (via 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡 ). In other words, there are two fundamental mechanisms 
through which weather shocks (extreme precipitation for the purpose of our empirical 
analysis) can potentially harm an agent’s health status here.  
First, through direct health effects: random shocks  𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡 , enter the agent’s health 
status directly as in equation (3.1). That is, holding constant the agent’s income, 
location, and consumption decisions, we expect a negative weather shock to impact this 
agent’s health adversely (𝑤𝑡  impacts 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡  in the language of our model). In the case 
considered here, heavy rainfall and flooding can directly impact one’s health status 
through greater exposure to and contact with contaminated water and food. An 
extensive public health literature discusses the potential for cholera prevalence in wet 
environments and in cases of heavy precipitation and flooding (see for example, Osei et 
al. 2012). Further, the magnitude of the effect can be expected to depend on the 
relationship the weather phenomena and the disease pathogens have with local 
infrastructure characteristics. Cholera strives in stagnant water and poor hygiene 
conditions as explained earlier. 
The second, more indirect mechanism through which weather can affect health in 
this model is through the agents’ productivity in equation (3.2). This term depends on 
weather shocks that may affect the agent’s ability to work via  𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡 . Flooding and heavy 
rainfall may also significantly affect work-places and accessibility in contexts where poor 
roads and infrastructure is widespread (see footnote 4). Reduced productivity can 
                                                          
3 We assume the consumption good is produced using an aggregate production function that requires 
capital and labour inputs; it exhibits decreasing return to scale. Goods can be bought and sold at the 
market price, which is exogenously determined. Agents are subject to budget constraints in each period 
which are a function of the labour income (in turn dependent on productivity and adverse weather 
shocks), as well as prices and quantities of goods consumed. We assume imperfect credit and savings 
markets which prevents agents from smoothing their consumption in time.  
4 We assume   𝑎𝑖𝑡  =  𝑎𝑖(𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝑤𝑡), 𝑄𝑛𝑡(𝑤𝑡))  , where 𝑄𝑛𝑡 refers to complements to work such as 
accessibility to jobs, machinery, or location, that can be affected by weather shocks.  
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translate in lower earnings and reduced consumption of healthier quality goods such as 
clean water or medicines. The dependency of productivity and hence, labour income, 
on this type of shocks is extremely likely in low-income countries where informal jobs 
dominate employment. It is estimated that close to 80% of jobs in the services sector 
are informal in Tanzania (UNDP 2015). Note that this assumes imperfect credit and 
savings markets preventing agents from smoothing their consumption when hit by 
economic hardship. Given the Tanzanian context, this assumption does not seem 
unrealistic.  
The main implication of this exercise is to expect an increase in cholera cases due to 
a weather shock such as extreme precipitation and flooding. The increase should be 
larger in neighbourhoods with poorer infrastructure. Conversely, the impact of heavy 
rainfall should be mitigated in areas with a supply of higher-quality local public goods. 
Linking this section with our empirical analysis, we expect to see non-linear effects of 
rainfall on cholera occurrence.  
Finally, one additional implication of this simple formalization concerns policy 
interventions. In the face of potential weather shocks, any agent i would seek to 
minimize the damage that the negative shock has on their utility, 𝑢𝑖(𝑐𝑖𝑡, ℎ𝑖𝑡) by 
consuming health-improving goods or potentially by reallocating resources between 
periods. This latter option here is limited due to credit and savings constraints. These 
potential shock-minimizing strategies have strong implications for policy. In the 
theoretical framework considered here, governments can reduce the adverse effect of 
weather on health outcomes by directly increasing the quality of infrastructure that is 
related to the pathogens’ transmission (i.e. pavement, sanitation, water drainage, 
sewage), and thus directly limit the potential effect of an adverse health shock,  𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑛. But 
they can also intervene by supporting the agent’s shock minimization strategies through 
subsidized health goods or direct transfers.  
3.3 Background & Data 
This section provides further details on cholera-specific characteristics as well as 
Dar es Salaam’s context. It also describes the data in detail and provides basic summary 
statistics.  
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3.3.1 Cholera 
Cholera is an acute diarrhoeal infection of fecal-oral transmission. It is caused by 
the ingestion of food or water contaminated with the bacterium vibrio cholera. It takes 
between twelve hours and five days for a person to show symptoms after ingesting 
contaminated food or water. It can affect both children and adults and can kill within 
hours if left untreated; there is a 50% death rate if untreated, but all deaths are avoidable 
otherwise. Main treatments include antibiotics and Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS). 
Roughly 1.3 to 4.0 million cases are recorded worldwide every year, and the disease is 
endemic to many parts of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (WHO 2017).  
There are multiple pathways for cholera transmission (Clasen et al. 2007). The 
disease is closely linked to inadequate access to clean water and sanitation facilities. Risk 
factors are also considered to be high population density and crowding, all of which are 
often common in urban slum areas (Penrose et al. 2010). Cholera incidence has been 
found to be highest in highly urbanized areas (Osei & Duker 2008; Sur et al. 2005). The 
main reservoirs of the cholera bacterium are people and warm salty water bodies such 
as estuaries and coastal areas. Global warming and rising sea levels are believed to create 
a favourable environment for cholera bacterium growth (WHO 2017). Heavy rainfall 
and flooding have all been associated with a higher likelihood of cholera outbreak. 
Surface runoff from point sources (pit-latrines, waste dump site, water wastes) may 
cause increased contamination of water sources, while stagnation and slow flowing of 
waterways may lead to increased exposure to cholera vibrios (Osei et al. 2010).  
3.3.2 Dar es Salaam 
Dar es Salaam is one of the largest cities in eastern Africa. It is located in the east of 
Tanzania by the Indian Ocean. Its urban population grew at 6.5% yearly between 2002 
and 2012 (Wenban-Smith 2014), and today the city counts with more than 4.4 million 
people. Since 2016, it is divided in five municipal districts: Ilala, Temeke, Kinondoni, 
Kigamboni and Ubungo5. These municipalities are further divided up into 90 wards.  
The rapid pace of urbanization has led to large infrastructure deficits. Close to 70% 
of Dar es Salaam’s residents live in informal settlements without adequate access to 
clean water, proper drainage system and waste collection (UN-HABITAT 2010; Natty 
2013). Only 13% of the city’s residents have adequate sewage systems and 37% of the 
                                                          
5 In the analysis, we only use 3 municipal districts as these were the ones that existed at the time cholera 
cases were recorded during the last outbreak. Ubungo and Kigamboni were created in 2016 from dividing 
Kinondoni and Ilala further so this does not impact our findings in any way.  
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solid waste is properly collected. The World Bank (2015) estimates that only 50% of 
residents have access to improved sanitation. The most common form of improved 
sanitation is improved pit-latrines (other forms are rare). About two-thirds of 
households in the city share their toilet facilities. Access to piped water is also very 
limited, with only 17% of city-centre dwellers having piped-water.  
Dar es Salaam’s geography and coastal location makes it vulnerable to climatic 
hazards, particularly floods, sea level rise and coastal erosion (Kebede and Nicholls 
2010). There are two rainy seasons every year, the short (October to December) and 
long (March to May) seasons, and average annual precipitation is above 1,000 mm. The 
combination of high informality and climatic vulnerability makes flood risk one of the 
main challenges for sustainability, exposing infrastructure and residents to safety and 
health hazards from vector-borne diseases such as malaria and cholera (World Bank 
2017).  
Cholera has been endemic in Tanzania since the 1970s and Dar es Salaam has 
historically been the most affected region6. During the 2015-2016 outbreak, there were 
over 24,000 cases recorded nationally, with more than one fifth in Dar es Salaam 
(Figure C1 in appendix)7. Previous outbreaks occurring between 2002 and 2006 
reported over 30,000 cases nationally, with nearly 18,000 in the capital city (WHO 
2008). Given the city’s poor sanitary conditions, high population density, lack of access 
to safe drinking water, and limited drainage, continuous heavy rainfall makes stagnant 
and unsanitary water a widespread health risk for common water borne diseases. The 
lack of storm water drains, frequently blocked by unregulated waste dumping, means 
that heavy rainfall quickly leads to flooding and contaminates water wells (Pan-African 
START 2011).  
3.3.3 Data 
To examine the relationship between weather variation and cholera incidence 
outlined in our theoretical framework, we collect data from several sources and put 
together a comprehensive ward-level panel dataset for each week between the first week 
of March 2015 and the first week of September 2016. The choice of the timeframe is 
data constrained – that is, we use the first week for which precipitation data is available 
and the last week for which cholera cases were recorded to avoid measurement error 
                                                          
6 The largest cholera epidemic in Tanzania to date took place in 1997 where 40,000 cases were reported. 
The epidemic is said to have started in Dar es Salaam. Dar es Salaam has had the most cholera cases since 
2002 of all regions of the country (Penrose et al. 2010). 
7 All tables and figures indexed by C# are in Appendix C. 
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from unrecorded cases. We cover all the 90 wards of the city8. The use of high-
frequency data and the fine geographical detail allow us to estimate with precision our 
relationship of interest. The basic panel thus consists of weekly cholera cases registered 
according to the ward of residence. We combine this data with weekly accumulated 
precipitation and weekly air-temperature in these wards. Further, we add data on ward-
level infrastructure, geographical characteristics (i.e., elevation, flood-prone surface) and 
population (census). We outline below the different data sources. Main summary 
statistics are in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
3.3.3.1 Cholera cases 
The key data in this analysis are the new ward-level cholera cases collected from the 
Regional Medical Office and Municipal Health Officers for all the wards of Dar es 
Salaam and covering the entire 2015-2016 outbreak. The data was registered daily for 
each individual presenting symptoms of severe diarrhoea in a medical facility. It includes 
basic socio-demographic characteristics (age, sex) of the individual, the ward and sub-
ward of residence, as well as the date of the first symptom and registration at the 
hospital. Cases were tested for the vibrio cholera bacteria, and the dataset also includes 
lab results. We exclude all cases tested negative and focus on effective cholera cases 
only9. No positive case is reported earlier than mid-August 2015 (epidemic week zero). 
The outbreak officially lasted from August 2015 until May 2016. We aggregate the daily 
cases by week to account for the fact that the incubation period is between 12 hours to 
5 days.  
Measurement error is a potential problem. The biggest threat concerns the 
possibility that not all cholera cases are reported in the non-outbreak period. It is also 
possible that not all registered cases during the peak of the epidemic are effective 
cholera cases (see footnote 8). There are mitigating factors against both these risks. 
First, cholera is one of the few diseases that require reporting to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) by the International Health Regulations as it can quickly spread if 
left untreated and result in explosive outbreaks. This implies careful monitoring of the 
disease as well as frequent laboratory testing. Further, we focus our analysis during an 
outbreak where monitoring is more likely to be enforced. Finally, our baseline estimates 
                                                          
8 Since mid-2016 there are 5 municipalities in Dar es Salaam as two municipalities were further sub-
divided. We use the original administrative units at the time of the outbreak in our regression analysis for 
simplicity and coherence with the recorded cholera dataset. This should not affect any of the results.  
9 We include both positive and untested cases. Most untested cases are at the peak of the outbreak when 
all patients presenting symptoms are treated as cholera patients. Measurement error is possible but should 
be limited as tests are frequently carried, particularly at the beginning and end of the outbreak period.  
 121 
 
 
 
121 
are weighted by the population of the ward, to account for the difference in precision 
concerning cholera measurement from larger and smaller populated wards. While bias 
from measurement error in our dependent variable is still possible, it should not be 
large. 
Overall, close to 5 thousand cases of cholera were reported positive in Dar es 
Salaam in the period analysed (4964 of total 5698 tested), with the bulk taking place 
during the first 10 weeks of the outbreak (Figures 3.1 & 3.2). On average, during the 
period covered there were 0.72 effective cases weekly per ward. The number is larger 
during the first 10 weeks of the epidemic (3.16) as well as the first 20 weeks of the 
epidemic (2.54) (Table 3.2). Cholera cases were more pronounced in Kinondoni and 
Ilala, reporting totals of 2428 and 1796, respectively. Temeke was the least affected 
(Figure C2). Most cases took place within 15 km from the Dar es Salaam CBD (Figure 
3.3); only 2 of the 90 wards reported zero positive cases throughout the period.   
3.3.3.2 Weather & geography  
Rainfall - The weather datasets in this paper are from NASA. The daily precipitation 
measures by ward are derived from the Integrated Multi-satellite Retrievals (IMERG) 
for Global Precipitation Mission (GPM), where rainfall is comprehensively measured at 
the highest accuracy and finest spatial resolution to date (Huffman, 2016). We use the 
near-real-time total daily rainfall defined as precipitation accumulated in the past 24 
hours by 23:59pm (Coordinated Universal Time) of each day. We calculate weekly 
accumulated precipitation from the daily data. In terms of the spatial resolution, rainfall 
is measured at squared pixels of 0.1 ◦ × 0.1 ◦ (roughly 120km2). 
As ward boundaries are irregularly shaped, we compute ward-level daily rainfall 
accumulation by weighting recorded rainfall with the ward overlay with satellite pixels. 
We first union these two layers to create polygons at the ward-pixel level. These ward-
pixel polygons all have consistent rainfall measurement, and their respective area is 
computed. We then sum up the ward-pixel rainfall measures for each ward by weighting 
by their ward area share. This gives us the area-weighted weekly rainfall accumulation at 
the ward level (Figure C3). The choice of focusing on rainfall accumulation (i.e. total 
weekly rainfall) stems from the fact that precipitation is ‘readily stored’ in the soil, tanks, 
or water wells. It is stagnant water that might breed cholera and thus, measuring average 
rainfall instead would fail to take this important dimension into account.  
Because satellite data are subject to error (Dell et al. 2014), we also use an 
additional and independent gridded data set to address potential measurement issues 
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and obtain instrumental variables (IV) estimates. We use precipitation obtained from 
IMERG’s predecessor technology, the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) 
(Goddard Earth Sciences Data and Information Services Center 2016). Despite the fact 
that TRMM is less accurate (Shari et al. 2016; Chen and Li. 2016; Wang et al. 2017) and 
its resolution coarser, it has been widely used since 1997. Its algorithm intercalibrates all 
existing satellite microwave precipitation measures, microwave-calibrated infrared 
satellite estimates, and precipitation gauge analyses. The near-real-time data is chosen 
over the production data as it is recommended for flood and crop forecasting (NASA 
Precipitation Measurement Missions 2016). The instrumental variables approach is 
motivated by the fact that both satellite measures assign weather variables to grid points 
and contain measurement error in their ‘true’ representation of rainfall. In that case, the 
IV estimates can correct for measurement error bias under the assumption that errors in 
both variables are uncorrelated (Burgess et al. 2017).  
Temperature - The daily temperature data also comes from NASA. We obtained 
near-surface air temperature (i.e., temperature at the height of most human activities) 
from the FLDAS Noah Land Surface Model (McNally 2016). The spatial resolution of 
this dataset is also 0.1 ◦ × 0.1 ◦, so ward-level daily temperature is computed similarly to 
rainfall above. Average weekly temperature is later computed at the weekly level. 
Elevation – The elevation calculation is based on the Japan Aerospace Exploration 
Agency (JAXA) global digital surface model. The measurement is at 30-meter spatial 
resolution, based on the most precise global-scale elevation data at this time acquired by 
the Advanced Land Observing Satellite. Mean ward-level elevation is computed across 
all grids that fall inside each ward. 
Flood-prone surface – To estimate the surface of a ward that is prone to flooding, we 
use data collected by the NGO Dar Ramani Huria (RH) in OpenStreetMap (OSM) 
format. Using community-based mapping RH is able to create highly accurate maps of 
infrastructure and flood-prone areas in Dar es Salaam. We complement their detailed 
mapping of drainage, waterways and wetlands with GeoFabrik’s OSM data for missing 
wards. The data is less accurate but allows us to have a larger coverage. We then use 
InaSAFE10 to model build-areas prone to inundation and calculate the total share of the 
ward area that is flood-prone. We compare our estimates to the more precise-ones of 
RH for available wards. The pairwise correlation is 0.81.  
                                                          
10 InaSAFE is a free software that produces realistic natural hazard impact scenarios. It was developed by 
the government of Indonesia, the Australian government and the World Bank. For more details see 
http://inasafe.org/ (last accessed on July 21st 2017). 
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Basic summary statistics of weather and geographical variables are displayed in 
Table 3.2. The average weekly rainfall in Dar es Salaam according to the meteorological 
agency amounts to 20.6 mm. This is consistent with our weekly accumulation from 
both TRMM and GPM’s measures. On average, in the period covered there were 20.1 
mm of accumulated rainfall weekly, with a median of 2.9 mm. The rainiest month is 
usually April, which is seconded by our dataset. There is little spatial variation of 
temperature across the city’s’ wards, the average recorded weekly is 26.7º C with a 
standard deviation of 0.37º C. On average 10% of the area of a ward is prone to 
flooding, but there are significant disparities across wards (the standard deviation being 
16%).  
3.3.3.3 Infrastructure & population  
Infrastructure - Infrastructure data at the ward-level is also obtained from data 
collected by RH’s in OSM format, and complemented with GeoFabrik’s for missing 
wards. We focus on the following characteristics which are likely to be correlated with 
cholera incidence: drains, roads, footways (i.e. unpaved roads) and water wells. For the 
first four variables, we use their density, calculated as the number of km per square km. 
Aside from roads where we can distinguish between roads and footways, we have no 
specific measure of quality of the infrastructure. A general assumption is to think that a 
higher density of roads and drains reflect higher-quality infrastructure, while a higher 
density of footways reflects lower-quality. The distinction in practice is hard to make, 
particularly for drains. Anecdotal evidence suggests drains often get clogged by 
unregulated waste dumping due to heavy rainfall and quickly contaminate surfaces. We 
are thus agnostic concerning the expected signs of these coefficients. We have 
unfortunately no data on sewerages11.  
We obtained a dataset of formal and informal plots from the municipalities’ 
database of surveyed plots, and are then able to estimate the share of the ward’s area 
that houses informal settlements. Not all municipalities have mapped their informal 
plots fully12 which explains the smaller sample when using this data. For the wards for 
which we have information, 34% of the total areas are on average informal. The large 
number reflects the fact that 70% of the population of Dar es Salaam lives in informal 
settlements.  
                                                          
11 Basic sanitation data in Table 3.1 is obtained from the 10% sample of the Census 2012. Unfortunately, 
these are only used in the descriptive section because of the lack of consistency in the sample. 
12 Only the Municipality of Kinondoni has. 
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Population- We make use of the population data from the Census 2012 to weight our 
regressions by ward population size. The interest in this is twofold. First, cholera 
incidence in wards with large populations is likely to be more precise, so weighting 
corrects for heteroskedasticity associated with these differences in precision (Burgess et 
al. 2017). Second, rather than on the average ward, the results reveal the impact on the 
average person, which is more meaningful here. We also use this data to calculate ward-
level population density. The average ward of Dar es Salaam was populated with 48.5 
thousand people in 2012; population density was 11.53 per square km (Table 3.1).  
3.4 Empirical Strategy 
In this section, we describe the econometric methods we use to estimate the effect 
of precipitation on cholera occurrence. As the relationship between rainfall and new 
cholera cases is expected to be non-linear, we adopt both parametric and flexible semi-
parametric specifications. We begin by presenting specifications measuring the 
contemporaneous effect of precipitation. We then consider models allowing for the 
effect of rainfall to be associated with local public goods provision and other ward 
characteristics. We also assess the importance of the spatial spillovers of precipitation. 
Lastly, the last sub-section details a more general dynamic model including various 
precipitation time lags. 
3.4.1 Contemporaneous effects 
 To quantify the contemporaneous effect of rainfall on cholera incidence in any 
given ward and week, we begin by estimating a baseline panel log-linear model relating 
the logarithm of cholera cases13 to weekly rainfall accumulation for this ward: 
Cwmt = α. Rwt + γ. Twt + µw + δt + θm. t + εwmt  (3.3) 
where Cwmt is the outcome variable (log of total cholera cases) in ward w in week t. 
The key explanatory variable of interest is Rwt , measuring weekly accumulated rainfall. 
We also control for ward daily temperatures measured as weekly averages (Twt) as 
temperature variation is likely to be correlated with rainfall variation. Since our focus is 
                                                          
13 Since no cholera cases are recorded in several wards and weeks in our sample, we add one to all cholera 
cases and take the logarithm of that expression. In mathematical terms: Cwmt = ln(1 + Cwmt). We test 
the results to linear regressions where the dependent variable is the ratio of cholera cases for every ten 
thousand people of the ward. Results are unchanged (section Appendix C, section C.IV) and we prefer 
the specification that considers the non-linear relationship between rainfall and cholera. 
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on precipitation and spatial variation in temperature in Dar es Salaam is limited, we 
model a linear temperature effect. The specification in equation (3.3) also includes a full 
set of ward fixed effects, µw , absorbing unobserved time-fixed ward idiosyncratic 
characteristics. Permanent differences in access to healthcare for instance will therefore 
not confound the estimates. Their inclusion also addresses the potential issue of sorting 
across neighbourhoods. We also include week fixed effects, δt, to control for time-
varying influences common across wards. The equation also includes municipality linear 
time trends to account for time-varying factors that differ across administrative 
boundaries and affect health. We also estimate equation (3.3) with municipality-week 
fixed effects to flexibly control for unobserved municipality-wide time shocks. We use 
only three municipalities in the analysis as these were the administrative divisions 
existing at the time of data collection. Further, the main three hospitals are located in 
these municipalities. As shown later, our estimations across these specifications are 
consistent and robust. εwmt is an error term clustered at the ward level. Finally, we 
weight our regressions by ward population as explained earlier. Unweighted regressions 
are in Appendix C (section C.I). Results are unchanged. 
To take into account non-linear relationships more rigorously, we also estimate 
contemporaneous rainfall effects using the following flexible model: 
Cwmt = ∑ βk. 1{Rwt in quartile k} +
4
k=1  ϕ. Twt + µw + δt + θm. t + ηwmt 
 (3.4) 
where the independent variables we are mainly interested in capturing are the 
distribution of weekly rainfall in Dar es Salaam. The regressors 1{Rwt  in quartile k} 
calculate whether the total amount of rainfall Rwt  in week t and ward w was in the first, 
second, third, or fourth quartile of the rainfall distribution of our study period. We 
estimate a separate coefficient on each of these quartile variables and treat the second 
quartile as the omitted reference category. The other regressors are as defined in 
equation (3.3). This approach has two benefits. The first one is to allow for more 
flexibility in the response function. The second one, more relevant here, is that it also 
allows us to specifically distinguish the effect of intense and light rain. The upper 
quartile (>75th percentile) is generally used as a proxy for flooding (Chen et al. 2017).  
The parameters in equations (3.3) and (3.4) are thus identified from ward-specific 
deviations in rainfall from the ward average remaining after controlling for week fixed 
effects and municipality linear trends. Given the relatively short time period of analysis 
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we argue that this variation is as good as exogenous and uncorrelated with other 
unobserved determinants of cholera incidence. 
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) make several important assumptions about the effect of 
rainfall on cholera. First, they assume that the impact depends on weekly accumulation 
alone. It ignores the possibility of within week variation in rainfall having an effect on 
health. In addition, equation (3.4) assumes that the impact of rainfall is constant within 
a given quartile. While this might be restrictive, we estimate separate quartile 
coefficients to improve on equation (3.3) and its parametric assumptions. Third, by 
estimating contemporaneous effects, we assume that past weekly rainfall does not affect 
health outcomes. We also ignore the possibility of neighbouring wards’ rainfall 
influencing a given ward’s cholera outcomes. We relax some of these assumptions in 
what follows.  
A final concern is spatial dependence. In this case, within-cluster correlations in the 
specification of the error covariance matrix (i.e., standard-errors clustered at the ward 
level) may not be enough (Barrios et al. 2012). To account for this issue, we also 
compute equations (3.3) and (3.4) using Conley (1999) spatial standard-errors14. The 
implicit assumption is that spatial dependence is linearly decreasing in the distance from 
the wards centroids up to a cutoff distance, for which we chose 50 km based on Dar es 
Salaam’s extent. This technique ensures that uncertainty in 𝛼 and β is adjusted to 
account for heteroscedasticity, ward-specific serial correlation, and cross-sectional 
spatial correlation. Statistical significance is generally unchanged. We consider these 
results as robustness checks in Appendix C Section C. II. 
We are interested in reduced-forms here. However, we are conscious that the true 
(unknown) relationship may include some time dependency in the dependent variable. 
That is, past cholera may determine contemporaneous cholera. To test the validity of 
our fixed-effects model, we compute a dependent-lagged model instead in Table C15 in 
Appendix C. While we find the effect of lagged cholera cases significant, and positive 
up to 5 weeks, the size of the coefficient for contemporaneous precipitation always 
remain stable and statistically significant. Further, contemporaneous rainfall is 
orthogonal to past cholera. Including the lags would only increase the precision of our 
point estimates but should not alter the identifying assumptions. 
 
 
                                                          
14 We use the Stata code developed by Fetzer (2010) and Hsiang (2010). 
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3.4.2 Non-linear effects and spatial spillovers 
Ward characteristics, such as population density or the number of water wells, may 
affect the impact of rainfall on health as outlined in our theoretical framework. To 
account for this possibility, we estimate variations of equation (3.3) that include 
interactions between rainfall and ward features. While local public goods are not 
exogenously allocated to wards, there are several reasons to believe this is not a problem 
here. First, the use of ward fixed effects should deal with neighbourhood sorting. 
Further, the lack of proper infrastructure is widespread in Dar es Salaam and public 
health evidence suggests households from all income-levels may be affected by cholera. 
Using the 2015-16 Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey and Malaria Indicator 
Survey (DHS) we test the relationship between income, wealth, and incidence of 
diarrhoeal diseases in the city (Appendix D). We find no evidence in favour of a wealth 
bias regarding the risk of contracting a diarrheal disease. 
We also measure whether contemporaneous precipitation in neighbouring wards 
affect cholera cases in a given ward. We focus on first contiguity wards and consider 
total neighbouring accumulated rainfall to begin with. We then distinguish between 
rainfall recorded in uphill and downhill neighbouring wards. We calculate the average 
elevation of each unit and classify as uphill the neighbouring wards with a relatively 
higher elevation. Downhill neighbouring wards have a lower or equal average elevation. 
Formally the model we estimate is as follows: 
Cwt = ρ1. Rwt + ρ2. URwt + ρ3. DRwt + π. Twt + µw + δt + ςwt (3.5) 
where URwt and DRwt measure weekly accumulated rainfall in uphill and downhill 
neighbours, respectively. The other regressors are defined as in equations (3.3) and (3.4).  
3.4.3 Dynamic effects  
The empirical approaches discussed so far do not address the possibility of a 
dynamic relationship between precipitation and new cholera cases. Rainfall in one week 
might result in increased cholera incidence in the following weeks due its incubation 
period and the manner in which the disease spreads. This delayed response would imply 
that the contemporaneous estimates from equation (3.3) underestimate the true impact 
of rainfall. We investigate this possibility by including a distributed lag structure in our 
models:     
Cwt = ∑ λj. Rwt−j +
J
j=0  ρ. Twt + µw + δt + ζwt  (3.6) 
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This model allows the effect of rainfall up to J weeks in the past to affect cholera 
incidence in a given week. In equation (3.6), the total dynamic effect of rainfall on 
cholera cases is obtained by summing the coefficients on the contemporaneous and 
lagged rainfall variables. Different lag structures potentially generate different estimates 
of the dynamic causal effect. As a consequence, we experiment with several time lags 
and use up to 5 lagged weekly accumulated precipitation in our regressions.  
3.5 Main Results 
This section presents our empirical results on the relationship between precipitation 
and cholera incidence. We begin with discussing baseline contemporaneous estimates of 
both rainfall and flooding. We then assess the importance of non-linear effects, spatial 
spillovers and measure dynamic effects last. 
3.5.1 Baseline effects 
Our baseline results concern the effect of rainfall and precipitation on weekly-ward 
cholera occurrence. Tables 3.3-3.6 report baseline estimates of population-weighted 
regressions. Unweighted regressions are in Appendix C Section C.I (Tables C.1-C4), 
while the same regressions with Conley HAC standard-errors are in section C.II (Tables 
C.7-C9). Conclusions remain unchanged irrespective of the specification.  
Table 3.3 reports estimates based on equation (3.3). The first column shows 
coefficients obtained with ward and week fixed effects only. Precipitation is found to 
have a positive and statistically significant effect on cholera. The point estimate suggests 
that a 10 mm increase in weekly accumulated rainfall causes a 2% increase in recorded 
cholera cases in a given ward. Including municipality linear trends does not affect the 
results much (column 2). Municipality-week fixed effects are controlled for instead in 
column 3. While the impact of precipitation remains statistically significant at the 1% 
level, its magnitude increases; that is, there are 3.4% additional cholera cases per ward 
every 10 mm increases in rainfall. Overall, these reduced form estimates consistently 
show a positive impact of precipitation on cholera incidence.  
All subsequent tables are organized in the same fashion, with municipality trends 
added in column 2 and municipality-week fixed effects added in column 3. To test the 
sensitivity of our results to measurement error in the recorded rainfall data, we 
instrument our main precipitation variable with rainfall recorded by the TRMM satellite 
as explained in section 3.3.3.2. The potential sources of measurement error in these two 
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datasets are likely to be unrelated, and therefore uncorrelated. Results are displayed in 
Table 3.4. The two satellite-based precipitation variables are strongly correlated, and 
first stage F statistics range between 24 and 37 across specifications (see fourth row). 
Our two-stages least squares coefficient estimates remain positive but become larger as 
attenuation bias theory would predict. Including municipality-week fixed effects results 
in a loss of statistical significance (column 3). The first stage F-statistic is also lower 
however, inflating standard errors to some degree. On the whole, our findings are 
supported by the IV results. There is a strong positive relationship between cholera 
occurrence in a given ward and precipitation. In the interest of proceeding 
conservatively we continue to stress the OLS results hereafter, but Table 3.4 suggests 
that the true impact of precipitation on cholera may be even larger. 
Table 3.5 explores the impact of rainfall using the more flexible quartile 
specification detailed in equation (3.4). The second rainfall quartile (light rain or 
precipitation between 0 to 2.9 mm weekly) is used as omitted category. Notably, the 
semi-parametric relationship between weekly accumulated rainfall and cholera 
occurrence show particularly large effects at the upper-end of the rainfall distribution. 
Indeed, the estimated coefficients in the three columns consistently indicate that 
extreme precipitation has a strong impact on cholera incidence. For instance, a single 
additional week with recorded rainfall falling in the fourth quartile (>75th percentile, 
between 26.9 mm and 408.6 mm weekly), relative to a week with light rain, increases the 
number of new cholera cases by 20.3% (column 2). The first quartile coefficients, 
measuring loosely speaking the effect of a dry week relative to little rainfall, are positive 
but not statistically significant. These results are key findings in our paper. Clearly, 
extreme rainfall has a higher incidence on ward-level cholera occurrence than light rain, 
suggesting not all ranges of precipitation are necessarily related to cholera occurrence. 
Moreover, upper-quartile rain has been consistently used in the literature as a proxy for 
flooding (Chen et al. 2017), and implies water stagnation may be a likely mechanism.   
To explore further the role of extreme precipitation, Table 3.6 puts the emphasis on 
flooding and attempts to measure its impact in various ways. We begin with assessing 
whether the impact of rainfall is non-linear and depends on the extent to which a ward 
is prone to flooding. We use our measure of the share of the ward that is subject to 
flooding and interact it with weekly accumulated rainfall. Our results presented in panel 
A show a positive interaction term as theory would predict. The interaction is non-
statistically significant however. The coefficient of the uninteracted precipitation 
measure remains in the same order of magnitude as the coefficients of Table 3.3. In 
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panel B we measure the effect of the fourth quartile precipitation relative to the rest of 
the precipitation distribution. Here flooded is a dummy variable for weekly accumulated 
rainfall falling on the upper-quartile of the overall rainfall distribution. Our estimates are 
positive, significant at the 1% level, and stable across alternative specifications. In panel 
C we interact the flooded dummy with our flood-prone area share defined as above. 
The interaction term is now positive and significant at 5% level, implying that the 
impact of heavy rainfall is much higher in wards at greater risk of flooding all else equal.  
Overall, the results of this section support the theoretical mechanisms described in 
section 3.2 and the channels put forward in the public health literature. There are 
various reasons why heavy rainfall and flooding could lead to an increase in cholera, as 
mentioned earlier. Not only the bacterium survives longer in wet humid surfaces, but 
the risk of increased contamination is higher. The inundation of drains, water systems, 
and pit latrines, greatly enhances the probability of exposure to contaminated water and 
food. Further, behavioural changes during periods of weather shocks may also increase 
the probability of contagion (WHO). Finally, indirect mechanisms through income-
shocks due to the inundation of job locations or inaccessibility to the work-place may 
further contribute to the adoption of risky behaviour.  
3.5.2 Non-linear effects: a story of infrastructure quality? 
We now explore further the relationship between rainfall and cholera incidence and 
assess potential non-linearities related to ward-level characteristics. As explained above, 
the size of the weather shock in a given ward is likely to depend on the quality of the 
infrastructure such as the availability of well-functioning drains, paved roads and 
improved sanitation. This section concentrates on the correlation that rainfall and 
several indicators of ward infrastructure and ‘neighbourhood quality’ has with cholera 
incidence. Our choice of ward characteristics is in part dictated by data availability. We 
focus on population density, road density, as well as the density of drains and footways, 
and the number of water wells. We also include the percentage of the ward’s area that 
hosts informal and formal housing.   
As mentioned earlier, we are constrained when it comes to measuring the quality of 
infrastructure and focus on quantity when no distinction is possible. Because of this, 
while we expect higher population density to increase the measured effect of rainfall on 
cholera through a heightened risk of contagion, we are agnostic with respect to the 
influence of road and water infrastructure measures. On the one hand, greater physical 
supply of water wells and drains could be negatively associated with cholera by 
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efficiently evacuating used-water and rain. On the other hand, it could magnify the 
impact of heavy precipitation on cholera when the quality is low, for instance if because 
of unregulated dumping, drains and evacuation canals are clogged in times of heavy 
rain.  
Table 3.7 reports baseline estimates of population-weighted regressions. Estimates 
of unweighted regressions are in Table C5, and results with Conley HAC standard-
errors are in Tables C10, both in Appendix C. The size of the coefficients is stable 
across our different specifications. Further, contemporaneous precipitation remains 
consistently positive and statistically significant at between 1 to 5% levels.  
The first seven columns of the tables separately estimate each interaction term, 
while in the last three columns we estimate all interactions jointly. Since we lose a large 
number of observations when we include certain interactions, we report results using 
three alternative samples. Overall, almost all characteristics considered individually are 
positive and significant at various levels of significance. Yet, only footway densities and 
housing informality are consistently so across the different specifications. The 
mechanisms here are intuitive. Footways are unpaved roads. Contaminated water might 
stagnate easier in muddy surfaces. At the same time, footways could just reflect 
informality. Indeed, informality displays the larger size, with on average weekly 
accumulated rainfall increasing cholera incidence by 2.3% to 4.5% more in wards with 
higher shares of informal housing.  
  Once we introduce all interaction terms together in columns (8) to (10) 
significance and signs are considerably changed suggesting individual interactions may 
be suffering from omitted variable bias. Nonetheless, some important patterns remain. 
First, the only consistently positive and statistically significant coefficient (at 5% level) 
across the various specifications is the non-linear informal housing correlation. While, 
the sample size is much smaller, results suggest living on informal housing increases 
cholera incidence due to weekly accumulated rainfall by between 2.3% and 2.7%.  This 
finding is far from surprising. Informal settlements are usually located in flood-prone 
areas. They suffer from poor quality infrastructure and deprived water and sanitation 
conditions. Penrose et al. (2010) find similar patterns when investigating a previous 
cholera episode in Dar es Salaam. Two other infrastructure interactions display stable 
sizes and signs. The non-linear water wells correlation is negative but almost never 
statistically significant. Related to informality, wards with a higher density of footways 
have again a higher likelihood of accumulated rainfall affecting weekly cholera 
incidence. The size is small (between 0.2% to 2%), and fails to be statistically significant.  
 132 
 
 
 
132 
These results support the theoretical mechanisms outlined earlier. First, informal 
housing and unpaved roads increase the effect of the weather shock. They are thus 
likely to affect individuals directly and indirectly through health and productivity shocks. 
Our results so far, despite being imperfectly measured, suggest the quality of 
infrastructure is highly correlated with the detrimental effect accumulated rainfall and 
flooding have on cholera prevalence.  
3.5.3 Spatial spillovers: Neighbours contagion. 
Next, we focus on spatial precipitation spillovers as in equation (3.5). Precipitation 
recorded in adjacent wards might exacerbate pressure on water infrastructures. They 
might also contaminate common water sources, particularly if wards are at different 
levels of elevation. In this case, uphill rainfall may also wash down contaminated waste 
or soil material, harming wards below. Table 3.8 contains our baseline results, while 
Tables C6 and C13 in Appendix C contain the usual alternative specifications.  
We first estimate the average effect of weekly accumulated rain in neighbouring 
wards on the cholera incidence of a given ward. We do not find evidence of an effect 
here. The estimated coefficients are almost no different from zero and insignificant 
across econometric specifications. In Table C11 of Appendix C we further look at the 
effect of one and two-weeks lags of neighbouring rainfall. None of these spatial lagged 
variables seem to matter.  
We then differentiate between rainfall accumulation in uphill and downhill 
neighbouring wards. Results here are more nuanced. We register a small but significant 
effect from accumulated weekly precipitation in adjacent downhill wards. That is, a 10 
mm increase in weekly accumulated rainfall in downhill neighbouring wards increases 
cholera cases in the ward by 0.01% to 0.03%. This finding is consistent with water 
source contamination from relatively lower wards. The size is negligible suggesting 
almost no spatial spillovers from rainfall in contiguous areas. Further, precipitation in 
one’s own ward is almost always significant at 1% level, retaining the size of baseline 
estimates. Again, allowing for time lags yields no significant effect (Table C12).  
Failing to detect any spatial spillovers of precipitation in contiguous wards is 
unexpected. It suggests only local contamination prevails. This is consistent with 
findings in Ambrus et al. (2015) on the 1854 cholera epidemic in London’s Soho 
neighbourhood. Their identification strategy and results suggest cholera is contained 
within a very specific area. Implications concerning channels of transmission are many 
but go beyond the scope of this paper.  
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3.5.4 Time dynamic effects. 
So far, we have not taken into account the possibility of a dynamic relationship 
between rainfall and cholera incidence. If cholera responds to precipitation with a delay, 
that is, if precipitation in previous weeks or days also impacts cholera in the current 
week, the estimates of Table 3.3 could underestimate the true effect. While cholera 
symptoms can manifest 12 hours after an individual being in contact with the bacteria, 
they can also take up to 5 days. These might not coincide with our weekly definition. 
Further, rainfall is easily stored and stagnation from previous weeks may contribute 
heavily to contagion.   
To test for dynamic effects, we estimate distributed lag models (equation 3.6) and 
allow rainfall to affect health up to five weeks later. The sixth lag of rain (not shown) is 
not statistically significant. We also report the contemporaneous coefficient and the sum 
of the six week period. Table 3.9 displays our point estimates.  We gradually introduce 
additional rainfall lags in our model, which includes municipality-week fixed effects.  
First, this exercise allows us to confirm that including time-lags does not change our 
conclusions. The contemporaneous rainfall effect on cholera remains in the same order 
of magnitude as in Table 3.3, close to 3% and statistically significant at 1% level. 
Second, the results in the table clearly show that past rainfall up to five preceding weeks 
impact cholera incidence in the current week. All lags decrease in size the farther in 
time, suggesting the contemporaneous effect matters most. The total effect of 
precipitation is obtained by summing the coefficients on the contemporaneous and 
lagged precipitation variables. The total cumulated impact amounts to 0.12 points (last 
row). That is, six-week cumulated rainfall increases current cholera incidence in a ward 
by up to 12%.  The key message of this table is that weekly cumulated rainfall promotes 
cholera occurrence immediately and with a lag of up to 5 weeks.  
We repeat the exercise with our more flexible semi-parametric specification in Table 
3.10 (quartiles). The table is as Table 3.9 except that we only include lags up to two 
weeks later. The third lags (not shown) are not statistically significant. Again, the 
predominant effect is that of extreme rainfall or flooding captured in the upper-quartile, 
and up to two prior weeks. As before, all lags decrease in size the farther in time, 
suggesting the contemporaneous effect matters most. Further, we confirm that the 
inclusion of the lags does not affect our conclusions as the size and statistical 
significance are unchanged for contemporaneous coefficients. The total cumulative 
effect of each quartile is also computed in the last row. The total cumulated impact 
amounts to 0.37 points for the upper-quartile. It is interesting to highlight that the size 
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of the two-week lag of the first quartile (no rain) remains positive but increases in size. 
It is even statistically significant at 10% level for one specification. This supports 
theories according to which dryness also matters for cholera incidence by increasing the 
risk of drinking unsafe water. The time lag is consistent with this type of behavioural 
changes.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Rapid urbanization in developing countries has often led to unplanned cities, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, with large shares of the urban population living in 
informal settlements, with poor transport infrastructure and limited access to water and 
sanitation. Under these conditions, developing countries’ city dwellers have become 
more vulnerable to disease transmission and epidemics. Global warming is expected to 
exacerbate these health-related risks. The World Bank (2016) estimates that climate 
change may push up to 77 million more urban residents into poverty by 2030. As 
extreme weather events become more frequent, understanding the relationship between 
disease transmission, infrastructure quality and weather shocks in urban areas is 
important. We make significant advances on this issue.  
The key contribution of this paper has been to show that heavy rainfall has a strong 
positive effect on weekly cholera incidence within wards. We assemble a panel dataset 
defined at the ward level containing weekly information on cholera incidence, 
precipitation, and infrastructure quality from various sources. On average, we find that a 
10 mm increase in weekly accumulated precipitation leads to an increase of up to 3.5% 
of weekly recorded cholera cases. Extreme rainfall has a larger impact: a single 
additional week of rainfall falling above the 75th percentile of the total rainfall 
distribution increases the number of effective cholera cases by up to 20.3% relative to a 
week with very light rain. The impact is even higher in wards at greater risk of flooding.  
Results in the paper also emphasize the key role of local infrastructure. We find the 
effect of weekly rainfall on cholera cases to be consistently higher in wards with larger 
shares of informal housing and a higher density of footways (i.e. informal roads). These 
results are in line with the mechanisms outlined. Neighbourhoods with low-quality 
infrastructure are likely to be more exposed to the cholera bacteria when surfaces are 
washed and drains are overflown by severe precipitation. Vulnerable populations in 
these wards are also more likely to suffer from negative income shocks during extreme 
weather events.  
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Findings here have important policy implications. Cities in developing countries 
need to address infrastructure gaps to contain the risk of recurrent epidemic outbreaks 
in fragile environments. Policies that improve the quality of local infrastructures and 
housing conditions should mitigate the negative impact of rainfall on health. Given the 
transmission channels of cholera, the proper servicing of informal areas, including 
sewerages connections and the pavement of informal roads, as well as the regulation of 
waste-dumping, may prove to be more beneficial in the long-term than the use of short-
term palliative measures during outbreaks. Interventions improving access to drinking 
water as well as access to sanitation should also greatly reduce cholera risk. In the 
theoretical framework considered, governments can also reduce the adverse effect of 
weather on health outcomes by supporting households in periods of health-shocks 
through subsidized health goods or direct transfers. These policies also need to be taken 
into account given the large room for increasing social safety nets in urban areas. 
Evidence on large-scale policy interventions in urban areas are limited and more is 
needed to understand priority-investments that increase resilience and prevent 
contagion of treatable diseases in developing cities if these are to become engines of 
growth (Glaeser 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7 Tables & Figures
Figure 3.1 Distribution of cholera effective cholera cases (epidemic weeks)
Figure 3.2 Distribution of effective cholera cases, by age (epidemic weeks)
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Figure 3.3 Spatial distribution of cholera indicidence, total outbreak
(cases per 10,000 inhabitants)
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Ward characteristics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Area (km2) 18.12 31.15 0.414 209.55 90
Pop (c2012) 48,495 26,064 6,411 106,946 90
HH size (c2012) 4.00 0.21 3.60 4.40 90
Density (km2) 11.53 11.12 0.05 46.74 90
Improved sanitation 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.48 90
Electricity 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.37 90
Drinking water 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.42 90
Hospital per 10tho. 0.19 0.43 0.00 2.97 90
Density of roads* 4.00 3.84 0.00 18 88
Density of footways* 8.83 15.76 0.01 75.99 63
Density of waterways* 5.00 5.61 0.00 24.81 78
Density of drains* 3.28 2.66 0.02 11.04 45
# water wells 1.25 2.99 0.00 21 76
% area informal 34 28 0.00 88 23
Notes: c2012 referes to data from census 2012, all of the infrastructure density
measures (*) are measured in km per square km
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Weather and Cholera
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Weather:
% flooded area 10.00 16.00 0.00 73.00 90
Average temperature (C) 26.73 0.37 25.43 27.17 90
Total rainfall (10mm) 162.36 18.15 134.27 216.42 90
Average weekly temperature (C) 26.73 1.57 22.92 29.99 6930
Weekly rainfall accumulation (10mm), GPM 2.11 4.05 0.00 40.86 6930
Weekly rainfall accumulation (10mm), TRMM 2.67 5.53 0.00 44.62 6930
Cholera:
Total cases 2015-2016 63.32 94.01 0.00 588 90
Total weekly cases per ward (excl. neg) 0.72 3.84 0.00 192 6930
Total weekly cases female 0.36 1.85 0.00 90 6930
Total weekly cases below 5 yrs 0.08 0.49 0.00 14 6930
Total weekly cases tested neg 0.11 0.56 0.00 20 6930
Total effective cases epiweek10 3.16 9.40 0.00 192 890
Total effective cases epiweek20 2.54 7.25 0.00 192 1780
Total effective cases epiweek30 1.77 6.03 0.00 192 2670
Notes: Temperature are degrees celsius; all measures of rainfall are accumulated rainfall (units:
10mm), cholera cases are total numbers. 88 of 90 wards where affected throughout the outbreak.
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Table 3.3: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Precipitation 0.0198*** 0.0208*** 0.0344***
(0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0077)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4491 0.4502 0.5254
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in
parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumu-
lated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are
the log of effective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a
given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temper-
ature; they are weighted by the population of the ward (census
2012). The period coverered is from the first week of March
2015 to the first week of September 2016. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05
*** p≤0.01
Table 3.4: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (IV Estimates)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Precipitation 0.0689** 0.0779** 0.0451
(0.0341) (0.0356) (0.0476)
N 6930 6930 6930
First Stage F-test 36.812 35.354 24.202
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Precipitation is
measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward
(10mm units), cholera cases are the log of effective (tested posi-
tive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control
for weekly ward air temperature. The period coverered is from
the first week of March 2015 to the first week of September 2016;
they are weighted by the population of the ward (census 2012).
Nasa GPM v3 precipitation measurement is instrumented with
NASA TRMM measurement. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table 3.5: Impact of Weekly Quartiles of Precipitation on Cholera Incidence
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Quartile 1 0.0010 0.0040 0.0049
(0.0197) (0.0193) (0.0177)
Quartile 3 -0.0360 -0.0286 -0.0536*
(0.0324) (0.0329) (0.0317)
Quartile 4 0.1867*** 0.2032*** 0.1525**
(0.0594) (0.0610) (0.0611)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4510 0.4522 0.5254
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in
parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumu-
lated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are
the log of effective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a
given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temper-
ature; they are weighted by the population of the ward (census
2012). The period coverered is from the first week of March 2015
to the first week of September 2016. The quartiles of the rainfall
distribution are defined as follows: Q1 (0mm), Q2(0-0.29mm),
Q3(0.29-2.69mm), Q4(2.69-40.86mm). *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 ***
p≤0.01
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Table 3.6: Impact of Flooding on Cholera Incidence
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:
Precipitation 0.0192*** 0.0204*** 0.0340***
(0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0077)
Precipitation × % Flood-prone area 0.0091* 0.0076 0.0043
(0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0047)
Panel B:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.2189*** 0.2280*** 0.2029***
(0.0485) (0.0487) (0.0498)
Panel C:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.2007*** 0.2103*** 0.1970***
(0.0470) (0.0472) (0.0517)
Flooded × % Flood-prone area 0.2262** 0.2176** 0.2076**
(0.1019) (0.1007) (0.1028)
N 6930 6930 6930
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. All
panels are independent regressions. Precipitation is measured as the weekly
accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log
of effective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. Flooded is
a dummy variable for weekly precipitation falling above the 75th percentile
of the total rainfall distribution. Flood-prone area is the total area of the
ward that is prone to flooding. All regressions control for weekly ward air
temperature;they are weighted by the population of the ward (census 2012).
The period coverered is from the first week of March 2015 to the first week of
September 2016. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table 3.9: Dynamic Effects: Lags of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Precipitation 0.0337*** 0.0313*** 0.0300*** 0.0305*** 0.0298**
(0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0072)
Precipitation (w−1) 0.0249*** 0.0243*** 0.0214*** 0.0200** 0.0205**
(0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0083)
Precipitation (w−2) 0.0222*** 0.0215*** 0.0195*** 0.0185**
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0070)
Precipitation (w−3) 0.0256*** 0.0252*** 0.0240***
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0073)
Precipitation (w−4) 0.0182** 0.0180**
(0.0076) (0.0075)
Precipitation (w−5) 0.0113*
(0.0061)
Cumulative (6 weeks) 0.1221***
(0.0288)
N 6840 6750 6660 6570 6480
R2 0.5263 0.5267 0.5274 0.5275 0.5270
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is
measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are
the log of effective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control
for weekly ward air temperature; they are weighted by the population of the ward (census 2012).
The period coverered is from the first week of March 2015 to the first week of September 2016.
Precipitation w−n are the lags of weekly precipitation up to n weeks. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 ***
p≤0.01
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Table 3.10: Dynamic Effects: Lags of Quartiles of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Q1 0.0013 -0.0020 0.0039 0.0005 0.0061 0.0058
(0.0194) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0175) (0.0171)
Q3 -0.0335 -0.0372 -0.0262 -0.0301 -0.0519* -0.0551*
(0.0309) (0.0300) (0.0315) (0.0307) (0.0300) (0.0296)
Q4 0.1825*** 0.1753*** 0.1982*** 0.1908*** 0.1504** 0.1442**
(0.0559) (0.0538) (0.0578) (0.0556) (0.0574) (0.0554)
Q1w−1 -0.0034 -0.0066 0.0004 -0.0030 -0.0049 -0.0071
(0.0218) (0.0222) (0.0220) (0.0224) (0.0198) (0.0202)
Q3w−1 -0.0198 -0.0215 -0.0137 -0.0154 -0.0227 -0.0271
(0.0352) (0.0346) (0.0350) (0.0344) (0.0314) (0.0302)
Q4w−1 0.1212** 0.1139** 0.1355** 0.1277** 0.1368** 0.1256**
(0.0590) (0.0565) (0.0592) (0.0569) (0.0605) (0.0566)
Q1w−2 0.0312 0.0347* 0.0158
(0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0206)
Q3w−2 0.0320 0.0372 0.0495
(0.0356) (0.0357) (0.0352)
Q4w−2 0.0903* 0.1029* 0.1052*
(0.0543) (0.0549) (0.0568)
Q1 (Cumulative 3 weeks) 0.0145
(0.350)
Q3 (Cumulative 3 weeks) -0.0327
(-0.490)
Q4 (Cumulative 3 weeks) 0.3750***
(0.1348)
N 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4522 0.4526 0.4535 0.4540 0.5267 0.5271
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is measured
as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of effective
(tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air
temperature; they are weighted by the population of the ward (census 2012). The period coverered
is from the first week of March 2015 to the first week of September 2016. The quartiles are defined
as in Table 4. Quartilew−n are the lags of the quartiles of weekly precipitation up to n weeks. *p ≤
0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Chapter 4 
 
Who Really Benefits from Export 
Processing Zones? Evidence from 
Nicaraguan Municipalities1 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The use of Export Processing Zones (EPZs)2 as a policy for trade and economic 
development has exponentially grown in the past decades, particularly in developing 
countries. In 1986, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated that there 
were 176 zones in 47 countries. By 2008, the number reached more than 3,000 zones in 
135 countries, accounting for over 40 million direct jobs and over US$200 billion in 
global exports (Farole & Akinci 2011). Despite the importance of the phenomenon, 
there is surprisingly little empirical evidence for evaluating these programs in the 
context of developing countries3. Further, the focus has remained on aggregate and 
traditional outcomes (FDI, exports, firm dynamics), and little attention has been paid to 
understanding the welfare and distributional effects resulting from the establishment of 
EPZs.  
                                                          
1 I thank Vernon Henderson, Pascal Jaupart, three anonymous referees, and Rafael Lalive for their helpful 
comments to improve the work. I further thanks participants at LSE seminars, at the 4 th SOLE/EALE 
World Meetings, and at the 2015 RIDGE Workshop on Trade and Firm Dynamics for useful comments. 
All errors remain my own. This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
2 When discussing EPZs, a variety of terminologies, such as Industrial Free Zones, Free Trade Zones, 
Special Economic Zones and Maquiladoras are used interchangeably in the literature. Although each has 
their own particularity, we will consider the broad definition of them being “demarcated geographic areas 
contained within a country’s national boundaries where the rules of business are different from those that 
prevail in the national territory. These differential rules principally deal with investment conditions, 
international trade and customs, taxation, and the regulatory environment; whereby the zone is given a 
business environment that is intended to be more liberal from a policy perspective and more effective 
from an administrative perspective than that of the national territory” (Farole & Akinci 2011:23). 
3Aside notable exceptions, the literature is limited to case studies and macro-economic reviews. See 
Farole and Akinci 2011; Engman & Onodera 2007; Aggarwal 2006 and Glick & Roubaud 2006, for 
recent examples. 
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To fill this gap this study takes advantage of the gradual establishment of EPZs in 
Nicaraguan municipalities during the period 1993-2009 to assess the average effect and 
the distributional pattern of this spatially-bound policy within the host municipalities. 
Nicaragua provides an excellent setting to study this phenomenon. The number of 
firms operating under the regime has increased markedly since its inception in the early 
1990s, across more than 20 of the 153 municipalities of the country. By 2010, EPZs 
accounted for 50% of total exports, and nearly 90% of manufacturing exports. The 
government considers that in the same year, EPZs jobs represented 25% of total formal 
work across the country, with on average firms directly employing around 7.5% of the 
total labour force of the municipalities where they locate4. Yet, no empirical assessment 
exists.   
While having a wider reach than traditional place-based policies (i.e. diversify 
exports, increase FDI), EPZ programs are prone to have a significant influence on the 
local economies (Wang 2013) as they operate with incentives to hire and create 
economic activity in or near the areas where they locate fostering agglomeration 
economies (Combes et al. 2011). In this sense, local welfare effects might differ 
substantially from those at the aggregate level, particularly in cases with labour market 
frictions. Labour mobility and land-price responses may be such that the jobs created go 
to non-poor residents and that the gains from land prices benefit higher-income 
segments (Neumark & Simpson 2014). As stressed by Kline & Moretti (2014) and 
shown by Reynolds & Rohlin (2015) for the case of US federal empowerment zones, 
positive average effects of spatially-tied policies can mask significant disparities in terms 
of the actual beneficiaries across the income distribution in treated areas. There are 
heterogeneous effects according to whether individuals are homeowners or renters, or 
more generally by skill and initial income levels, that are not necessarily captured by 
looking at the average effect on local wages (Neumark & Simpson 2014). In this sense, 
disentangling in what way the establishment of an EPZ profits the different segments of 
the income distribution within concerned areas helps to shed light on the mechanisms 
of the policy and ultimate local beneficiaries. The question is of great policy relevance in 
developing economies with already large levels of overall income disparities.  
For the analysis here, I exploit a repeated cross-sectional dataset based on official 
household surveys and censuses, and construct a unique municipal-level panel that 
allows for the examination of different moments of the expenditure distribution before 
                                                          
4 Data obtained from the Comisión Nacional de Zonas Francas (CNZF) and Nicaragua’s Central Bank 
(BCN). 
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and after the policy implementation. By focusing on the aggregate outcomes at the 
municipal level and on household per capita expenditures, the study captures general 
equilibrium effects of EPZ establishment within a locality5. The identification strategy is 
straightforward. I use both the time and cross-section variation of zones’ establishment 
across municipalities to estimate their average effect on the levels of real expenditure 
per capita of working age individuals, and across all the deciles of the expenditure 
distribution in treated municipalities. In the main approach, I use a difference-in-
differences (DID) strategy extended to quantiles (Athey & Imbens 2006). An important 
feature of the overall empirical strategy needs to be emphasized. The approach does not 
aim at measuring the impact of the EPZ policy on inequality across Nicaragua as a 
whole. Rather, it looks at the question of knowing whether within municipalities 
exposed to the establishment of EPZs, certain segments of the distribution capture 
more or less of the resulting gains or losses.  
This analysis builds on two complementary bodies of research. Mostly, it borrows 
from the large literature that has looked at evaluating place-based programs in the US 
and Europe (Busso et al. 2013; Neumark & Kolko 2010), and adds to the nascent 
counterpart studying the impact of EPZ policies at the subnational level in developing 
countries. Findings in these papers are revealing of the extent to which local economies 
are influenced by the establishment of an exporting zone. Using employment data and 
census statistics on educational outcomes at the municipal-level for Mexico, Atkin 
(2012) finds an increase in school dropouts in concerned municipalities following the 
arrival of new better-paying export jobs. Similar in strategy to this paper, Wang (2013) 
shows that Chinese Special Economic Zones (SEZ) benefit local economies through 
higher levels and growth rates of per capita FDI and total factor productivity (TFP), as 
well as higher average wages that compensate any increase in the local cost of living. 
Additionally, this paper adds empirical evidence to the literature analysing the effects of 
trade policies on local labour markets in developing countries. This area of research has 
emphasized the importance of understanding the impact of trade policies at the local 
level, particularly in cases of limited factor mobility (see Goldberg & Pavcnik 2007 for 
an extensive review).  
The validity of my findings relies on the assumption that the different empirical 
methods successfully account for the underlying differences in municipalities’ 
                                                          
5 In the absence of disaggregated property prices and firm-level data, using expenditure data remains the 
best strategy to capture the net effect of EPZ establishment. A similar strategy was used by Topalova 
(2010) to measure the local effect of trade liberalization within Indian districts. 
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characteristics that are likely to explain the non-random choice of EPZs location across 
time and space. In the absence of a credible instrument, I take care of unobservable 
confounders by allowing for time and municipalities fixed-effects across specifications. I 
also include province and region-time dummies to control in a flexible manner for the 
fact that EPZs concentrate in the western part of the country. Further, I use 
information on accessibility and socio-economic indicators to build alternative sets of 
control municipalities that are likely to be more meaningful comparable groups under 
the DID setting. My preferred control group is balanced on covariates and pre-
treatment trends of outcomes, and the assumption of parallel trends of main outcomes 
holds.  
Further threats to validity concern possible spillover dynamics and the relocation of 
individuals across treated and control areas. I address these concerns in several ways. 
First, I test for the existence of spillovers on the outcomes variables of neighbouring 
areas using varying degrees of distance. I find no evidence supporting large firm 
relocations or commuting flows. This is consistent with the literature registering small 
backward linkages generated by EPZ policies, and the low commuting of the 
Nicaraguan labour force (Jansen et al. 2010). The potential threat from labour mobility 
is harder to address. There are two dimensions to consider: in and out-migration. Both 
may have compositional effects that may alter the location decisions of firms (related on 
skills and local wages effects) as well as outcomes. Reassuringly, I find no evidence of 
large population readjustments across municipalities when measuring the effect of the 
policy on the likelihood of migrating for the working-age sample. Results are also 
unchanged when adding baseline population weights. Although, I find evidence of 
compositional changes towards an increase in the share of the high-to-low skill ratios in 
treated municipalities, the size is too small to challenge the identification validity, and if 
anything, contributes to elucidating the mechanisms of the policy. Finally, the results are 
also robust when excluding the capital city and municipality of Managua. 
The analysis reveals interesting conclusions concerning average and distributional 
dynamics of EPZ policies at the local level. First, I confirm that there is a positive 
average treatment effect on the levels of real per capita expenditure in treated 
municipalities. The magnitude is small but non- negligible, with an average 10 to 12% 
increase in treated areas for the entire period. Second, I find that the mean effect hides 
significant disparities across the distribution. Results offer suggestive evidence that 
those at the upper-tail of the distribution are the main beneficiaries of the policy over 
the period covered. This effect is incremental with the more years of EPZ operation. 
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The impact is heterogeneous in time for the remaining segments, significant at middle-
range deciles after eight years of an EPZ establishment. These results are consistent 
with the existence of a skill-premium in the exporting sector that may be altering the 
cost of living (i.e. land price responses) in profit of the higher-skill/higher-income 
segments. Indeed, I find that the average positive gains are concentrated in the high-skill 
working-age group.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the EPZ 
program in Nicaragua. Section 4.3 introduces and examines the data, and section 4.4 
discusses the empirical strategy. Results are discussed in section 4.5, with extensions and 
robustness checks shown in section 4.6. The final section concludes. 
4.2 Nicaragua’s Export Processing Zone Program  
4.2.1 Ley de Zona Franca: Legal procedures & tax exemptions 
Resembling analogous initiatives, Nicaragua’s EPZ regime (‘Zonas Francas’) was 
put in place with the aim of generating employment, attracting FDI, increasing non-
traditional exports, acquiring new technologies, and expanding international trade. The 
program is relatively young compared to other Central American countries as an earlier 
initiative was abandoned for a decade during the civil conflict (1979-1990) and was only 
reintroduced following the shift to democracy and the market economy in 1990. In 
1991, Decree N.46-91 formally established the existing regime, with the appropriate 
regulation passed in the following year (Decree N.31-92). Together, these two decrees 
created the legal framework concerning the organization of EPZs, the fiscal incentives, 
the rights and obligations of operators and users, as well as the regulatory body in the 
form of the National Commission of Free Trade Zones (CNZF). The law was amended 
over the years, with its most notable reform aimed at simplifying procedures taking 
place in 2005 (Decree N.50-2005).  
Under the Nicaraguan legislation, EPZ status is granted to foreign or national 
private firms oriented towards the export of goods and services that meet a certain array 
of criteria and follow the official procedures with the CNZF. There have been many 
efforts to expedite the legal process of application in the recent years (i.e. establishment 
of a one-stop shop after 2005). Firms applying to be recognized under the EPZ regime 
need to provide detailed information of their project (which includes financial plans, 
market analysis, exporting markets, construction or building agreements, estimates of 
job creation, among others). They also need to comply with environmental, building 
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and health regulations, and the project must be approved by the mayoral office in the 
municipality where they intend to locate. There is no explicit rule regarding the age of 
the firm (new or pre-existing).   
Following standard practice, the program is based on attracting and generating 
business by offering particular tax incentives to qualifying firms. These include the full 
exemption from payment of (1) Income Tax during the first ten years of operation (and 
60% from the eleventh year onwards); (2) all taxes and custom duties of machinery, 
equipment and intermediate goods, as well as of transportation and support services for 
the zones (including for instance equipment needed for installation of health care or 
child care); (3) indirect taxes, taxes on selective sales or consumption; (4) export taxes 
on processed products made within the regime; (5) municipal taxes on property sales, 
including the tax on capital gains if any; and (6) municipal taxes. The regime also 
includes the unrestricted repatriation of capital. In exchange, firms have to pay an 
annual fee to the CNZF, determined according to the industrial sector and square 
meters of occupied area. 
Under Nicaraguan law, EPZs are allowed to sell intermediate goods and inputs to 
other exporting firms in the country, provided they pay custom duties. However, EPZs 
are strictly forbidden from selling final goods in the local market. The legislation also 
provides conditions under which EPZ developers may benefit from tax exemptions, as 
well as the possibility for them to subcontract to local Nicaraguan firms which are then 
exempted from VAT payment. The restriction to sell in the local market and the 
barriers to sell intermediate inputs means that in terms of production the larger effect of 
EPZs is contained to the exporting sector, without hampering local producers. The 
possibility to outsource to local providers creates some incentives to generate backward 
linkages, and any firm relocation or diversion is likely to happen through this indirect 
mechanism. I expect these to be low. Backward linkages with local firms have been 
found to be very low in Latin America (Jenkins et al. 1998). The share of domestic 
expenditures as a share of total value of EPZ exports in Nicaragua has ranged between 
25 to 30%, with wages constituting the bulk of the shares (ECLAC 2012). I formally 
address this issue in section 4.6.1.   
Nicaraguan labour laws regulate work in EPZs and minimal wages have been in 
place since 1999. The country has the lowest manufacturing wages in the region, which 
is a source of its comparative advantage. Still, minimum wages in EPZs have 
traditionally been higher than the overall manufacturing and agricultural sectors 
throughout the period (20 to 70% higher on average per year). 
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4.2.2 Definition & characterization of EPZs 
The law distinguishes three different categories: administrators (industrial park 
operators), users (situated within industrial parks) and ‘single-factory’ EPZs. The 
distinction is relatively artificial. Operators and users of industrial parks operate in the 
same area, with the former only providing a service to the using firms and most of time 
owning some firms within the park. The distinction serves administrative purposes for 
the payment of different types of fees to the CNZF. Further, the single-factory category 
is mostly used by large multinational corporations with a wide range of functions. 
Examples of these are New Holland Apparel, a large US manufacturing firm that 
produces sportswear for Nike, or Yazaki, a Korean firm in the area of light 
manufacturing considered to be the single largest employer in the country. Each of 
these firms employ about 2 to 8 thousand workers, respectively (2013). In this sense, 
despite the different legal definitions, industrial parks made of smaller firms are thus 
essentially equivalent in terms of employment and export volume to stand-along EPZ 
firms. As such, I do not distinguish between the different categories6. For the empirical 
analysis, I define EPZs as stand-alone firms or an industrial park hosting one or more 
firms, and reported by the CNZF at year end7. By this definition, the total number of 
EPZs in my sample is 64 by 2009 8, located in 20 different municipalities across 10 
provinces9. Figure 4.1 depicts the pattern of localization across municipalities according 
to the sequence of establishment.  
In terms of numbers of firms and parks, a larger share is concentrated in the capital 
city Managua (37%), the adjacent provinces of Masaya and Carazo (20%), and the 
north-eastern provinces of Estelí and Chinandega (18%). These provinces also 
represent 55% of the country total population (2012). 76% of EPZs are foreign, the 
majority of which (40%) are from the US, followed by South Korea (22%). According 
to official statistics for 2010 (CNZF), American EPZs employed 35% of the total 
workforce in the sector, followed by South Korean which employed about 30%. 
Nicaraguan EPZs are attributed only 5% of the workforce in the sector, which implies 
little firm relocation from previously operating firms. There is no disaggregated statistics 
                                                          
6 Because I do not have access to firm-level data (workers, exports, sales or value-added), I cannot 
corroborate or disentangle EPZ categories with a continuous treatment variable. Any attempt to 
categorize EPZs in terms of intensity would likely be misspecified. 
7 I compiled information on EPZs location by the end of each year, origin and sector of operation from 
the CNZF annual yearbooks. When possible, I cross-checked the information with the EPZ website 
profile.  
8 The discrepancy with the official figure of +150 stems from this definition, as I count industrial parks as 
one irrespective of the quantity of firms. Since the launch of the program, by this definition, the number 
of EPZs increased from 1 in 1993 to 64 (+150) in 2009. 
9 There are 153 municipalities, 15 provinces and 2 autonomous regions in Nicaragua. 
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on the number of employees within each EPZs. According to the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys, only 12% of domestic firms exported in 2010. Near to 90% of these 
EPZs operate in the manufacturing sector, with a predominance of firms producing 
textile, apparel and light electronics, followed by cigar production and other agri-
businesses. 25 firms are categorized as single factories, the majority of which are also in 
the apparel and light manufacturing sectors. All of the agri-business EPZs are stand-
alone firms. Both the average years of stand-alone firms and industrial parks is close to 
5 years, with standard deviations of 3.5 and 3.4 years, respectively. Attrition is relatively 
low, with about 5% of the EPZs having closed during the period considered, but some 
measurement error is possible due to the difficulty in tracking earlier EPZs.  
In theory, eligible firms can locate anywhere in the country. The regime does not 
institute a particular area of the territory as being a free-trade zone, but rather grants the 
status to the firm, which needs to negotiate directly with the municipality (irrespective 
of locating as a stand-alone firm or within an industrial park, a letter of acceptance from 
the mayoral office of the relevant municipality is a pre-condition, CZNF 2015). In 
practice, not all municipalities are prone to receiving an exporting zone, and the export-
oriented nature of the firms has made the western area of the country the natural host.  
This dimension underlines the ‘de-facto’ place-based nature of the EPZ regime in 
Nicaragua. Place-based policies are defined as policies that particularly target geographic 
areas for some form of special treatment including special regulations or tax exemptions 
(Kline & Moretti 2014), in order to create incentives to hire or generate local economic 
activity. While in Nicaragua privileges are granted to the firm or industrial park, the 
location decision is subject to the municipal approval. Once established, EPZs are 
spatially-fixed, and their propensity to hire or outsource in the area where they operate 
implies that the local economy will be directly impacted through labour, capital, land 
and price channels. This is further emphasized in the case of industrial parks that 
remain spatially-bound but can increase the number of firms located within. In practice, 
the establishment of EPZs in a given municipality has the same local effects than a 
traditional place-based policy (Wang 2013, Atkin 2012). Limitations to factor mobility 
may emphasize this dimension. The trade literature has stressed the importance of 
analysing the effect of trade policies in local and regional labour markets (Autor, Dorn 
& Hanson 2013, Kovak 2013, Topalova 2010), particularly due to the lack of perfect 
factor mobility across geographical areas in both developed and developing countries.  
For the empirical study, I set a general EPZ dummy variable, 𝐸𝑃𝑍𝑚𝑡 , equal to one 
if an industrial park or stand-alone firm was authorized within the municipality, and 
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zero otherwise. I discuss the relevance of using this level of analysis further in the next 
section.   
4.3 Data  
4.3.1 Datasets  
The data for this analysis were drawn from several sources. First, I compiled a 
repeated cross-sectional dataset for the period 1993-2009 based on five LSMS 
Household Surveys10 (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares para la Medición del Nivel de 
Vida, EMNV) collected by the Nicaraguan Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de 
Información de Desarrollo, INIDE), and representative at the national, regional, urban, 
and rural levels. These contain detailed information on living standards and various 
other households and individual socio-demographic characteristics. I use this 
information to construct a panel at the municipal-level and calculate expenditure deciles 
at this level of aggregation. These measures include a correction for the sample bias 
using sampling weights. Municipalities with less than 30 households per period were 
excluded to reduce measurement error. Overall, the sample comprises observations for 
an unbalanced panel of between 82 to 126 municipalities per year – of which 61 are 
observed for the full period, and 107 are observed four times (Table 4.1)11. The data on 
EPZs was compiled from various CNZF annual yearbooks, which only contain 
information on location and sector of operation of each zone at year end. Data on 
accessibility measures (road density, ports, airports and railways) was compiled from 
reports of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (MTI)12 and World Bank 
logistics’ assessments (2004-2011).   
4.3.2 Main definitions 
This analysis follows common practice in referring to the measure of living 
standards as income, which should be interpreted broadly to encompass all the 
characteristics associated with geographical location including climate or local public 
good provision, in order to assume that individuals with the same level of income at 
different locations are equally well-off (Shorrocks & Wan 2004). Here, following best 
                                                          
10 The Living Standards Measurement Surveys were developed by the World Bank to improve the type 
and quality of household data collected by statistical offices in developing countries. The years of each 
EMNV are: 1993, 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2009.  
11 20 municipalities are omitted because of N<30 rule across the years. As a robustness check, I run the 
different specifications with a balanced panel, omitting observations observed less than 4 times. 
Conclusions remain unchanged.   
12 Ministerio de Transporte e Infraestructura (MTI) Red Vial de Nicaragua. 
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practice income is proxied by consumption expenditure (Goldberg & Pavcnik 2007). 
The choice for using consumption expenditure as a measure of income has been widely 
discussed in the literature. It is arguably the most appropriate variable for capturing 
lifetime wellbeing (Deaton 1997) as it better captures intertemporal shifts of resources 
and incorporates changes in purchasing power. Expenditure data are of better quality in 
LSMS Household Surveys (Deaton 2005; Banerjee & Duflo 2007), given that reporting 
problems are less pronounced and consumption is less affected by the redesigning of 
surveys, which hampers comparability across years. The large period considered in this 
analysis, and the existence of a large informal sector (73% of all jobs in 2010) in 
Nicaragua also motivate the use of expenditure levels instead of labour income. Further, 
wages are under-reported in the household surveys, particularly in 1993 and 2001 when 
only between 10 to 20% of working age members report a value. There is no 
information on the location of employment of workers in the household surveys, and I 
have no access to data on housing prices within municipalities. These data limitations 
further justify the use of expenditure per capita as the best approximation of a welfare 
measure that encompasses multiple dimension across time and unit of analysis. 
I use constant annual per capita expenditure (in Córdobas of 1999, C$)13, defined as 
the household annual net expenditure divided by the number of persons in the 
household. All households surveyed and all of their members are included (though 
consumption is adjusted depending on members being children or adults). Missing 
values and zero incomes have been excluded. Additionally, expenditure has been 
adjusted for difference in prices across provinces every year using local price indices in 
the households’ surveys. Adjusting for spatial price differences will not alter inequality 
within regions, and are an important factor to take into account given the strong 
correlation of prices with welfare levels (Shorrocks & Wan 2005).  
As mentioned, to analyse the moments of the expenditure distribution I follow 
Milanovic (2005, 2008) and partition the real per capita expenditure distribution by 
deciles at the municipal level using sampling weights to correct for sample bias. This 
method allows me to focus on the pattern of change across all the deciles shares of the 
distribution, and has the advantage of decomposing the average effect. This method is 
used for other household characteristics. There are limitations to using this approach 
                                                          
13 I use the Managua CPI from the Central Bank of Nicaragua (CBN) as the overall country CPI is not 
available before 2000. The CPI is a Laspeyres-type (1999=100) index compiled on the basis of the 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 1998-1999. 15 departmental capitals and two autonomous 
regions were used to select the products to be included in the various baskets and the corresponding 
weights. These include durables and non-durables as well as residential rents. A summary methodology is 
available in the CBN Boletín Económico, Volume II, Number 2, April - June 2000 (IMF). 
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for small areas using household survey data. However, I take several measures to 
control for the quality of the values, such as excluding municipalities with too few 
observations, and comparing the municipal averages with census data available for 1993 
and 2005. Results approximate well. Tables E1 and E2 in Appendix E contain 
descriptive statistics at the decile level according to treatment and control groups for the 
beginning and end of the period studied. These are reassuring in that all deciles display a 
similar evolution across the period, with the ratios between treated and control groups 
remaining constant in time. As expected individuals at higher deciles display higher 
levels of educational achievement, access to electricity and a smaller proportion is 
employed in the informal sector. Generally, the differences within deciles between 
treatment and control groups are small. Particularly, household size, average age and 
individuals at working age are consistently comparable and evolve at a similar ratio.  
Because of the characteristics discussed in section 4.2, it seems logical to consider 
municipalities as the unit of analysis. They are the best approximation of the actual 
functional area at which firms and zones operate, and a fair representation of the local 
labour market. Labour mobility in Nicaragua is limited, not only because of the low-skill 
level of the labour force, but because commuting distances are found to be an 
important deterrent to participate in the labour market (Jansen et al. 2007). Excluding 
Managua, municipalities had a median population of 20 thousand in 2012. Additionally, 
they are the ultimate discrete policy unit for which welfare data is available and they 
remain the reference framework for delivering public services and distributing 
government funds (Lall & Chakravorty 2005).  
4.3.3 Descriptive statistics  
This section discusses key summary statistics for the main outcomes and control 
variables used in the analysis. Table 4.2 displays period averages for selected outcomes. 
They include both municipal-level variables, and averages for the working age 
population of the pooled cross-sectional dataset. Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics 
of municipality characteristics according to treatment status and sequence of EPZ 
establishment. Values are period averages. The table examines whether or not early 
zones exhibit different characteristics relative to later zones, and both compared to 
municipalities never having authorized the establishment of an exporting zone. For this, 
I group the municipalities based on the establishment waves: group 1 [<1999] is 
composed of four municipalities that were exposed to EPZs by 1999, it includes 
Managua, which is always treated in the sample since the first industrial park was 
opened in 1994; group 2 [2000-2001] is composed of five municipalities that granted 
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authorization to new EPZs between 1999 and 2001; group 3 [2002-2005] is composed 
of seven municipalities that authorized establishment during this period; and group 4 
[2006-2009] is composed of the final waves of municipalities receiving an exporting 
zone. Because data was of poor quality (too few observations) I had to exclude two 
municipalities treated in that last wave.   
Overall, municipalities receiving EPZs display significantly better accessibility 
measures (i.e. density of paved roads, access to airports, ports or trade posts, and 
proximity to large water bodies), and closer proximity to the municipality of the capital 
city. Group 4 is a particular outlier, probably due to progress in infrastructure across the 
period. This trend is to be expected as the choice of location of exporting firms is 
unlikely to be exogenous and should be highly correlated with accessibility and 
infrastructure. Similarly, the sectoral compositions also diverge, with non-treated 
municipalities showing much higher levels of agricultural specialization and a 
predominance of rural areas. Nicaragua remains overall a rural country, with less than 
60% of its population living in urban areas in 2010 (World Bank). The skill composition 
displays a better distribution across municipalities, differing only in the proportion of 
illiterate adults which is much lower in EPZs areas (20 vs 30%). On the other hand, all 
groups show similar levels of access to electricity, unemployment, share of working age 
populations, and migrants. In this sense, it would seem as if the geographical 
distribution of economic activities across the country is not necessarily correlated with 
different labour outcomes. This largely reflects the importance of agriculture for the 
Nicaraguan economy. Even in 2011, the sector was the main employer (32% of total 
employment) and represented 19% of total value added (above manufacturing).  
Figures E114 provide a more detailed image of the distribution of the sector of 
economic activity across the deciles of per capita expenditure by years and treatment 
groups. Both EPZ and no-EPZ municipalities display similar patterns for services and 
agriculture, with a higher concentration at the upper-end and lower-end of the 
distribution, respectively. Discrepancies are noticeable however in manufacturing, 
construction, and transport. EPZ municipalities show a higher concentration in 
manufacturing at the upper-end of the distribution, despite a general shift towards the 
median during the period. The opposite is visible in the construction sector. Given the 
size of the change, it could well reflect the modernization of the sector rather than any 
trade-related effect. 
                                                          
14 Figures and tables E# are contained in Appendix E. 
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4.4 Empirical Strategy 
The main empirical analysis relies on the Difference-in-Differences (DID) 
framework. For the identification strategy, I rely on the variation provided by the timing 
of zone creation across the sample of municipalities.  
4.4.1 Basic specifications 
I follow Angrist & Pischke (2009) and define equation (4.1) and (4.2) as the 
extension of the simple DID model for multiple periods and groups, in order to 
estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) using both the pooled 
individual level dataset and municipal averages. As defined in section 4.2.2, I denote 
EPZ as a dummy variable that switches to one when a municipality m gets treated in 
year t. The basic specifications take the following forms: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝛾0𝑚 + 𝛾1𝑚. 𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛿𝐸𝑃𝑍𝑚𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑚𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡    (4.1) 
 
𝑌𝑚𝑡 = 𝛾𝑚 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜑𝐸𝑃𝑍𝑚𝑡 + 𝑍′𝑚𝑡𝜃 + 𝜔𝑖𝑚𝑡     (4.2) 
 
Where m and t index for municipality (m=1... 126) and year (t=1993, 1998, 2001, 
2005, and 2009) respectively, and i indexes for working-age individuals. 𝑌𝑚𝑡  is the 
outcome variable of interest in municipality m at year t; 𝑌𝑖𝑚𝑡 is the outcome variable of 
interest for individual i in municipality m at year t; 𝛾𝑚 are municipality-level fixed-effects 
and 𝜇𝑡  are time effects. The fixed-effects capture the permanent differences in the 
municipalities observed and unobserved characteristics that may influence the location 
of EPZs as well as any time varying shocks. 𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑡 and 𝑍𝑚𝑡 are vectors for time-varying 
individual and household characteristics. In equation (4.1) they include measures for 
household size, age-squared, and dummies for gender, economic sector of employment, 
migrant status, education level, access to electricity and urban location. Equation (4.2) 
contains equivalent measures aggregated at the municipal level (i.e. shares of education 
levels, households with access to electricity, urban population, and migrants). 
𝜔𝑖𝑚𝑡(𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡) is the error term. Following Bertrand et al. (2004) I use robust standard 
errors clustered at the municipal level to prevent misleading inference due to serial 
correlation in the error term across years within a municipality. Results are robust to the 
clustering of standard errors at the province level to account for possible serial 
correlation at this level of aggregation.  
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The parameters of interest are 𝛿 and 𝜑 which measure the average effect of the 
establishment of an EPZ on the outcomes 𝑌𝑖𝑚𝑡 and 𝑌𝑚𝑡  (i.e. measures of real 
expenditure per capita). The effect is identified by comparing municipal outcomes 
among treated and non-treated groups before and after EPZ establishment. To control 
even more richly for differences across municipalities, I add a municipality-specific time 
trend in the form of interactions between a municipality dummy and a linear time trend, 
𝛾1𝑚. 𝑡 in equation (4.1). This specification allows for municipalities unobservable 
characteristics to follow different trends in time, which is particularly relevant in the 
case of a gradual treatment. The larger dataset allows introducing the trends without 
compromising degrees of freedom. I use province-time fixed effects and region-time 
fixed effects in alternative specification at both individual and municipal level of 
analysis, to account for sorting across Nicaragua and the concentration of EPZs in the 
western area of the country. 
I measure the effect across the expenditure distribution by extending the DID 
method to each quantile (𝜏) instead of the mean (Athey & Imbens 2006). The 
specification takes the following form: 
 
𝑌𝑚𝑡|EPZ𝑚𝑡,ρ𝑚𝑡 (τ)  =  γ𝑚(τ) + μ𝑡  (τ)  +  ψEPZ𝑚𝑡 (τ)   + W’𝑚𝑡  (τ) α +  ξ(τ,ρ𝑚𝑡 ) 
(4.3) 
 
Where notations are the same as previously defined in the simple DID cases but τ 
now stands for each decile of the expenditure distribution estimated at the municipality 
level. All notations are as specified above. I cluster standard errors at both municipal 
and province levels. This method referred to as the QDID allows comparing individuals 
across both groups and time according to their quantile. Here, the quantiles are fixed and 
the DID estimator compares changes in the levels of expenditure around them, under 
the identifying assumption that the growth in expenditure from pre-EPZ to post-EPZ 
groups at each particular quantile would have been the same in both treatment and 
comparison groups in the absence of treatment. It relies on the assumptions of rank-
preservation15 and homogeneity of treatment effect across individuals (Athey & Imbens 
2006).   
                                                          
15 While rank-preservation is in theory a rather constraining assumption, social mobility in Latin America, 
and Nicaragua, in particular, is in practice very low. The World Bank (2013) estimates that since the 1990s 
more than one in five individuals remained chronically poor, and approximately the same proportion 
remained steadily in the middle class in the subcontinent, with Nicaragua being the second-worse country 
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4.4.2 Validity of the identification strategy 
Given the setting here, there are three main threats to identification to address. As 
most spatially-bound policies these concern the reverse causality and omitted variable 
bias related to the non-random choice of EPZs location across time and space (i.e. 
sorting), and the limitations related to the fact that the experimented created here may 
not coincide with the administrative boundaries used (i.e. firm spillovers -creation and 
diversion -, and mobility of individuals). I will empirically evaluate the last two issues in 
sections 4.5.4 and 4.6.1.  
I address the issue of the endogenous location of EPZs in several ways. Regarding 
unobservable factors, I allow for municipality and year fixed-effects. These allow me to 
sweep out time-invariant features of the municipality as well as time-specific dynamics. 
Additionally, I use province-time dummies and region-time dummies that control for 
omitted variables that change over time within these levels of aggregation. Some 
specifications also include municipality-level time trends to control for any omitted 
variable that varies over time within municipalities in an approximately linear fashion.  
I further refine the identification strategy with the construction of alternative 
control groups based on relevant observable municipal characteristics. One important 
challenge in the evaluation of spatially-bound policies is the selection of appropriate 
counterfactuals. The ideal control municipalities here are areas economically similar to 
EPZ municipalities but lacking zones and firms’ establishment. There are many reasons 
why using all never treated municipalities would yield bias estimates (i.e. different 
sectoral skill and age compositions for instance). An ideal approach would rely on areas 
that were targeted at some point in time but where a zone finally was not created, using 
the eligibility criteria to ensure similarity (Greenstone et al. 2010). An alternative, would 
be to use the temporal difference between treated municipalities to compare them 
against each other (Busso et al. 2013, Wang 2013). I do not have information on eligible 
municipalities that eventually did not receive an exporting zone. Further, because of the 
sequence and relatively small number of treated areas in earlier phases I cannot use the 
temporal sequence to compare municipalities against each other. Instead, I use 
municipalities’ observable characteristics to define alternative control municipalities. 
While limitations to this approach remain, tests for the balance of covariates and pre-
treatment outcome trends give me confidence on their validity. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
in the region in terms of the proportion of individuals not displaying any type of upward mobility 
between 1998 and 2005 (80%). Intergenerational mobility shows similar patterns.  
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The export-oriented nature of EPZs and its human capital needs imply that both 
accessibility conditions (i.e. ports, airports, and roads), basic infrastructure and the 
educational attainments are likely to play an important role in the choice of location of 
the industrial parks and firms. The first approach is thus to match municipalities based 
on these and related observable elements, using propensity score matching to 
complement the DID strategy (Abadie 2005, Imbens & Woolridge 2009). This 
approach is widely used in the literature, and has generally been shown to produce 
sensible counterfactual groups. For this, I estimate the propensity score (logit) for a 
municipality to receive EPZs based on a series of pre-treatment variables for each of 
the treatment sequences using a k-nearest neighbour approach16, and use only matched 
municipalities as the comparison group. As shown in Tables E3 and E4 there is a large 
overlap in p-scores between treated and matched municipalities, particularly for groups 
one and four. T-test and pseudo-R2 are both fairly low after matching which suggests 
that potentially important selection criteria become not significant after matching.  
The second approach is to define the control municipalities based on the quality of 
their road infrastructure and distance to the capital city (Managua). Given the limited 
development of Nicaraguan ports, airports and railways, road networks remain the main 
mode of transport for most domestic movements and a large share of imports and 
exports (World Bank 2011). Good roads are not only likely to be one key determinant 
for EPZs location choices, but they may also be correlated with higher levels of regional 
development. I use the meters of paved roads every 1 km2 to account for road quality, 
and set the threshold at the minimum in treated municipalities (40 meters). At the same 
time, distance to the capital city is also likely to be a key factor in EPZ location, as firms 
are drawn towards it to benefit from agglomeration economies and higher levels of 
human capital. I set the threshold to the maximum distance for an EPZ municipality 
(<170km)17. Despite the fact this counterfactual is constructed in a more arbitrary way, 
it imposes less restrictions in terms of observables characteristics. Table 4.4 shows that 
there is significant overlap between this control group (group 2) and the treatment 
areas. While the propensity-score matched municipalities are more balanced in relation 
to the urban-rural dimension, the second group seems slightly closer in terms of 
                                                          
16 Because of the small sample size, I use different values of k from 3 to 5. I note that the k-nearest 
neighbouring matching with replacement is likely to use some control municipalities multiple times in 
different periods. 
17 Earlier versions of this paper also included a control group that excluded the two autonomous regions 
of the Atlantic coast (RAAN and RAAS). These correspond to the poorest areas of the country and also 
have very particular ethnic and economic characteristic. The inclusion of province-fixed effects and 
region-time fixed-effects addresses this issue in a parametrical way. 
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educational attainment. In any case, with both cases, controlling for specific covariates 
will wipe-out any remaining difference between the two groups. 
I choose group 2 as the preferred counterfactual as it imposes less restrictions in 
terms of sample size, makes fewer assumptions on the municipal characteristics linked 
to the program, and parallel trends in levels of pre-treatment outcomes are more 
consistent (Figures 4.2 and E2). I formally test the assumption of parallel trends for the 
main specification by including pre-treatment trends; these results are supportive of the 
identification strategy (Table E6)18. The common trend assumption that the two groups 
measured outcomes would have followed the same trends over time in the absence of 
policy, is essential to support the DID framework. Ultimately, I compare results with 
both methods and conclusions are unchanged (results with the matched municipalities 
are on appendix E).  
4.5 Basic Results 
4.5.1 Average Treatment Effect of EPZ establishment 
Table 4.5 presents the results of the basic DID specifications (equation 4.1 & 4.2) 
using both the working-age population dataset and the municipal-level outcomes. The 
different columns explore the sensitivity of the results to different area fixed-effects and 
time trends. Overall, I find that the establishment of EPZs increases the average level of 
real per capita expenditure in the treated municipalities, with point estimates ranging 
between C$800-460 depending on specifications. The size is nontrivial but relatively 
small if we consider the large time span of the analysis. It amounts to about 10 to 12% 
of the average levels across the period. It is reassuring to see that the magnitude of the 
effect and its statistical significance remain stable across the specifications, particularly 
with the addition of municipality-time trends. Further, results are consistent irrespective 
of the sample used, though they lose precision with the panel dataset as observations 
are reduced. Using the alternative control group based on propensity-score matching 
does not alter the results (Table E5). 
 
                                                          
18 I run a formal test of parallel trends in the main specifications of equations 4.1 and 4.2 by including 
pre-treatment trends in the fashion of Greenstone et al. (2010). For this, I augment equations 4.1 and 4.2 
with a municipality-specific trend variable defined as the interaction between municipality specific linear-
time trends and the treatment dummy variable EPZ as previously defined. Overall, coefficients on pre-
treatment trends are not statistically significant supporting the conclusions of the effect not being the 
result of different pre-existent trends between treated and control municipalities (see Table E6 in 
Appendix E). 
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4.5.2 Deciles of the expenditure distribution. 
Table 4.6 presents the results of DID estimates across moments of the real per 
capita expenditure distribution of treated municipalities (equation 4.3). In interpreting 
these results, it should be kept in mind that I estimate treatment effect on each decile of 
the expenditure distribution of treated municipalities strictly with respect to its 
respective decile in the control group. As noted, this implies the assumption of rank-
invariance. While this is a strong assumption, social mobility in Latin America and 
particularly in Nicaragua has been very low since the early 1990s19. Caution is still 
warranted when interpreting these results, and I refrain from making any reference with 
respect to within-area inequality dynamics.  
The most salient feature in Table 4.6 is the containment of the treatment effect at 
the top-end of the distribution (80th and 90th percentiles), with point estimates 
significant at 10% levels. The size of is much larger in this case, ranging at about 20 to 
25% of the average levels of per capita expenditure of the top deciles for the period, 
suggesting that on average, the establishment of exporting zones profits the top deciles 
of the distribution in host municipalities the most. Point estimates are consistent to the 
inclusion of different time-area fixed-effects, as well as to the clustering of standard 
errors at the province level and against the alternative control group (Table E7). The 
coefficient at the 10th percentile is also positive and significant (at 10% level) in one of 
the specifications. The size is smaller, on average EPZs increase the expenditure levels 
of the bottom decile by 10% across the period.  
The fact that such a strong concentration is visible when decomposing the average 
treatment effect across the expenditure distribution, provides support for two 
alternative but complementary theoretical intuitions. The first one, relates to the various 
models of urban economics that integrate land prices’ responses and labour mobility 
dynamics for estimating welfare at the local level. Kline & Moretti (2014) show that 
mobility responses may lead the local cost of living to change, which in turn can lead 
landlords or high-skill incomers, to capture the benefits associated with the firm’s 
arrival. Evidence of this on US empowerment zones is found by Reynolds & Rohlin 
(2015). The second relates to international trade models that put emphasis on the 
existence of a high-skill premium in the exporting sector stemming either from 
productivity gains or higher skill intensity (Goldberg & Pavcnik 2010 for review). 
Topalova (2010) emphasizes how these dynamics are likely to be larger in the case of 
                                                          
19 The fact that individual characteristics across each decile remain relatively constant in both groups and 
with similar relative sizes, support the use of this assumption. See footnote 18.  
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rigid labour markets. Although information on the skill composition of workers within 
EPZs is not available, manufacturing firms in Nicaragua do exhibit higher high-to-low 
skill ratios, with on average only 34% of the workforce in the firms classified as 
unskilled (Nicaragua Enterprise Survey 2010). The positive coefficient of the first decile 
may also offer some support for polarization theories (Autor & Dorn 2013), according 
to which new technologies and the related inflows in skilled labour in local labour 
markets may have reallocated low-skill labour into lower-earnings services occupations. 
There is no solid evidence of polarization in developing countries yet, but it is plausible 
to imagine the changes happening between the formal and informal sectors, particularly 
in more urbanized areas in countries with small middle-classes. 
The conclusions of the basic specifications are somewhat counter-intuitive with the 
mediatized image of the zones as prime generators of employment for the unskilled 
labour force. Data limitations prevent me from completely disentangling the 
mechanisms through which firms operate, however I address possible channels next by 
looking at the effect across the skill distribution and the effect of EPZ formation on 
labour mobility. 
4.5.3 Heterogeneous time dynamics: an event study 
Before introducing any additional extensions, I explore the time dynamics of the 
establishment of exporting zones. Considering the relatively long period covered, it is 
important to address the question of how the program impacts expenditure levels 
across time. The literature has emphasized that the impact of EPZs may take time to 
materialize. In some cases, it has also been found to diminish with the years, as low 
labour costs vanish.  
To explore the time pattern, I compute a modified version of equation (4.3) adding 
a set of dummy variables for leads and lags of the year of EPZs authorization (Autor, 
2003). Specifically, I add indicator variables for 11, 8 and 3 years before and after EPZ 
establishment20. The dummies are equal to one in only one year each per treated 
municipality. The treatment dummy 𝐸𝑃𝑍𝑚𝑡   equals one only on the first year of EPZ 
establishment, or year zero. To help visualize the results figure 4.3 displays point 
estimates at different moments of the distribution with the 95% confidence intervals; 
estimates are reported in Table 4.7.   
                                                          
20 Leads and lags of 4 and 8 years also include municipalities with 3 and 7 years, respectively, in order to 
avoid noise from dummies with few municipalities. Each lead contains 4 to 16 treated municipalities. 
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The positive sign and relatively large size of most of the coefficient seem to 
indicate a consistent incremental effect on the level of real expenditure per capita at all 
percentiles of the distribution with the more years of EPZ operation. Only the 90th 
percentile is statistically significant for year zero. The larger effect still occurs at the very 
upper-tail of the distribution, notably at the 90th percentile with statistically significant 
point estimates at 5 and 1% levels that imply a growing absolute effect of about 10 to 
20% per period. However, the time decomposition indicates statistically significant 
effects at all deciles above the 30th after 8 years of EPZ operation, sustained only for 
the median deciles after that period. Different explanations are conceivable here. Classic 
trickle down mechanisms might be taking place, resulting from both medium-term 
consumption and production dynamics after the expansion of the zones, or the 
increases in productivity over the years. Negative values before treatment are too 
imprecise to make any conclusion21, but they are supportive of the effect resulting from 
the arrival of new exporting firms. 
Findings of this section shed light on the more complex dynamics of the EPZ 
policy. They highlight the predominance of the effect at the upper-tail of the 
distribution. At the same time, they are also suggestive of a diffusion of the treatment 
effect at the middle of the distribution and 10th percentile, after 8 and 11 years of zone 
establishment.  
4.5.4 Skills distribution 
I next use the distribution of per capita years of education to verify the predictions 
of the conceptual channels (i.e. a skill premium related to the establishment of EPZ). 
Ideally, I would want to break down the skill distribution by industry and test the effect 
of EPZ establishment across the full interactions of skill and industries (Atkin 2012). 
However, data limitations regarding industrial affiliations and labour earnings prevent 
me from disentangling the effect further. 
Given the large proportion of unskilled individuals, testing for the effect of EPZ 
relative to skill-levels is not straightforward. 30% of the working age sample reports 
zero years of formal education across the period and only 5.4% reports having 
completed education at the tertiary level. For this reason, I use relative education levels. 
First, I calculate the distribution of education (years of completed education22) amongst 
                                                          
21 The particular negative shock at -8 years coincides with the post-hurricane Mitch period hitting 
Nicaragua. 
22 Years of schooling or completed formal education span from 0 to 20 in the sample. 
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all working age individuals by year and provinces23. Following Atkin (2012) I then 
generate a three-level skill-specific measure. I code as low-skill, individuals below and at 
the 40th percentile of the schooling distribution, as mid-skill, individuals above the 40th 
and up until the 70th percentile, and as high-skill individuals with years of schooling 
above the 70th percentile24. With these measures in hand, I rerun specifications for 
equation (4.1), but augment the regression with 3 distinct dummies created from the 
interaction of the treatment variable and the binary variables for each skill level (low, 
mid and high)25.  
Table 4.8 shows the results of this regression for the average level of real per capita 
expenditures for the working-age individuals. Results are robust to the inclusion of 
province-fixed effects and the clustering of standard-errors at the province level. The 
ordering and signs of the coefficients are largely as expected due to findings in section 
4.5.2. The highly significant and positive effect contained at the high-skill level supports 
the view that the gains from EPZ establishment are larger for the upper-deciles of the 
distribution. It is hard to be conclusive on what is driving the high-skill individuals to 
benefit the most from EPZ formation without decomposing by industry. These 
findings seem supportive of the channels previously mentioned in section 4.5.2. I find 
similar results using an alternative measure for skill-levels based on the actual level of 
education achievement26 (column 2). Low-skill individuals also register significant 
positive point estimates here, which is consistent with the heterogeneous time dynamics 
and the bottom decile being significant in some specifications.  
4.5.5 Relocation of workers 
An important concern that remains relates to possible bias from internal mobility 
across areas during the period studied. Does low and high-skill labour relocate across 
space in response to the labour supply shock? The most important threat to validity in 
the place-based policy literature relates to compositional changes in the distribution of 
workers within units of analysis. This threat is greater during large time periods, like the 
one here.  
                                                          
23 I use working-age individuals given that using the sample of employed instead does not allow me to 
generate a full distribution. Similarly, using municipalities provide an incomplete picture. 
24 The distribution by skill levels is skewed towards the lower tail in both treated and non-treated 
municipalities, but the proportion of low-skill is much higher in non-treated municipalities. This is largely 
due to the period 1993-1998 (Figure E3). 
25 Mid-skill is the omitted variable. 
26 Here low-skill corresponds to working age individuals reporting no years of formal education, mid-skill 
stands for those having completed primary school, and high-skill includes those having completed 
secondary education and/or university. I include secondary education as a high-skill given that only 5% of 
the entire sample has tertiary formation. 
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There are two dimensions to consider in this case. The first is possible internal 
migration across municipalities. This would impose an upward or downward bias on my 
results, depending on which type of migrants arrive or leave treated areas. This 
dimension is closely related to the skill composition of the migrants, as it could be 
foreseen that the higher skill may be drawn towards EPZ’s employment, and on the 
contrary the lower-skill may be pushed to rural areas. Additionally, large exogenous 
inflows of migrants may alter both income levels and firms’ location decisions related to 
the impact of the flows on local wages. During the entire period considered, 10.7% of 
the sample reports having moved from another municipality in the past five years27. The 
flow however seems to have been under-reported in 1998 and 2009, both years 
displaying extremely low percentages (2-5%). Excluding these, more than 7% of 
working age population is defined as an internal migrant (7.6 and 7.7% in treated and 
control municipalities, respectively). There is limited information regarding origin and 
destination of the flows, with data available only for 1998. For that year, 7.8% of the 
migrants moved to a municipality hosting an EPZ, with most flows taking place among 
non-treated areas.  
To address this issue, I start by estimating the likelihood of migrating for the 
working age population following the establishment of a zone in a given area, using 
both OLS and logit estimators. Results are reported in Table E10. I find no evidence of 
a statistically significant impact. Additionally, point estimates are always very small, 
permitting to discard major bias from large displacement following the establishment of 
a zone in a given area. The absence of perfect factor mobility is not surprising. The 
World Bank (2012) estimates that during the 2000s, only 10% of the improvements in 
living standards were related to population shifts (from rural to urban), and find little 
evidence of changes in the structural distribution of employment in the last decade, with 
a continued dominance of the agricultural sector. As a second test, I estimate the effect 
of EPZ formation on changing the skill composition of the residing population. This 
may capture finer dynamics due to migration patterns that are not visible using the 
overall migrants’ measure. Results in Table 4.9 are in line with theoretical intuitions. 
Although the sign of the coefficients on the share of high skill changes with respect to 
the definition, this is due to the larger weight given to the medium-skill (primary school) 
using the second definition. I focus on the first definition. Here point estimates on the 
high-skill are large and positive though not statistically significant. Conversely, there 
seems to be negative to zero effects on the low skill. Overall, the share of the high-to-
                                                          
27 As defined in the Household Surveys. This is the only measure consistent for the 5 different surveys. 
 169 
 
 
 
169 
low skill does seem to be impacted, increasing by 3 percentage points (pp) across the 
period. Though not robust across specifications, results are significant at 10% level. 
These changes are in line with the theoretical mechanisms put forward. The small size 
of the impact means the increase in the proportion of higher-skill workers in treated 
municipalities following the establishment of an EPZ is unlikely to be driving the 
average positive effects of the baseline results.  
The second dimension to address concerns the general out-migration phenomenon 
of the poor in Nicaragua. Similar to internal migration, large out-migration flows would 
also alter the composition of the labour force. It is estimated that near half a million of 
Nicaraguan migrated to neighbouring Costa Rica since 1994. To address this issue, I run 
the previous equations holding constant population weights of 1993 (using census data 
and initial sampling weights). Results remain unchanged discarding any strong 
compositional changes from out-migration (Table E11). 
4.6 Extensions & Robustness Checks 
The final empirical section contains some alternative specifications that examine 
the robustness of the previous conclusions.   
4.6.1 Spillover dynamics & commuting   
This section addresses the concerns related to possible interactions taking place 
between an EPZ municipality and its neighbours. If these exist, not taking them into 
consideration would lead to a bias estimation of the EPZ effects.  
I define spillovers as any form of business diversion or creation that could take 
place because of agglomeration forces between treated and control municipalities 
adjacent to each other. Backward linkages between EPZs and local producers are 
probably the main mechanism through which spillovers can be expected to happen. 
These could lead to neighbouring areas being indirectly ‘treated’ or on the contrary, to 
the relocation of economic activity closer to EPZs, in detriment of control 
municipalities. Additionally, I consider commuting behaviour as a form of spillover. 
Individuals working in a treated municipality but residing in a neighbouring area are 
likely to generate similar types of possible externalities. Both mechanisms are hard to 
measure. Information on commuting is only available for 2001, when it represented 
3.56% of the total sample (5.05 and 3.02% in treated and control municipalities, 
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respectively). This is consistent with some studies finding limited labour mobility in 
Nicaragua28. 
In order to formally test for the possibility of these two dynamics, I measure 
treatment effect across the real expenditure distribution of municipalities adjacent to a 
treated municipality. For this, I compute a modified version of equation (4.3) adding a 
set of dummy variables that switch to one for municipalities neighbouring a treated 
area. Because of the particular small size of Nicaraguan municipalities in the west part 
of the country, considering the shared border as criteria for proximity would imply 
denoting the vast majority of control municipalities in the region as neighbours. Instead, 
I use the municipality’s distance from its centroid to the centroid of the nearest treated 
one using two levels of distance, one set at between 5 to 15km and the other at 15 to 
35km29. This differentiation allows accounting for both dimensions, commuting with 
the closer group, and more formal spillover effects with the one further away.   
Table 4.10 provides the DID estimates augmented with the neighbour dummies on 
the deciles of the real per capita expenditure distribution. It is encouraging to find a 
close similarity in the size, sign and statistical significance of the EPZ coefficients to the 
ones in previous estimations. Point estimates on neighbouring areas seem to indicate 
low (negative) to no spillover effect from EPZ location. Only one coefficient shows 
statistical significance but the size is not higher than 2%. Despite the sign being 
consistently negative for the larger ring, bias from this phenomenon can be expect to be 
very small, validating the previous estimates. 
4.6.2 Balanced panel & weight of capital city 
Given that the identification strategy relies on the timing and cross-section 
variation of EPZ establishment across municipalities, this final empirical section 
addresses the possibility that the results are driven by the inclusion of particular outliers. 
First, I limit the sample to municipalities observed for at least 4 of the 5 periods 
considered. Second, I exclude the capital city (and municipality) of Managua from my 
sample to verify that this larger agglomeration is not pooling the results. Managua 
                                                          
28 Related to the low-skill level of the labour force, the cost of transport with respect to minimum living 
standards and frequent transportation strikes, commuting distances are found to be an important 
deterrent for participating in the labour market (Jansen et al. 2007). 
29 The measure is of course imperfect. While using the centroid’s distance offers the advantage of 
reducing the noise from larger municipalities where a large proportion would not be in contact with 
treated areas, it might also exclude some bordering zones. Smaller units of analysis and household’s geo-
references would be needed for a more precise measure. For simplicity, I refer to the measure as the 
direct distance between municipalities, but it always registers the distance between the centroids of two 
municipalities. 
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remains by far the largest municipality in the country in terms of economic output and 
population, with its average level of real expenditure per capita being twice the one of 
all other municipalities in the country. The range is almost as high across all the decile 
of the expenditure distribution. Results are reported in appendices E12-E13. Overall, 
conclusions remain unchanged.  
4.7 Conclusion 
The present analysis has exploited a rich dataset at both individual and municipal 
levels to estimate average and distributional effects of EPZ establishment within their 
host municipalities in Nicaragua for the period 1993-2009. Evidence amassed is 
consistent across different specifications and robustness checks. 
Overall, I find robust evidence that EPZ establishment in a given municipality 
increased the average level of real expenditure per capita between 10 to 12% across the 
period. The decomposition of the effect across the expenditure distribution suggests 
that the upper-tail benefited the most both in terms of size and across time, with 
middle-range deciles benefiting only after eight years of a zone establishment. The 
exception is a small significant effect at the 10th percentile. The bulk of the positive 
effect is concentrated on the higher-skill working-age individuals.  
Data limitations do not allow me to be conclusive regarding the ultimate channels 
at play here. An obvious question is why EPZs would have mainly benefitted higher-
income households. Is this due to the effect on the local cost of living, rent or land 
prices? Or is it the result of the skill premium in the exporting sector? The question 
remains open on whether the effect is really due to the exporting nature of the firms or 
the local dynamics on factor prices and possible production externalities.  
Theoretical models incorporating responses in land prices and rents (Neumark and 
Simpson 2014; Busso et al. 2013; Kline and Moretti 2014), as well as labour market 
heterogeneity (Topalova 2010; Kovak 2013) seem to be the best framework to 
understand both possibilities. In this sense, this paper offers some interesting insight on 
the importance of analysing trade policies at the local level, taking into account local 
labour market dimensions and agglomeration economies. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016) 
acknowledge the move towards this direction, and underline the interest of the 
empirical literature in influencing richer theoretical models. Findings here encourage the 
honing of theoretical trade frameworks that incorporate labour market heterogeneity in 
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terms of skills and formality of employment, as well different mobility patterns between 
low and high income segments.  
The findings in this study are also important from a policy perspective. They 
contribute to elucidate the dynamics of a popular policy tool, and contradict popular 
belief that EPZs are directly beneficial for the low-skill/low-income groups through 
local employment. The time lag registered for the policy to reach different segments of 
the distribution leaves a door open for policy intervention. There is an urgent need for 
further research in the area in order to identify with more precision the different 
mechanisms at play. 
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4.8 Figures and Tables 
Figure 4.1. Gradual Establishment of EPZs in Nicaraguan Municipalities (1993-2009) 
 
1993 
 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
2005 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: GIS digital maps. Municipalities are highlighted following the establishment of an industrial 
park or single factory under the EPZ regime. During the period considered some municipalities may 
contain more than one firm or industrial park. Data was compiled from the annual yearbooks of the 
Comision Nacional de Zonas Francas (CNZF). 
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Figure 4.2. Parallel Trends – Selected Outcome Variables, Preferred Control Group 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figures depict parallel trends of levels of real expenditure per capita according to treatment and 
control groups. Main control municipalities are selected according to the density of the road network. 
On the left side, the treated include only those treated in 2001, and on the right side the treated are 
only those treated in 2005. Values are in thousands of constant Cordobas (C$1999). 
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Figure 4.3. Events Study – Selected Outcome Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The horizontal axis measures the number of years since the EPZ program took place. The vertical line 
represents thousands of Cordobas. The plots connect by the solid line indicate the effect on the levels of real 
per capita expenditure compared to the period immediately before, the dotted lines are the 95% CI where the 
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. See table 7 for point estimates. 
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Table 4.1. Sample Description (Cross Section and Panel Datasets)  
Sample Level 1993 1998 2001 2005 2009 Total 
Municipalities 80 115 114 126 92 527 
with EPZs 1 3 9 16 18 47 
Individuals   24,892 23,182 22,298 36,183 29,749 136,304 
Individuals (≥15 years) 13,689 13,185 13,306 22,146 20,146 82,472 
Households  4,412 4,125 4,075 6,779 6,375 25,766 
Notes: Not all municipalities are observed every year. Municipalities with less than 30 households each year were dropped from 
the sample. The minimum number of households per municipality in a given year is 30 and the max excluding Managua is 408 
(Managua's max. is 2004). 
 
Table 4.2.  Summary Statistics Main Outcome Variables (1993-2009) 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev N 
Average real per capita expenditure, annual 6,642.68 7,268.44 81,249 
Individuals reporting having migrated in the past 5 years 0.15 0.36 82,472 
Average real per capita expenditure, annual (municipality) 4,824.33 2,390.96 527 
10th percentile - real per capita expenditure, annual 1,976.24 1,065.97 527 
30th percentile - real per capita expenditure, annual 2890.912 1477.893 527 
50th percentile - real per capita expenditure, annual 3,890.79 1,953.95 527 
70th percentile - real per capita expenditure, annual 5,289.22 2,696.75 527 
90th percentile - real per capita expenditure, annual 8,792.86 5,094.79 527 
Share of low-skill (definition 1) 0.34 0.11 527 
Share of high-skill (definition 1) 0.09 0.09 527 
Share of low-skill (definition 2) 0.37 0.21 527 
Share of high-skill (definition 2) 0.12 0.11 527 
EPZ Neighbouring Municipalities (5 to 15 km) 0.05 0.21 527 
EPZ Neighbouring Municipalities (15 to 30 km) 0.13 0.34 527 
Migrant in the past 5 years (municipality share) 0.10 0.12 527 
Notes: The first two variables are measured at the working-age individual level. Expenditure measures are expressed in 
constant Cordobas of 1999 (Exchange rate US$1=C$11.8). The share of low and high skill according to definition 1 are 
determined with respect to the skill distribution of the province; definition 2 is defined with respect to years of formal 
education. See section 6 for further details. The share of migrants is estimated by individuals reporting having migrated to 
the current municipalities in the previous 5 years. The EPZ neighbouring municipalities represents the share of 
municipalities at the given km distance to a treated municipality. 
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Table 4.3.  Summary Statistics of the EPZ by Establishment Sequence (1993-2009)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timing
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
A. Granting Sequence
Municipalities with newly established EPZs
Total Municipalities with EPZs
B. Municipality Characteristics
Distance To Managua (km) 56.70 51.44 43.09 76.25 84.84 48.07 35.88 13.28 142.77 77.85
Road Density (m) 91.30 28.51 92.33 24.50 80.68 29.66 225.42 109.39 46.24 40.69
Landlocked (=1) 0.53 0.51 0.38 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.36 0.49 0.46 0.50
Main Trade Access (=1 if main port, airport or 
trade post in municipality)
0.20 0.32 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.41 0.64 0.50 0.31 0.46
Electricity (% Households) 0.99 0.01 0.97 0.07 0.94 0.14 0.97 0.03 0.97 0.09
Completed Primary Education 0.27 0.03 0.29 0.03 0.28 0.44 0.29 0.03 0.26 0.06
Illiterate 0.13 0.06 0.18 0.10 0.20 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.31 0.16
Economically Active Population 0.61 0.05 0.59 0.42 0.58 0.07 0.57 0.05 0.54 0.07
Unemployment 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07
Manufacturing (% employed) 0.23 0.05 0.21 0.08 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.03 0.12 0.08
Agriculture (%employed) 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.30 0.30 0.18 0.04 0.55 0.27
Urban 0.90 0.11 0.74 0.18 0.57 0.33 0.41 0.30 0.35 0.34
Migrants in past five years 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.97 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.12
Group 1 
[<1999]
Group 2
[2000-2001]
Group 3 
[2002-2005]
Group 4 
[2006-2009]
Municipalities 
Never EPZ
4 5 7 2
Notes: Municipalities are grouped based on the sequence of EPZ establishment. Values are for sample averages across the period. 
Distance to Managua measures the centroids' distance of a municipality to the capital city, the measure excludes Managua; road 
density corresponds to meters of paved roads every 1 sq.km; main trade access is a composite dummy that equal one if a 
municipality has a major port, airport or trade post; economically active population corresponds to individuals betwene 13 and 68 
years old as per the definition of the statistical office; percent employed in different sectors, urban and unemployment levels are 
census data (1995-2005).Migrants in the past five years is the share of individuals that migrated to the municipality in the last 5 
years.*Never EPZ municipalities vary per year, as per the unbalanced nature of the panel. There are between 64 in 1993 to 108 in 
2005.
4 9 16 18 108*
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Table 4.4 Balance of covariates for the pre-treatment period, by sequence of establishment – Preferred Control Group (Road Network) 
Sequence of establishment
Group 1 
[<1999]
RN 
Control
t-test
Group 2
[2000-
2001]
RN 
Control
t-test
Group 3 
[2002-
2005]
RN 
Control
t-test
Group 4 
[2006-
2009]
RN 
Control
t-test
A. Municipality Characteristics
Distance To Managua (km) 72.54 101.72 -1.70* 42.43 107.11 -3.9*** 90.96 103.60 -1.00 35.65 107.92 -4.56***
Road Density (m) 84.67 71.67 0.47 92.00 71.88 1.26 78.42 72.28 0.51 225.42 156.85 3.01***
Landlocked (=1) 0.67 0.71 -0.18 0.40 0.74 -2.38** 0.57 0.74 -1.50 0.36 0.76 -2.98**
Main Trade Access (=1 if main port, airport or 
trade post in municipality)
0.27 0.43 -1.49 0.20 0.43 -1.48 0.42 0.42 -0.01 0.63 0.42 1.43
Electricity (% Households) 0.99 0.82 0.99 0.94 0.86 1.00 0.93 0.88 0.98 0.97 0.89 1.33
Completed Primary Education 0.27 0.29 -0.29 0.29 0.30 -0.03 0.27 0.27 -0.01 0.29 0.27 0.97
Illiterate 0.22 0.35 0.22 0.24 0.32 -1.42 0.24 0.31 -1.73* 0.21 0.29 -1.56
Economically Active Population 0.54 0.51 0.97 0.56 0.53 1.62 0.55 0.54 1.03 0.55 0.54 0.43
Unemployment 0.03 0.02 0.9 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.04 1.0 0.12 0.03 1.20
Manufacturing (% employed) 0.18 0.13 1.10 0.16 0.13 1.17 0.16 0.13 1.41 0.17 0.13 1.64
Agriculture (%employed) 0.08 0.47 -2.29** 0.16 0.50 -3.62*** 0.30 0.5 -2.16** 0.20 0.48 -2.11**
Urban 0.90 0.38 2.39** 0.78 0.38 3.42*** 0.56 0.39 1.98** 0.35 0.40 -0.47
Migrants in past five years 0.01 0.02 -0.36 0.01 0.02 -1.05 0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.08 0.10 -0.47
B. Pre-trend, Selected Outcomes
Average real per capita expenditure, annual 0.99 0.59 0.83 0.27 0.46 -0.42 0.48 0.61 -0.56 0.23 0.47 -0.99
10th p- real per capita expenditure, annual. 1.10 0.70 0.73 0.53 0.53 0.00 0.71 0.71 0.03 0.29 0.60 -1.13
50th p- real per capita expenditure, annual 1.13 0.67 0.78 0.32 0.61 -0.51 0.60 0.69 -0.32 0.25 0.53 -1.00
90th p- real per capita expenditure, annual 0.83 0.63 0.31 0.48 0.54 -0.10 0.57 0.64 -0.27 0.23 0.47 -0.83
Share of high-skill over low-skill (1) 4.30 4.02 0.07 2.28 4.21 -1.02 8.80 3.49 2.48** 2.46 2.61 -0.09
Share of high-skill over low-skill (2) -0.71 -0.50 -0.26 -0.69 -0.48 -0.54 -0.56 -0.47 -0.21 -0.26 -0.09 -0.35
N= 4 101 5 91 7 90 2 93
Notes: Municipalities are grouped based on the sequence of EPZ establishment. Values are for simple averages for the pre-treatment period. Definitions are as in Table 3. For municipalities 
treated before 2000, the historical trends denotes the average growth rate of the outcomes before 2001. I would otherwise  have no  pre-treatment trends for this group. A similar approach is 
done for the rest of the groups, but strictly considering only the pre-treatment period. The control group is defined with respect to the density of paved road. 
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Table 4.5. DID Estimates of the Effect of EPZs on Average Real 
Expenditure per capita  
 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
  
  
  
EPZ 
800.5** 639.6** 525.8** 477.4** 457.9** 
(353.6) (317.8) (214.1) (203.9) (207.4) 
Observations 52,997 52,997 375 375 375 
R-sq. 0.341 0.339 0.722 0.818 0.914 
 
    
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality-year trend ✓ ✓   
  
Province-year dummies 
  
✓ ✓ 
 
Region-year dummies 
  
  
 
✓ 
Covariates 
 
✓   ✓ ✓ 
Municipalities 106 106 106 106 106 
            
Notes: Dependent variable is levels of real expenditure per capita. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at municipality. Covariates in column 2 include dummies for time-
varying individual and household characteristics: educational level, age square, gender, 
urban, sector of work, household size and having migrated within the past five years. 
Individual observations are only for working age individuals. Covariates in column 4-5 
include illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary education, the share 
of urban population, migrants and share of households with access to electricity at 
municipal-level. Results are estimated against the preferred control group using the road 
network buffer. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6. DID Estimates of the Effect of EPZs across the Expenditure 
Distribution in Treated Municipalities 
Real Expenditure per capita (1) (2) 
    
10th Percentile 218.3 232.6* 
  (145.1) (138.0) 
20th Percentile 143.8 149.8 
  (175.7) (169.9) 
30th Percentile 169.2 173.1 
  (219.7) (211.4) 
40th Percentile 213.8 209.5 
  (228.2) (218.5) 
50th Percentile 258.4 245.2 
  (264.8) (251.5) 
60th Percentile 271.3 250.9 
  (317.7) (302.5) 
70th Percentile 463.2 414.9 
  (359.9) (345.4) 
80th Percentile 844.0* 785.6 
  (506.5) (475.0) 
90th Percentile 2138* 2,061* 
  (1,223) (1,109) 
Year FE  ✓ ✓ 
Municipality FE ✓ ✓ 
Province-year trends  ✓  
Region-year dummies  ✓ 
Covariates  ✓ ✓ 
Observations 375 375 
Municipalities 106 106 
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of real expenditure distribution. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. Covariates include illiteracy rate, the share 
of population with primary and tertiary education, the share of urban population, migrants 
and share of households with access to electricity at municipal-level. Results are estimated 
against the preferred control group using the road network buffer. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.7.  The Heterogeneous Time Dynamics of EPZ Establishment  
  
10th 
percentile 
20th 
percentile 
30th 
percentile 
40th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
60th 
percentile 
70th 
percentile 
80th 
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EPZ establishment, t-11 -134.9 -85.65 -109.9 118.3 228.4 536.8 190.9 310.1 -99.58 
  (122.3) (216.1) (260.9) (249.7) (289.2) (487.8) (551.6) (491.2) (1,475) 
EPZ establishment, t-8 -298.3** -244.8 -171.0 -193.6 -184.0 -221.0 -594.3* -663.6 -1,889* 
  (127.1) (174.7) (170.4) (201.1) (211.4) (253.4) (341.9) (448.8) (1,034) 
EPZ establishment, t-4 -10.84 140.8 337.8 266.8 105.9 180.5 -40.45 34.72 -559.7 
  (215.9) (230.5) (310.7) (321.5) (313.5) (396.0) (440.5) (510.6) (871.0) 
EPZ establishment, t0 -16.95 -20.45 172.4 231.8 163.3 287.7 391.4 537.1 1,025 
  (175.1) (189.8) (177.5) (216.2) (239.5) (272.0) (511.7) (548.0) (1,316) 
EPZ establishment, t+4 124.9 271.6 336.3 363.5 390.7 296.7 238.6 722.2 1,032* 
  (240.7) (243.6) (301.5) (277.7) (273.6) (316.7) (417.3) (545.9) (528.3) 
EPZ establishment, t+8 66.13 399.8 462.4* 651.6*** 1,029*** 1,163*** 1,149** 1,942** 2,591** 
  (180.1) (284.4) (259.0) (217.8) (383.6) (436.2) (464.6) (845.2) (1,052) 
EPZ establishment, t+11 589.1** 492.9 782.7 858.8 1,148*** 895.0* 1,022 962.8 3,237*** 
  (258.7) (344.7) (523.6) (532.5) (433.8) (478.1) (680.5) (634.0) (1,140) 
Observations 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
R-sq. 0.709 0.748 0.752 0.774 0.785 0.778 0.702 0.728 0.630 
Municipalities 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of the real per capita expenditure distribution. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. All regressions include year and 
municipality fixed-effects and province-year dummies. Covariates include illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary education, and the share of urban 
population, migrants and households with access to electricity at municipal-level. All leads are equal to one in only one year each per adopting state. EPZ dummy (t0) equals one only 
for year of establishment. EPZ t+/-4 includes t+/-3, and EPZ t+/-8 includes t+/-7, to have balanced dummies. Results are estimated against the preferred control group using the 
road network buffer. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.8. The Effect of EPZs By Skill-Level  
 
 
Skill-Distribution Education-Level 
(1) (2) 
EPZ 486.1 204.0 
 
(466.7) (485.1) 
Low-Skill*EPZ 29.98 209.1** 
  
(134.4) (70.18) 
High-Skill*EPZ 1,810*** 2,018*** 
 
 
(189.4) (115.6) 
Observations 52,997 52,997 
R-sq. 0.338 0.346 
Municipalities 106 106 
        
Notes: Dependent variables are levels of real expenditure per capita. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. All regressions include time and 
municipality fixed effects, municipality-time trends and province-time dummies. 
Covariates include education level, illiteracy rate, as well as the share of urban 
population, migrants and households with access to electricity at municipal-level. 
Column 1 show the results using the years of education to define the skill distribution. 
Column uses the second definition using the levels of formal education. Results are 
estimated against the preferred control group using the road network buffer. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.9. The effect of EPZ formation on skill composition 
Definitions Skills Definition 1 Skill Definition 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    
Share of High Skill 0.253 0.134 -0.205 -0.242 
(0.176) (0.150) (0.228) (0.221) 
Share of Low Skill -0.01 0.000 -0.018 -0.007 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.0112) 
Proportion of High/Low Skill 0.0369* 0.0251 0.005 0.002 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.011) 
Observations 375 375 375 375 
R-sq. 0.753 0.865 0.845 0.833 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality-year trend ✓ 
 
✓ 
 Province-year dummies  ✓  ✓ 
Covariates ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Cluster Municipalities 106 106 106 106 
          
Notes: Dependent variable are the share of high and low skill working age populations and the 
proportion of high to low skill populations at the municipal level. Robust standard errors clustered at 
municipality are in parentheses. Columns 1-2 define skills according to the distribution of years of 
education, while columns 3-4, and define skills according to the level of formal education achieved. 
Definition are in section 5.4. Covariates are as in table 6. Results are estimated against the preferred 
control group using the road network buffer. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 184 
 
 
 
184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10. The Effect of EPZs Establishment & Spillover Dynamics 
  
10th 
percentile 
20th 
percentile 
30th 
percentile 
40th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
60th 
percentile 
70th 
percentile 
80th 
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EPZ 232.8* 121.0 127.4 227.2 271.3 307.3 532.2 942.5* 2,123* 
 (134.6) (173.9) (214.3) (231.7) (268.2) (319.9) (376.5) (491.4) (1,142) 
Neighbouring Municipalities 
1 -147.1 -401.4 -362.3 109.8 12.05 74.33 454.2 699.8 -238.4 
(5 to 15km) (327.0) (306.1) (381.1) (389.3) (343.1) (322.7) (421.0) (538.6) (493.9) 
Neighbouring Municipalities 
2 -139.6 -237.4 -357.6* -257.7 -239.9 -142.6 -170.1 -104.1 -435.0 
(15 to 35km) (127.5) (159.3) (184.7) (176.0) (222.3) (248.9) (300.7) (415.8) (568.3) 
Observations 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
R-sq. 0.687 0.735 0.739 0.756 0.759 0.753 0.691 0.699 0.687 
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of the real per capita expenditure distribution. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. All 
regressions include year and municipality fixed-effects and province-year dummies. Covariates include illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and 
tertiary education, the share of urban population, migrants and the share of households with access to electricity at municipal-level.  The variables Neighbour 
Municipalities are dummy variables that equal one if a municipality's centroid is situated at 5 to 15km, and 15km to 35km distance from a treated municipality, 
and zero otherwise. I use the centroid's distance to avoid noise from larger municipalities. Results are estimated against the preferred control group using the 
road network buffer.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A3. Main Qualification Criteria for Subsidy Housing in Selected Informal 
Settlements 
 
Notes: Data from HDA (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 198 
 
 
 
198 
Figure A4. Distribution of final sample by Metro-Municipality 
 
 
Figure A5. Probability of Receiving RDP Housing at R$1500 & R$3500 
(a) R$1500 
 
(b) R$3500 
 
 
Notes: Probit and Linear probabilities of receiving RDP at cutoff. 
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Figure A6. Non-Parametric Estimates by bandwidths 
(a) Labour Supply Index 
 
(b) Unemployment per working age 
 
(c) Neighbourhood Quality Index 
 
(d) Housing Amenities 
 
 
Notes: The graphs show the 2SLS coefficients estimated in nonparametric regressions when varying the 
bandwidths between 0.5 and 6 thousand around the threshold. CCT and IK bandwidths are preferred at 1.11 
and 2.48 respectively.  
 
Table A1. Initial Sample (NIDS Panel) 
            
 
2008 2010 2012 2014 Total 
I. Original Sample       
Individuals 28,226 35,116 38,209 43,236 144,787 
Adults (14+ years) 18,603 24,012 26,034 29,380 98,029 
Households  6,875 6,586 7,539 8,845 29,845 
CSM - 29,448 29,448 30,479 89,375 
RDP recipients (HH) 396 997 1,297 1,587 4,277 
RDP recipients (Adults) 1,492 3,953 6,835 6,835 19,115 
Notes: CSM refers to continuing sample members as define per NIDS. RDP recipients in each wave are 
individuals that report living in household that has received a housing subsidy at the period interviewed. 
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Table A2. Sample Selection Criteria 
 2008 2010 2012 2014 Total 
II. Selected Sample 
    
 
Raw data 18,603 24,012 26,034 29,380 98,029 
Step 1 18,017 23,215 24,388 27,621 93,241 
Step 2 17,340 18,289 20,670 24,096 80,395 
Step 3 8,831 10,385 12,465 13,593 45,274 
Step 4 8,831 10,104 11,528 12,283 42,746 
Step 5 1,269 1,290 1,741 2,031 6,331 
Final Sample -    Individuals 3,170 4,098 5,018 6,353 18,639 
Households 923 940 1,240 1,595 4,698 
% RDP HH 0.0 17.6 17.2 17.4 14.2 
Notes: Rows in the table refer to different selection steps. Numbers reported refer to observations left 
after each step. Description of sample selection procedure: 
Raw Data: Adults (14+ years old, as defined by SSA), household residents. 
Step1: Keep only individuals with age ≥14 in wave 1, age≥16 in wave 2 & age≥17 in wave 3 with South 
African nationality  
Step2: Keep only individuals that did not own a dwelling in previous period. 
Setp3: Keep only individuals married/living with partner or with dependents (hh size>1) in previous 
period. 
Step4: Keep only individuals that never received RDP at baseline 
Step5: Keep only individuals in 6 main metro municipalities & urban. 
Final Sample: Head of HH eligible for RDP subsidies and working-age household members, not subject 
to income condition yet. 
 
Table A3. Summary Statistics – Indices (Baseline) 
 
    Mean Std. Dev. N 
A. Adult Labour Supply 0.098 1.00 692 
Fraction of HH members employed over working age members 0.294 1.00 692 
Weekly labour hours per working age member -0.065 1.00 692 
B. Adult Labour Supply Cost -0.08 1.00 692 
Distance to Main Employment Nodes (min by mode of 
transport) 
-0.051 1.00 
692 
Distance to Main Employment Nodes (km) -0.115 1.00 692 
Monthly amount spent on transport as a fraction of HH income  0.058 1.00 692 
C. Amenities Index -0.262 1.00 692 
HH has electricity -0.225 1.00 692 
Type of toilet facility in the HH [none to inside, 1-7] -0.061 1.00 692 
Dwelling Rating [1-7] 0.000 1.00 692 
Number of Rooms -0.520 1.00 692 
D. Neighbourhood Quality Index 0.0872 1.00 692 
Refuse collection  0.194 1.00 692 
Not common to have robberies in the neighbourhood  0.003 1.00 692 
Functioning street light  0.064 1.00 692 
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Notes: This is the final subsample of RDP eligible households in urban areas in period 1. Employment 
definition is as in Table 3.  Indices' subcomponents are z-scores.  Electricity is a dummy variable related 
to access to electricity within the dwelling; type of toilet is a categorical variable that goes from 1 to 7 for 
none to flush toilet within the household. The dwelling rating rates 1-5 the structure from dilapidated to 
in good condition. Refuse collection is a dummy variable for weekly refuse collection by local authorities.  
 
 
Table A4. RD Manipulation Test using local polynomial density estimation 
   Running Variable - Household Nominal Monthly Income (t-1)
Robust Bias-Corrected T p>|T| 
2010-2014 -0.135 0.892 
2008 0.873 0.383 
2010 0.082 0.935 
2012 0.824 0.410 
2014 0.791 0.429 
Order local poly (left, right) 2 2 
Notes: Data-driven bandwidth selectors following Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2015). Tests the null 
hypothesis that the density of the forcing variable is continuous at cutoff, and its implementation 
requires the estimation of the density of observations near the cutoff, separately for observations 
above and below the cutoff, using a local polynomial density estimator. The latter does not require 
pre-binning of the data. Estimates use triangular kernel. Results are unchanged with uniform kernels 
or linear regressions. 2008 refers to current household income. 
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A.I OLS Results 
Table A5. OLS Results: Main Labour Market Outcomes  
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Labour Supply Index  Main Outcomes 
 
Composite 
Index 
Employed 
per wam 
Weekly 
hours per 
wam 
Weekly 
Total 
Hours 
Weekly 
Hours  
Female 
Weekly 
Hours  
Male 
Employed 
Members 
Employed  
Females 
 
Employed 
Males 
Unemployed 
members 
Unemployed 
per wam. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Baseline Mean 0.148 0.410 25.724 30.311 13.541 16.770 0.815 0.465 0.493 0.472 0.179 
 [1.00] [0.381] [15.571] [34.310] [22.924] [25.396] [0.776] [0.601] [0.566] [0.776] [0.287] 
RDP -0.19*** -0.25*** -0.15*** -6.05*** -2.29** 3.72*** -3.68*** -0.027 -0.10*** 0.096*** 0.0439*** 
  
(0.0382) (0.0496) (0.0344) (1.4549) (1.0411) (1.0421) (0.8335) (0.0297) (0.0286) (0.0268) (0.0117) 
Time & City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 
Notes: The table reports OLS coefficients. Dependent variables are measures of the labour supply of households. Columns (1) to (3) contain the labour supply index and its two 
components, measured as z-scores. All intensive measures are weekly total hours by household members, and extensive margins are the number of employed members. Wam stands per 
working-age members. Columns (10-11) are measures of unemployment that include discouraged members. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All 
regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as well as the proportion of adults>68-year-old & children <14 years old. Columns 
(4-5) and (10-11) control for the number of working age members in the household, while columns (6) to (9) control for the number of female and male working age members in the 
households, separately. Standard deviations are in brackets. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A6. OLS Results: Accessibility and Wellbeing Measures 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Commuting Times & Distances 
Neighbourhood 
Quality 
Amenities 
 
Composite 
Index 
Distance 
(km) to 
CBD 
Distance 
(min) to 
CBD Composite Index 
Composite 
Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) 
Baseline Mean  -0.081 26.823 116.37 
[64.58] 
0.087 -0.262 
 [1.00] [16.897] [1.00] [1.00] 
RDP 0.154** 0.170** 0.156* 0.098*** 0.239*** 
   (0.070) (0.078) (0.092) (0.0254) (0.0275) 
Time & City FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,050 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the effect of RDP subsidies on indices of commuting costs, 
neighbourhood quality and housing amenities. Variables are as defined in main tables. All regressions 
control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as well as the 
proportion of adults>68 years old & children <14 years old, and the working age members. Standard 
deviations are in brackets. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses.  *p<0.10; 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A7. OLS Results: Household Shifts Strategies (1): Compositional Changes 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Dependency 
Ratio Children 
Dependency 
Ratio Aged 
# Children 
living at 
home 
Young 
Children 
# of >68 
years old 
Age of Head 
Age of 
children 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline Mean 0.396 0.041 0.962 0.399 0.118 46.974 8.920 
 [25.535] [0.182] [1.327] [0.490] [0.366] [15.204] [ 4.285] 
RDP 0.0151 0.0025 0.069 -0.009 -0.017 -0.169 0.62 
  
(0.0162) (0.0057) (0.0550) (0.0241) (0.0206) (0.1895) (0.6138) 
Time & City fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 
Notes: The table reports the estimated OLS coefficients. Dependent variables are measures of household's age composition, as define in main tables. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household 
head. Column 6 excludes age as control. Standard deviations are in brackets. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 205 
 
 
 
205 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A8. OLS Results: Household Shifts Strategies (1): Coping Mechanisms & Preferences 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Coping Mechanisms Preferences 
 
HH Receives 
Rental 
Income 
Government 
Grant 
Non-commercial 
Agriculture 
Happier than 
 10 years ago 
HH  prefers 
to stay  
HH  prefers 
to stay 
(age<30) 
HH  prefers 
to stay 
(age>30) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline Mean 0.072 0.355 0.070 0.442 0.666 0.615 0.744 
 
[0.258] [0.479] [0.256] [0.497] [0.472] [0.487] [0.436] 
RDP 0.065*** 0.082*** 0.006 -0.034 0.090 0.086 0.072*** 
  
(0.0146) (0.0193) (0.0120) (0.0224) (0.0186) (0.0221) (0.0182) 
Time & City fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 
Notes: The table reports OLS coefficients of the effect of RDP subsidies on household shifts strategies. Dependent variables are different measures of household 
related to possible coping strategies and preferences.  Government Grand in column (2) is a dummy variable for receiving any type of government grant, including 
disability grants. Non-commercial agriculture is a dummy variable equal to one if households participated in agricultural activities without monetary compensation. 
While the remainder variables are dummy variables expressing happiness with respect to 10 years ago, and preference to stay in the current place, by age of the 
household head. Column (5) is the average of columns (6) and (7)  All regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household 
head, as well as the proportion of adults>68 years old & children <14 years old. Standard deviations in brackets. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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A.II Global Linear Polynomials 
 
 
 
Table A9. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Main Labour Market Outcomes (1) 
Global linear polynomial 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Unemployed 
Members 
Unemployed 
Members 
Unemployed 
per wam 
Unemployed  
- strict 
Unemployed  - 
strict 
Unemployed 
per wam - 
strict 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RDP 0.26 0.38 0.24** -0.12 -0.41 0.04 
 
(0.2219) (0.2713) (0.1195) (0.2722) (0.4343) (0.1086) 
First Stage F-Stat 30.25 25.53 30.25 30.25 25.53 30.25 
Polynomial Order 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Time & City FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,960 1,626 1,960 1,960 1,626 1,960 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS coefficients of the effect of RDP subsidies on labour market outcomes of beneficiary 
households. Dependent variables are measures unemployment. Columns (1-3) include discouraged members, while the 
remainder is only strict unemployment defined as those actively looking for a job. The first stage instrument Z is a 
dummy equal 1 for being below the assignment threshold.  All regressions control for a linear polynomial of the 
assignment variable and its interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All 
regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as well as the 
proportion of adults>68 years old & children <14 years old. In columns (1) and (3) I control for the number of working 
age members in the household. Results in columns (2) and (5) I control for female working age members.  
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A10. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Main Labour Market Outcomes (2) Global linear polynomial 
 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Labour Supply Index  Main Outcomes 
 
Composite 
Index 
Employed 
per wam 
Weekly 
hours per 
wam 
Weekly Total 
Hours 
Weekly 
Hours  
Female 
Weekly 
Hours  
Male 
Employed 
Members 
Employed  
Females 
 Employed 
Males 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
RDP -0.7376* -0.49 -0.9343** -40.26** -22.15** -11.82 -0.91** -0.4527 -0.40 
  
(0.3830) (0.5131) (0.3490) (14.8517) (10.3345) (11.1699) (0.4144) (0.3070) (0.2611) 
First Stage F-Statistic 30.25 30.25 30.25 30.25 30.25 30.25 30.25 23.95 26.67 
Polynomial Order 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Time & City fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,620 1,716 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS coefficients of the effect of RDP subsidies on labour market outcomes of beneficiary households. Dependent variables are measures of the labour 
supply of households. Columns (1) to (3) contain the labour supply index and its two components, measured as z-scores. All intensive measures are weekly total hours by household 
members, and extensive margins are the number of employed members. Wam stands per working-age members. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy equal 1 for being below the 
assignment threshold.  All regressions control for a linear polynomial of the assignment variable and its interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in 
parentheses. All regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as well as the proportion of adults>68-year-old & children <14 
years old. Columns (4) and (5) control for the number of working age members in the household, while columns (6) to (9) control for the number of female and male working age 
members in the households, separately. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A11. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Household Commuting Distances 
and Times - Global linear polynomial 
  Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Composite 
Index 
Distance 
(km) to 
CBD 
Distance 
(km) to 
main nodes 
Distance 
(min) to CBD 
Amount 
spent on 
transport  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RDP 0.47* 12.07*** 10.89** 28.83 0.033 
  (0.283) (4.534) (4.387) (23.716) (0.0375) 
First Stage F-Stat 38.41 38.41 38.41 38.41 25.84 
Polynomial Order 1 1 1 1 1 
Time & City fixed 
effects 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 2,295 2,295 2,295 2,295 736 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimates of the effect of RDP subsidies on elements related to the labour 
supply cost of households. Dependent variables are measures of the labour supply cost of households, 
with in column (1) the labour supply cost index. Columns (2-4) are the components of the index, and 
column (5) contains the monthly amount spent on transport as a share of monthly expenditures. Very few 
households have answered this question, limiting the sample size. Distance to CBD and main nodes are 
Euclidean distances to CBD (and the secondary node) from the suburb's centroid of the household 
residence. Distances measured in time of commute are calculated using the time of the most frequently 
used mode in the commuting area of residence, conditional on income and population group. Column (1) 
is an average of the normalized values of columns (2) and (4). Here I display the non-normalized value to 
provide the explicit km and minutes. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy equal 1 for being below the 
assignment threshold.  All regressions control for a linear polynomial of the assignment variable and its 
interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. Due to limitations 
to access secure address identifiers, these regressions are run on a different sample - i.e., for periods 1-3 
only. They control only for household size.  *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A12. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Wellbeing (1): Neighbourhood 
Quality  
Global Linear Polynomial 
  Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Composite 
Index 
Composite 
Index 
Robberies 
uncommon 
Street Light 
Refuse 
collection  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RDP -0.06 0.001 -0.48 0.05 0.39 
  
(0.2750) (0.2609) (0.4500) (0.4263) (0.4082) 
First Stage F-Stat 28.57 28.57 28.57 28.57 28.57 
Polynomial Order 1 1 1 1 1 
Time & City FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,947 1,947 1,947 1,947 1,947 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS c of the effect of RDP subsidies on measures of urban wellbeing. Dependent 
variables include the neighbourhood quality index and its components in columns (3 to 5). All variables are 
measured as z-scores. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy equal 1 for being below the assignment 
threshold.  All regressions control for a linear polynomial of the assignment variable and its interaction with 
Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All regressions control for the age, 
population group, education level and gender of the household head, as well as the proportion of adults>68 
years old & children <14 years old. Columns 2-5 also include a dummy variable for living in informal 
dwelling in the previous period. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A13. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Wellbeing (2): Housing Amenities 
Global Linear Polynomial 
 
  Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Composite 
Index 
Composite 
Index 
# of 
rooms  
Dwelling 
Quality 
HH has 
electricity 
Toilet 
inside  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RDP -0.61* -0.47* -1.13** -0.93** -0.001 0.20 
  
(0.3253) (0.2748) (0.4617) (0.4609) (0.4622) (0.4014) 
First Stage F-Statistic 30.25 30.25 30.25 30.25 34.05 30.25 
Polynomial Order 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Time & City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y N Y 
Obs. 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimates of the effect of RDP subsidies on measures of urban 
wellbeing. Dependent variables include a housing amenities index and its components in 
columns (3) to (6). All variables are measured as z-scores. The first stage instrument Z is a 
dummy equal 1 for being below the assignment threshold.  All regressions control for a linear 
polynomial of the assignment variable and its interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at household level in parentheses. All regressions control for the age, population group, 
education level and gender of the household head, as well as the proportion of adults>68 years 
old & children <14 years old. Columns 2-6 also include a dummy variable for living in informal 
dwelling in the previous period. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A14. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Household Shifts Strategies (1): Compositional Changes 
Global Linear Polynomial 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Dependency 
Ratio 
Children 
Dependency 
Ratio Aged 
# Children 
living at 
home 
Young 
Children 
# of >68 
years old 
Age of Head 
Age of 
children 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
RDP 0.003 0.13 -0.35 -0.31 0.15 -0.17 1.61 
  
(0.0029) (0.1001) (0.4056) (0.2019) (0.1540) (0.6501) (2.9818) 
First Stage F-Statistic 28.25 28.25 27.89 27.89 27.89 27.89 27.89 
Polynomial Order 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Time & City fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,882 1,882 1,947 1,947 1,947 1,947 1,947 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimates of the effect of RDP subsidies on household shifts strategies. Dependent variables are different measures of 
household composition. Columns (1) and (2) are dependency ratios calculated as the share of aged <14 & >68 over the working age members. Young 
children is a dummy variable for household with children below the age of 10. Average age of children and age of the household head are in columns (5) and 
(6). All regressions control for a linear polynomial of the assignment variable and its interaction with Z. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level 
in parentheses. All regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A15. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Household Shifts Strategies (2):  Coping Mechanisms & Preferences  
Global Linear Polynomial 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Coping Mechanisms Preferences 
 
HH Receives 
Rent Income 
Government 
Grant 
Non-
commercial 
Agriculture 
Happier than 
10 years ago 
HH  prefers 
to stay 
HH  prefers to 
stay (age<30) 
HH  prefers to  
stay (age>30) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
RDP 0.26* 1.10 0.11 -0.59** -0.24 -0.38 -0.04 
 
(0.1378) (0.1975) (0.0937) (0.4329) (0.2309) (0.2545) (0.2138) 
First Stage F-Statistic 31.67 28.65 28.58 26.34 21.34 21.34 21.34 
Polynomial Order 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Time & City fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 1,952 1,949 1,909 1,824 1,612 1,612 1,612 
Notes: The table reports 2SLS coefficients of the effect of RDP subsidies on household shifts strategies. Dependent variables are different measures of household related 
to possible coping strategies and preferences.  Government Grand in column (2) is a dummy variable for receiving any type of government grant, including disability 
grants. Non-commercial agriculture is a dummy variable equal to one if households participated in agricultural activities without monetary compensation. While the 
remainder variables are dummy variables expressing happiness with respect to 10 years ago, and preference to stay in the current place, by age of the household head. 
Column (5) is the average of columns (6) and (7).  All regressions control for a linear polynomial of the assignment variable and its interaction with Z. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as well as the 
proportion of adults>68 years old & children <14 years old. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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A.III Local Linear Regressions  
 
 
 
Table A16. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Household Commuting  
  Local linear regressions 
  Household Level dependent variable is: 
 Composite 
Index 
Distance (km) to 
CBD 
Distance (km) to 
main nodes 
Distance (min) 
to CBD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RDP 0.16 23.25* 12.61 40.49 
  (0.617) (12.878) (9.772) (52.103) 
First Stage F-Statistic 21.19 21.19 21.19 21.19 
Obs. 1,808 1,808 1,808 1,808 
Bandwidth (IK 2012) √ √ √ √ 
RDP 0.29 21.10 14.00* 34.56 
  (0.564) (14.852) (8.260) (43.052) 
First Stage F-Stat 10.96 10.96 10.96 10.96 
Obs. 638 638 638 638 
Bandwidth (CCT 2014) √ √ √ √ 
Notes: The table reports local linear regressions estimates of the effect of RDP subsidies on outcomes related 
to the labour supply cost of households. Dependent variables are measures of the labour supply cost of 
households, with in column (1) the labour supply cost index. Columns (2-4) are the components of the index, 
and column (5) contains the monthly amount spent on transport as a share of monthly expenditures. Distance 
to CBD and main nodes are Euclidean distances to CBD (and the secondary node) from the suburb's centroid 
of the household residence. Distances measured in time of commute are calculated using the time of the most 
frequently used mode in the commuting area of residence, conditional on income and population group. Column 
(1) is an average of the normalized values of columns (2) and (4). Here I display the non-normalized value to 
provide the explicit km and minutes. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy equal 1 for being below the 
assignment threshold. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. Due to limitations to 
access secure address identifiers, these regressions are run on a different sample - i.e., for periods 1-3 only. They 
control only for household size. IK (2012) and CCT (2014) refer to the rule for bandwidth choice as previously 
specified. Here optimal IK bandwidth is 3.453 and CCT 1.076. All regressions include city and time fixed-effects 
and basic controls.  *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A17. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Main Labour Market Outcomes - Local Linear Regressions 
 Household Level dependent variable is: 
 Labour Supply Index  Main Outcomes 
 Composite 
Index 
Employed 
per  
wam 
Weekly 
hours per 
wam 
Weekly 
Total 
Hours 
 
Hours  
Femal
e 
 Hours  
Male 
Employe
d 
Members 
Employe
d  
Females 
Employe
d Males 
Unemploye
d Members 
Unemploye
d per wam 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
RDP -0.96* -1.19 -0.72 -30.57 -21.81 -8.25 -0.77 -0.56 -0.12 0.28 0.19* 
  (0.5410) (0.73105) (0.4833) (20.6477) (14.48
28) 
(15.640
8) 
(0.5706) (0.4988) (0.2001) (0.3468) (0.1077) 
First Stage F-
Stat 
9.45 9.45 9.45 
9.45 10.15 
9.45 9.45 9.45 9.45 9.45 9.45 
Obs. 1041 1041 1041 1041 1077 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 
Bandwidth (IK) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
RDP -0.52 -0.54 -0.48 -14.07 -21.68 6.66 -0.46 -0.86 -0.04 0.57 0.24 
  (0.6678) (0.9417) (0.5703) (26.6326) (18.92
68) 
(21.570
2) 
(0.6286) (0.8402) (0.5338) (0.4987) (0.1585) 
First Stage F-
Stat 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 
Obs. 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 
Bandwidth 
(CCT) 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Notes: The table reports local linear regressions estimates of the effect of RDP subsidies on labour market outcomes of beneficiary households. Dependent variables are measures of  
the labour supply of households. Columns (1) to (3) contain the labour supply index and its two components, measured as z-scores. All intensive measures are weekly total hours by 
household members, and extensive margins are the number of employed members. Columns (10) and (11) include discouraged unemployed. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy 
equal 1 for being below the assignment threshold.  Wam stands per working-age members. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy equal 1 for being below the assignment threshold. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as well as 
the proportion of adults>68 year old & children <14 years old. Columns (4-5) and (10-11)  control for the number of working age members in the household, while columns (6) to (9) 
control for the number of female and male working age members in the households, separately. IK (2012) and CCT (2014) refer to the rule for bandwidth choice as previously specified. 
All regressions include city and time fixed-effects and basic controls. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A18. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Wellbeing (1): Neighbourhood 
Quality - Local Linear Regressions  
  Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Composite 
Index 
Robberies 
uncommon 
Street Light 
Refuse 
collection  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RDP 0.015 -0.309 0.096 0.220 
  (0.3730) (0.6398) (0.6110) (0.5283) 
First Stage F-Statistic 10.26 10.26 10.26 10.26 
Obs. 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 
Bandwidth (IK 2012) √ √ √ √ 
RDP -0.08 0.31 -0.64 -0.02 
  (0.5349) (0.8712) (0.8894) (0.7715) 
First Stage F-Statistic 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 
Obs. 489 489 489 489 
Bandwidth (CCT 2014) √ √ √ √ 
Notes: The table reports local linear regression estimates of the effect of RDP subsidies on measures of 
urban wellbeing. Dependent variables include the neighbourhood quality index and its components in 
columns (2 to 4). All variables are measured as z-scores. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy equal 1 
for being below the assignment threshold.  Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in 
parentheses. All regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the 
household head, as well as the proportion of adults>68 years old & children <14 years old. They also 
include a dummy variable for living in informal dwelling in the previous period.  IK (2012) and CCT 
(2014) refer to the rule for bandwidth choice as previously specified. All regressions include city and time 
fixed-effects and basic controls.*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A19. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Wellbeing (2): Housing Amenities 
Local Linear Regressions  
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Composite 
Index 
# of 
rooms  
Dwelling 
Quality 
HH has 
electricity 
Toilet 
inside  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RDP -0.93* -1.018 -1.38* -0.77 -0.07 
  (0.5327) (0.7623) (0.8342) (0.8434) (0.5007) 
First Stage F-Statistic 10.26 10.26 10.26 10.26 10.26 
Obs. 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 
Bandwidth (IK 2012) √ √ √ √ √ 
RDP -1.59** -1.56* -1.81* -2.22** -0.71 
  (0.6677) (0.8206) (0.9325) (1.0315) (0.7346) 
First Stage F-Statistic 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 9.05 
Obs. 489 489 489 489 489 
Bandwidth (CCT 2014) √ √ √ √ √ 
Notes: The table reports local linear regression estimates of the effect of RDP subsidies on measures of 
urban wellbeing. Dependent variables include a housing amenities index and its components in columns (2) 
to (5). All variables are measured as z-scores. The first stage instrument Z is a dummy equal 1 for being 
below the assignment threshold. Robust standard errors, clustered at household level in parentheses. All 
regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as well 
as the proportion of adults>68 years old & children <14 years old. They also include a dummy variable for 
living in informal dwelling in the previous period. IK (2012) and CCT (2014) refer to the rule for 
bandwidth choice as previously specified. All regressions include city and time fixed-effects and basic 
controls. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A20. Discontinuity Effect of RDP on Household Shifts Strategies:  Coping Mechanisms & Preferences  
Local Linear Regressions 
 
Household Level dependent variable is: 
 
Coping Mechanisms Preferences 
 
HH Receives 
Rent Income 
Government 
Grant 
Non-commercial 
Agriculture 
Happier than 
10 years ago 
HH  prefers 
to stay  
HH  prefers to 
stay (age<30) 
HH  prefers to  
stay (age>30) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
RDP 0.33 0.003 0.09 -0.68 -0.30 -0.95* 0.17 
  
(0.2577) (0.3286) (0.1530) (0.4692) (0.4027) (0.5231) (0.4088) 
First Stage F-Statistic 9.45 10.23 9.45 8.72 8.52 8.52 8.52 
Obs. 1,041 1,015 1,041 967 972 972 972 
Bandwidth (IK 2012) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
RDP 0.29 -0.83* 0.12 -0.80* -0.88* -0.42* -0.36 
  (0.2826) (0.4910) (0.1591) (0.4811) (0.5040) (0.7393) (0.4517) 
First Stage F-Statistic 9.05 9.24 9.05 10.67 9.99 9.99 9.99 
Obs. 489 451 489 419 464 464 464 
Bandwidth (CCT 2014) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Notes: The table reports local linear regression estimates of the effect of RDP subsidies on household shifts strategies. Dependent variables are different 
measures of household related to possible coping strategies and preferences.  Government Grant in column (2) is a dummy variable for receiving any type 
of government grant, including disability grants. Non-commercial agriculture is a dummy variable equal to one if households participated in agricultural 
activities without monetary compensation. While the remainder variables are dummy variables expressing happiness with respect to 10 years ago, and 
preference to stay in the current place, by age of the household head. Column (5) is the average of columns (6) and (7) Robust standard errors, clustered at 
household level in parentheses. All regressions control for the age, population group, education level and gender of the household head, as well as the 
proportion of adults>68 years old & children <14 years old. IK (2012) and CCT (2014) refer to the rule for bandwidth choice as previously specified. All 
regressions include city and time fixed-effects and basic controls. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix Box A.1 
 
A final issue that could complicate the identification strategy concerns the fact that the 
assignment variable relies on self-reported income data. Even absent intentional 
misreporting or manipulation, self-reported income data is noisy. This section aims to 
evaluate possible bias that could arise from bunching in the assignment variable due to its 
self-reported nature, i.e. it is easier for individuals to round the income they report (Barreca, 
Lindo and Waddell 2015).  
Below, I show that while there is heaping, it is random across round and non-round 
numbers. Figure A.5 plots the distribution of the data using one-unit bins, and shows that 
heaping is random across values with no particular higher density at any multiple of R$10. 
Particularly, it does not affect density at the cutoff of the value of the running variable 
(McCrary tests). Further, outcome variables do not seem to present significant variations by 
heaping types (Figure A.6). The scatter plots show similar distributions for selected 
outcome variables for heaping or non-heaping values of the running variable, with none 
being systematically higher.  
 
Figure A.7 Bunching in the Running Variable 
 
Notes: Obtained using Raj Chetty program bunch_count.ado 
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Figure A8. Excluding Heaps vs Non-Heaps – Selected Outcome variables 
(a) Labour Supply Index 
 
(b) Total Hours by Working Age Member 
 
(c) Total Hours by Working Age Male Member 
 
(d) Amenities Index 
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Appendices to Chapter 2.  
Is there one Ghetto University? 
Neighbourhoods & Opportunities in a 
Developing City. 
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Figure B3. Age Distribution of Young Adults by Ghetto (pooled-cross section, all
waves)
Notes: Age distribution across ghettos, final sample dataset of compliers in black townships; CAPS
dataset.
Figure B4. Gender Distribution of Young Adults by Sector of Occupations
(SIC Classifications)
223
Figure B5. Proportion of skill levels of occupation by Ghetto
Notes: Skill defined according to the classification of SOC occupations by Statistics South Africa.
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Table B1. Ghetto Quality Index 2001, all components (z-scores)
Langa Gugulethu Khayelitsha Nyanga
Electricity for light -0.994 -0.048 1.377 -0.335
Water inside -0.002 1.414 -0.738 -0.674
Refuse collection -1.181 0.342 1.173 -0.334
Formal dwelling -0.788 1.465 -0.385 -0.293
HHs above poverty line -0.609 1.181 0.445 -1.018
Adults > matric 0.637 0.423 0.433 -1.493
Adults some school 0.783 -0.641 0.920 -1.062
Km to CBD (inv.) 1.05 0.302 -1.344 -0.008
Km to non-black schools (inv.) 0.820 0.687 -0.153 -1.354
Murder rate (inv.) 1.182 0.137 -0.062 -1.257
Total Index 0.234 0.605 -0.031 -0.808
Total Rank 2 1 3 4
Notes: All variables are standardized census variables from the 2001 census. They are
defined as in Table 1. Inv. stands for inverse meaning that the values are substracted by
their maximum so that the higher number reflects proximity and lower murder rates.
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Section B.I: Separate Ghetto Regressions
Table B2. Results I: Education in young adulthood (separate regressions)
Years of education Ever college Delay in graduating grade
(1) (2) (3)
Langa 0.621* 0.083 0.168
(0.372) (0.066) (0.626)
R-squared 0.040 0.007 0.271
Gugulethu 0.138 0.017 -0.198
(0.267) (0.025) (0.327)
R-squared 0.036 0.001 0.271
Khayelitsha -0.353* -0.058** 0.108
(0.199) (0.023) (0.302)
R-squared 0.042 0.017 0.271
Nyanga 0.126 0.030 0.021
(0.227) (0.027) (0.308)
R-squared 0.036 0.004 0.270
All Controls Y Y Y
N 592 600 340
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Outcome
variables in column (1) is a dummy variable for YA not working and not studying in
2009, years of education (2) is the total years of formal education attained by the end
of the period, ever college (3) is a dummy variable for ever attending college over the
years in the panel, and delay in graduating grade is the delay in years for completing last
observed high-school grade against an upper bound (+1 year) of expected age of gradu-
ation. All regressions are separate regressions where the main explanatory is a dummy
variable for the ghettos of residence. Controls include age, age square, gender, dummy
variables for the education of mothers (secondary complete, primary and no education,
with one excluded category), main language spoken (English, Xhosa and Afrikaans, with
one excluded), and the type of place where YA answers spending most of their lives
(formal and informal urban, formal and informal rural, with one excluded). The sample
is only compliers - i.e. YA residing in a former Apartheid Black ghetto who moved to
their neighbourhood of residence before the end of Apartheid’s Group Areas Act removal
(1991); black only *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B3. Results II: Education in young adulthood by sex (separate regressions)
Years of education Ever college Delay in graduating grade
(1) (2) (3)
Females:
Langa 0.625 0.179 0.640
(0.600) (0.116) (0.930)
Gugulethu 0.378 0.026 -0.651
(0.320) (0.036) (0.415)
Khayelitsha -0.395 -0.073** 0.607
(0.247) (0.031) (0.378)
Nyanga -0.008 0.022 -0.340
(0.238) (0.039) (0.411)
N 319 323 183
Males:
Langa 0.607 -0.034** -0.642
(0.457) (0.017) (0.790)
Gugulethu -0.178 0.012 0.319
(0.403) (0.032) (0.505)
Khayelitsha -0.262 -0.039 -0.570
(0.314) (0.034) (0.466)
Nyanga 0.293 0.041 0.475
(0.384) (0.039) (0.459)
N 273 277 157
All Controls Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Outcome variables in
column (1) is a dummy variable for YA not working and not studying in 2009, years of education (2)
is the total years of formal education attained by the end of the period, ever college (3) is a dummy
variable for ever attending college over the years in the panel, and delay in graduating grade is the
delay in years for completing last observed high-school grade against an upper bound (+1 year)
of expected age of graduation. Controls and sample are as in A2. Regressions are run separately
by sex. Each point estimate is from a separate regression where the main explanatory is a dummy
variable for the ghettos of residence. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B4. Results I: Labour outcomes across period 2004-2009 (separate regressions)
Earnings (log) Working (paid) Idle Unemployed (ST) Unemployed (LT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Langa 0.194 0.186* -0.174* -0.079 -0.164*
(0.172) (0.102) (0.102) (0.099) (0.098)
R-squared 0.022 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.006
Gugulethu 0.015 -0.074 0.081 0.098 0.120*
(0.105) (0.063) (0.064) (0.066) (0.067)
R-squared 0.018 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001
Khayelitsha 0.005 -0.052 0.076 -0.022 -0.011
(0.086) (0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.056)
R-squared 0.018 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.009
Nyanga -0.063 0.083 -0.118** -0.043 -0.057
(0.090) (0.057) (0.057) (0.054) (0.058)
R-squared 0.020 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.007
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y
N 711 1251 1251 1251 1251
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Outcome variables in column
(1) are log monthly earnings, in column (2) working is a dummy variable for having any paid work, columns
(3) and (4) measure short term (ST) and (LT) unemployment defined as not employed and looking for a
job below and above 2 months, respectively. Outcomes are observed across the period 2004, 2005, 2006,
2009 for YA above 20 years old and not enrolled in school. All regressions are separate regressions where
the main explanatory is a dummy variable for the ghettos of residence. Controls include age, age square,
gender, dummy variables for the education of mothers (secondary complete, primary and no education,
with one excluded category), main language spoken (English, Xhosa and Afrikaans, with one excluded),
the type of place where YA answers spending most of their lives (formal and informal urban, formal and
informal rural, with one excluded) and the results of an aptitude quantitative test administered on year
one of the survey to all participants. The sample is only compliers - i.e. YA residing in a former Apartheid
Black ghetto who moved to their neighbourhood of residence before the end of Apartheid’s Group Areas
Act removal (1991); black only. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B5. Results I: Labour outcomes in young adulthood (separate regressions)
Earnings
(log)
Months
worked
Months
worked since
school
Months
search
Months
search since
school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Langa 0.264 3.194 3.373 -7.570*** -7.187***
(0.169) (4.275) (2.157) (1.988) (2.284)
R-squared 0.097 0.209 0.011 0.102 0.094
Gugulethu 0.046 -1.810 -0.541 3.696* 3.962**
(0.094) (1.928) (0.665) (1.946) (1.989)
R-squared 0.091 0.209 0.004 0.101 0.096
Khayelitsha -0.061 -3.262* -0.516 -3.463** -4.251***
(0.076) (1.749) (0.722) (1.391) (1.392)
R-squared 0.092 0.213 0.004 0.102 0.101
Nyanga -0.037 4.561** 0.279 2.519 2.800*
(0.082) (1.843) (0.807) (1.720) (1.682)
R-squared 0.091 0.217 0.004 0.097 0.091
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Outcome variables in
column (2) and (4) are defined as the total over the entire period, in columns (3) and (5) the
same variables are defined since last enrolled in formal education institution, earnings corresponds to
average log monthly earnings for the last two periods. Sample and controls are as in Table A4. ***
p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B6. Results II: Labour outcomes across period 2004-2009 by sex
(separate regressions)
Earnings
(log)
Months
worked
Months
worked since
school
Months
search
Months
search since
school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Females:
Langa 0.281 0.153 -0.144 0.009 -0.051
(0.202) (0.121) (0.121) (0.090) (0.088)
Gugulethu -0.162 -0.026 0.028 0.027 0.017
(0.126) (0.061) (0.061) (0.052) (0.053)
Khayelitsha 0.044 -0.104* 0.118** -0.020 0.002
(0.092) (0.059) (0.059) (0.041) (0.046)
Nyanga -0.002 0.104* -0.124** -0.002 -0.005
(0.107) (0.057) (0.056) (0.046) (0.052)
N 361 678 678 678 678
Males:
Langa 0.007 0.092 -0.092 -0.089 -0.094
(0.185) (0.136) (0.136) (0.099) (0.129)
Gugulethu 0.032 -0.088 0.100 0.116* 0.131*
(0.098) (0.066) (0.067) (0.064) (0.068)
Khayelitsha -0.042 -0.071 0.080 -0.065 -0.017
(0.097) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057)
Nyanga 0.011 0.133** -0.155** -0.008 -0.074
(0.097) (0.065) (0.065) (0.062) (0.069)
N 350 573 573 573 573
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Outcome vari-
ables in column (2) and (4) are defined as the total over the entire period, in columns (3)
and (5) the same variables are defined since last enrolled in formal education institution,
earnings corresponds to log monthly earnings in the final period (2009). Each point estimate
is from a separate regression where the main explanatory is a dummy variable for the ghettos
of residence. Controls include age, age square, gender, dummy variables for the education
of mothers (secondary complete, primary and no education, with one excluded category),
language spoken (English, Xhosa and Afrikaans, with one excluded), the type of place where
YA answers ’spending most of their lives (formal and informal urban, formal and informal
rural, with one excluded) and the results of an aptitude quantitative test administered at
the beginning of the survey on year one to all participants. The sample is only compliers -
i.e. YA residing in a former Apartheid Black ghetto who moved to their neighbourhood of
residence before the end of Apartheid’s Group Areas Act removal (1991), these are Black
only. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B7. Results II: Labour outcomes in young adulthood by sex
(separate regressions).
Earnings
(log)
Months
worked
Months
worked since
school
Months
search
Months
search since
school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Females:
Langa 0.567** 5.224 5.257 -8.530*** -8.711***
(0.226) (6.690) (3.860) (1.935) (2.531)
Gugulethu 0.011 -5.383** -0.349 2.435 2.422
(0.146) (2.576) (1.000) (2.524) (2.422)
Khayelitsha -0.054 -2.644 -1.405 -3.125* -4.094**
(0.111) (2.457) (1.030) (1.710) (1.650)
Nyanga -0.091 6.348** 0.836 3.581* 3.992**
(0.123) (2.556) (1.207) (1.904) (1.855)
N 224 317 295 317 289
Males:
Langa -0.047 0.797 1.332 -6.504* -6.103*
(0.125) (4.916) (1.647) (3.609) (3.570)
Gugulethu 0.116 1.677 -0.484 5.122* 5.658*
(0.110) (2.759) (0.812) (2.912) (2.973)
Khayelitsha -0.066 -3.749 0.560 -3.797* -4.217*
(0.110) (2.505) (0.931) (2.261) (2.335)
Nyanga -0.035 2.339 -0.544 1.069 1.210
(0.110) (2.968) (0.974) (2.956) (2.959)
N 222 273 248 273 249
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Outcome vari-
ables in column (2) and (4) are defined as the total over the entire period, in columns (3)
and (5) the same variables are defined since last enrolled in formal education institution,
earnings corresponds to average log monthly earnings for the last two periods. Each point
estimate is from a separate regression where the main explanatory is a dummy variable for
the ghettos of residence. Controls include age, age square, dummy variables for the education
of mothers (secondary complete, primary and no education, with one excluded category),
language spoken (English, Xhosa and Afrikaans, with one excluded), the type of place where
YA answers ’spending most of their lives (formal and informal urban, formal and informal
rural, with one excluded) and the results of an aptitude quantitative test administered at
the beginning of the survey on year one to all participants. The sample is only compliers -
i.e. YA residing in a former Apartheid Black ghetto who moved to their neighbourhood of
residence before the end of Apartheid’s Group Areas Act removal (1991), these are Black
only. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B8. Results I: Skill Sectors across period 2004-2009 (separate regressions)
High-skill Med-skill Low-skill Low-skill(b)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Langa -0.033 0.150* 0.046 0.036
(0.029) (0.077) (0.072) (0.071)
R-squared 0.006 0.032 0.033 0.023
Gugulethu -0.012 -0.039 0.045 0.074**
(0.024) (0.041) (0.034) (0.036)
R-squared 0.005 0.029 0.034 0.027
Khayelitsha 0.019 -0.065* -0.076** -0.092***
(0.020) (0.037) (0.033) (0.034)
R-squared 0.006 0.031 0.039 0.031
Nyanga -0.003 0.071* 0.036 0.032
(0.020) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
R-squared 0.005 0.031 0.033 0.023
All Controls Y Y Y Y
Time fixed-effects Y Y Y Y
N 768 768 768 768
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in paren-
theses; the excluded ghetto is Khayelitsha.ll regressions are separate
regressions where the main explanatory is a dummy variable for the
ghettos of residence. Outcome variables are dummy variables for work-
ing in a high-skill occupation (column (1), medium skill occupation
(column (2)), and low-skill occupations (columns (3) and (4)). The
skill level of occupations is defined according to SSA definitions. Low-
skill in column (4) also include armed forces and others. Outcomes
are observed across the period 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009 for YA above 20
years old and not enrolled in school. Controls and sample are the same
as in Table 10. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B9. Results I: Health & Behavioural Outcomes in young adulthood
(separate regressions)
Cigarettes Alcohol Other drugs Ever Pregnant
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Langa -0.086 -0.096 0.002 0.0123
(0.071) (0.084) (0.051) (0.1301)
R-squard 0.218 0.204 0.062 0.167
Gugulethu 0.143** 0.117* 0.000 -0.0599
(0.053) (0.063) (0.025) (0.0670)
R-squared 0.231 0.210 0.062 0.169
Khayelitsha -0.093** -0.124*** -0.010 0.0433
(0.039) (0.047) (0.022) (0.0625)
R-squared 0.226 0.215 0.063 0.168
Nyanga 0.014 0.069 0.012 -0.0051
(0.042) (0.048) (0.028) (0.0677)
R-squared 0.217 0.205 0.063 0.167
All Controls Y Y Y Y
N 535 534 535 317
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Outcome
variables in columns (1) to (3) are dummy variable equal to one if YA smokes, drinks
alcohol and consumes drugs in the last period. Ever pregnant is a dummy variable
if the YA was ever pregnant in the period studied (for females only). Controls and
sample are as in Table A1. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B10. Results III: Channels, Labour outcomes across period 2004-2009
(separate regressions)
Earnings (log) Working (paid) Unemployed (ST) Unemployed (LT)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Channels:
% Black 2001 0.001 -0.004 -0.014 -0.012
(0.040) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023)
% Black 1996 0.006 0.048 -0.058* -0.058*
(0.066) (0.041) (0.030) (0.034)
% Coloured 2001 -0.000 0.004 0.015 0.013
(0.041) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024)
% Coloured 1996 -0.026 0.023 0.036 0.013
(0.073) (0.042) (0.033) (0.036)
Access to jobs:
Access Index 2001 0.105 0.155** 0.014 -0.037
(0.128) (0.070) (0.056) (0.059)
Access Index 2005 0.119 0.191** 0.018 -0.043
(0.141) (0.078) (0.064) (0.066)
Access Index 2009 0.026 0.079*** 0.013 -0.011
(0.049) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024)
Km to CBD -0.004 -0.010*** -0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Quality of education:
Former white-col. school 0.230 -0.097 -0.071 -0.035
(0.169) (0.081) (0.072) (0.084)
Former Black school -0.192** 0.067 -0.022 -0.035
(0.081) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048)
Km to closest school -0.107 -0.119** 0.023 0.056
(0.101) (0.054) (0.060) (0.057)
Km to white-col. school -0.032 0.004 0.001 -0.005
(0.021) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
N 711 1251 1251 1251
All Controls Y Y Y Y
Time fixed-effects Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Outcome variables in column
(2) and (4) are defined as the total over the entire period, in columns (3) and (5) the same variables are
defined since last enrolled in formal education institution, earnings are average log monthly earnings for
the last two periods. Each point estimates is the result of a separate regression of the channel variable on
the outcomes variable. Controls and sample are as in Table A4. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B11. Results III: Channels, Labour outcomes in young adulthood
(separate regressions)
Earnings
(log)
Months
worked
Months
worked since
school
Months
search
Months
search since
school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Social Channels:
% Black 2001 -0.017 -0.737 -0.530 -1.560* -1.569*
(0.0477) (0.8160) (0.4446) (0.8252) (0.8172)
% Black 1996 -0.093 0.224 0.215 -3.795** -3.941**
(0.0873) (1.8426) (0.8907) (1.5918) (1.5980)
% Coloured 2001 0.019 0.766 0.530 1.624* 1.634*
(0.0490) (0.8418) (0.4539) (0.8464) (0.8388)
% Coloured 1996 0.070 -0.962 1.168 5.427** 5.368**
(0.1137) (2.3076) (1.4238) (2.1580) (2.1511)
Access to Jobs:
Access Index 2001 0.241* 4.524 2.479 -1.239 -0.021
(0.1398) (3.3802) (1.5503) (2.0638) (2.3196)
Access Index 2005 0.261* 5.502 2.680 -0.452 0.989
(0.1550) (3.7167) (1.6582) (2.4070) (2.6625)
Access Index 2009 0.065 2.244* 0.671 1.363 1.868*
(0.0552) (1.2479) (0.4959) (0.9625) (0.9998)
Km to CBD -0.009 -0.280 -0.092 -0.148 -0.214
(0.0075) (0.1715) (0.0679) (0.1307) (0.1373)
Quality of education:
Former white-col. school 0.102 -3.269 0.134 -3.762** -3.151*
(0.1309) (2.2771) (1.1390) (1.6697) (1.8293)
Former Black school -0.062 -1.590 0.028 -0.633 -0.804
(0.0755) (1.5927) (0.6978) (1.4275) (1.4240)
Km to closest school -0.166 -4.536* 0.560 -1.020 -1.008
(0.1336) (2.5294) (1.3211) (2.2097) (2.0345)
Km to white-col. school -0.023 0.091 0.436 0.680 0.777
(0.0195) (0.4611) (0.3576) (0.5227) (0.5855)
N 446 590 543 590 538
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Outcome variables in column
(2) and (4) are defined as the total over the entire period, in columns (3) and (5) the same variables are
defined since last enrolled in formal education institution, earnings are average log monthly earnings for
the last two periods. Each point estimates is the result of a separate regression of the channel variable on
the outcomes variable. Controls and sample are as in Table A4. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B12. Results III: Channels, on Education in young adulthood
(separate regressions)
Years of education Ever college Delay in graduating grade
(1) (2) (3)
Social Channels:
% Black 2001 -0.015 -0.007 0.184**
(0.0878) (0.0090) (0.0904)
% Black 1996 0.195 -0.003 0.036
(0.1958) (0.0168) (0.2894)
% Coloured 200 0.019 0.008 -0.197**
(0.0925) (0.0096) (0.0957)
% Coloured 1996 0.025 0.003 0.134
(0.2222) (0.0178) (0.3686)
Access to jobs:
Access Index 2001 0.741** 0.100** -0.114
(0.3112) (0.0476) (0.5078)
Access Index 2005 0.839** 0.116** -0.183
(0.3489) (0.0509) (0.5622)
Access Index 2009 0.282** 0.041*** -0.103
(0.1316) (0.0153) (0.1925)
Km to CBD -0.039** -0.005** 0.013
(0.0178) (0.0021) (0.0262)
Quality of education:
Former white-col. school 0.902*** 0.041 -0.194
(0.2644) (0.0412) (0.3739)
Former Black school 0.282 -0.012 -0.463*
(0.1796) (0.0185) (0.2696)
Subsidy Transport 0.236 -0.001 -0.052
(0.1954) (0.0235) (0.2895)
Km to closest school -0.185 -0.033** 0.097
(0.2722) (0.0150) (0.3941)
Km to white-col.school 0.017 0.003 0.153**
(0.0564) (0.0044) (0.0665)
N 583 590 338
All Controls Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Outcome variables in
column (1) is a dummy variable for YA not working and not studying in 2009, years of education
(2) is the total years of formal education attained by the end of the period, ever college (3) is a
dummy variable for ever attending college over the years in the panel, and delay in graduating grade
is the delay in years for completing last observed high-school grade against an upper bound (+1
year) of expected age of graduation. Controls and sample are as in Table A2. Each point estimates
is the result of a separate regression of the channel variable on the outcomes variable. *** p<0.01,
**p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Section B.II: Extensions
Table B13. Results IV: Labour Outcomes across period 2004-2009 (conditional
education).
Earnings (log) Working Idle Unemployed (ST) Unemployed (LT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gugulethu 0.010 0.021 -0.024 0.071 0.054
(0.077) (0.048) (0.048) (0.044) (0.043)
Langa 0.133 0.142* -0.141* -0.003 -0.055
(0.135) (0.085) (0.084) (0.067) (0.074)
Nyanga 0.032 0.127*** -0.148*** 0.023 -0.017
(0.074) (0.045) (0.046) (0.043) (0.046)
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Years of Education Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.136 0.098 0.104 0.012 0.009
N 704 1238 1238 1238 1238
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; the excluded ghetto is
Khayelitsha. Outcome variables in column (1) are log monthly earnings, in column (2) working
is a dummy variable for having any paid work, columns (3) and (4) measure short term (ST) and
(LT) unemployment defined as not employed and looking for a job below and above 2 months,
respectively. Outcomes are observed across the period 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009 for YA above 20
years old and not enrolled in school.The main explanatory is a dummy variable for the ghettos
of residence. Controls include age, age square, dummy variables for the education of mothers
(secondary complete, primary and no education, with one excluded category), language spoken
(English, Xhosa and Afrikaans, with one excluded), the type of place where YA answers ’spending
most of their lives (formal and informal urban, formal and informal rural, with one excluded)
and the results of an aptitude quantitative test administered on year one of the survey to all
participants. They also include years of total education completed. The sample is only compliers
- i.e. YA residing in a former Apartheid Black ghetto who moved to their neighbourhood of
residence before the end of Apartheid’s Group Areas Act removal (1991); blacks only. . ***
p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B14. Results IV: Labour outcomes in young adulthood (conditional on
education).
Earnings
(log)
Months
worked
Months
worked since
school
Months
search
Months
search since
school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gugulethu 0.088 0.867 -0.101 5.270*** 5.523***
(0.090) (2.166) (0.762) (1.970) (1.993)
Langa 0.183 4.549 3.308 -4.141** -3.521
(0.154) (4.446) (2.208) (2.093) (2.309)
Nyanga 0.006 5.226** 0.442 4.181** 4.769***
(0.082) (2.051) (0.887) (1.704) (1.658)
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Years of Education Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.181 0.219 0.009 0.139 0.130
N 440 583 537 583 535
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; the excluded ghetto
is Khayelitsha. Outcome variables in column (2) and (4) are defined as the total over the entire
period, in columns (3) and (5) the same variables are defined since last enrolled in formal
education institution, earnings are average log monthly earnings in for the last two periods.
The main explanatory is a dummy variable for the ghettos of residence. Controls and sample
are as in Table A13. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B15. Results IV: Labour outcomes across period 2004-2009 by sex
(conditional on education).
Earnings (log) Working Idle Unemployed (ST) Unemployed (LT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Females:
Gugulethu -0.097 0.034 -0.041 0.035 0.014
(0.096) (0.068) (0.068) (0.056) (0.057)
Langa 0.208 0.171 -0.167 0.026 -0.042
(0.159) (0.110) (0.108) (0.092) (0.089)
Nyanga -0.008 0.127** -0.148** 0.012 -0.003
(0.097) (0.064) (0.063) (0.049) (0.056)
N 359 670 670 670 670
Males:
Gugulethu 0.123 0.010 -0.007 0.115 0.091
(0.101) (0.066) (0.067) (0.072) (0.070)
Langa 0.059 0.124 -0.128 -0.043 -0.074
(0.157) (0.142) (0.142) (0.104) (0.130)
Nyanga 0.047 0.131** -0.152** 0.041 -0.034
(0.106) (0.065) (0.065) (0.069) (0.072)
N 345 568 568 568 568
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Years of Education Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed-effects Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; the excluded ghetto is Khayelit-
sha. Outcome variables in column (1) are log monthly earnings, in column (2) working is a dummy variable
for having any paid work, columns (3) and (4) measure short term (ST) and (LT) unemployment defined
as not employed and looking for a job below and above 2 months, respectively. Outcomes are observed
across the period 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009 for YA above 20 years old and not enrolled in school. Controls
and samples are the same as in Table A13, excluding sex as regressions are run separately by sex. ***
p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B16. Results IV: Labour outcomes in young adulthood by sex
(conditional on education).
Earnings
(log)
Months
worked
Months
worked since
school
Months
search
Months
search since
school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Females:
Gugulethu 0.018 -3.093 0.472 3.763 4.349*
(0.128) (2.883) (1.058) (2.586) (2.494)
Langa 0.352* 5.515 5.697 -6.181*** -5.863**
(0.206) (7.012) (3.930) (2.172) (2.664)
Nyanga -0.049 5.772** 1.367 4.262** 5.191***
(0.111) (2.844) (1.262) (1.952) (1.879)
N 222 314 292 314 287
Males:
Gugulethu 0.168 4.637 -0.743 6.425** 5.997**
(0.119) (3.070) (1.048) (2.779) (2.927)
Langa -0.024 3.328 0.767 -2.555 -1.805
(0.133) (5.176) (1.726) (3.699) (3.682)
Nyanga 0.049 4.586 -0.824 3.947 3.640
(0.114) (3.199) (1.164) (2.919) (2.988)
N 218 269 245 269 248
All Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses; the excluded ghetto
is Khayelitsha. Outcome variables in column (2) and (4) are defined as the total over the entire
period, in columns (3) and (5) the same variables are defined since last enrolled in formal
education institution, earnings are average log monthly earnings for the last two periods. The
main explanatory is a dummy variable for the ghettos of residence. Controls and sample are
the same as in Table A15, sex is excluded as regressions are run separately by sex. *** p<0.01,
**p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix C. 
 
First Appendices to Chapter 3.  
Cholera in Times of Floods.  
Weather shocks & health in Dar es Salaam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C1. Cholera cases during 2015-2016 outbreak, by region
Notes: Data obtained from the Red Cross. Total cases (vs. effective in analysis) up until April 2016.
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Figure C2. Distribution of effective cholera cases (epidemic week), by district
municipality
Notes: Therea are currently 5 municipal districts in Dar es Salaam. Here we use the three that
existed when the cholera outbreak started and at the levels at which the data was collected.
Figure C3. Ward-level weekly rainfall accumulation (area-weighted)
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C.I Unweighed Main Regressions
Table C.1: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (unweighted)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Precipitation 0.0157** 0.0165*** 0.0231***
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0063)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4049 0.4057 0.4638
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in
parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumu-
lated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are
the log of effective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a
given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temper-
ature. The period coverered is from the first week of March 2015
to the first week of September 2016. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 ***
p≤0.01
Table C.2: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (IV Estimates, unweighted)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Precipitation 0.0431** 0.0477** 0.0394
(0.0188) (0.0194) (0.0266)
N 6930 6930 6930
First Stage F-test 40.822 40.21 27.985
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Precipitation is
measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward
(10mm units), cholera cases are the log of effective (tested posi-
tive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control
for weekly ward air temperature. The period coverered is from
the first week of March 2015 to the first week of September 2016.
Nasa GPM v3 precipitation measurement is instrumented with
NASA TRMM measurement. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table C.3: Impact of Weekly Quartiles of Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (unweighted)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Q1 -0.0089 -0.0058 -0.0030
(0.0160) (0.0157) (0.0155)
Q3 -0.0301 -0.0250 -0.0359
(0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0269)
Q4 0.1592*** 0.1706*** 0.1521***
(0.0521) (0.0528) (0.0565)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4065 0.4074 0.4645
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in
parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumu-
lated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are
the log of effective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a
given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temper-
ature. The period coverered is from the first week of March 2015
to the first week of September 2016. The quartiles of the rainfall
distribution are defined as follows: Q1 (0mm), Q2(0-0.29mm),
Q3(0.29-2.69mm), Q4(2.69-40.86mm)*p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 ***
p≤0.01
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Table C.4: Impact of Flooding on Cholera Incidence (unweighted)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:
Precipitation 0.0154** 0.0162*** 0.0227***
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0062)
Precipitation × % Flood-prone area 0.0079 0.0066 0.0059
(0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0052)
Panel B:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1865*** 0.1930*** 0.1856***
(0.0424) (0.0425) (0.0456)
Panel C:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1688*** 0.1757*** 0.1658***
(0.0420) (0.0421) (0.0451)
Flooded × %Flood-prone area 0.2181*** 0.2113*** 0.2136**
(0.0795) (0.0786) (0.0879)
N 6930 6930 6930
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. All
panels are independent regressions. Precipitation is measured as the weekly
accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log
of effective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. Flooded is
a dummy variable for weekly precipitation falling above the 75th percentile
of the total rainfall distribution. Flood-prone area is the total area of the
ward that is prone to flooding. All regressions control for weekly ward air
temperature. The period coverered is from the first week of March 2015 to the
first week of September 2016.*p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
246
T
ab
le
C
.5
:
Im
p
ac
t
of
W
ee
k
ly
P
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
o
n
C
h
o
le
ra
In
ci
d
en
ce
:
In
fr
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
&
W
a
rd
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
(u
n
w
ei
g
h
te
d
)
C
h
o
le
ra
ca
se
s
(l
o
g
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
P
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
0.
02
38
**
*
0.
02
43
*
*
*
0
.0
2
4
6
*
*
0
.0
2
2
1
*
*
*
0
.0
2
4
5
-0
.0
0
0
8
0
.0
5
0
9
*
*
*
0
.0
2
4
2
*
0
.0
2
5
8
0
.0
0
6
3
(0
.0
06
9)
(0
.0
06
7
)
(0
.0
1
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
2
2
5
)
(0
.0
1
2
8
)
(0
.0
1
7
3
)
(0
.0
1
3
8
)
(0
.0
2
5
3
)
(0
.0
2
2
1
)
P
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
×
P
op
.
d
en
si
ty
0.
00
02
**
*
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
8
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
P
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
×
R
oa
d
s
d
en
si
ty
0.
00
1
4
0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
2
4
-0
.0
0
5
5
(0
.0
00
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
P
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
×
F
o
ot
w
ay
s
d
en
si
ty
0
.0
0
2
7
*
*
0
.0
0
2
3
0
.0
0
2
4
0
.0
0
6
3
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
P
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
×
#
W
at
er
w
el
ls
0
.0
0
1
3
*
-0
.0
0
0
4
-0
.0
0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
5
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
)
P
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
×
D
ra
in
s
d
en
si
ty
0
.0
0
2
9
*
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
4
6
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
P
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
×
%
In
fo
rm
al
h
ou
si
n
g
0
.0
1
7
8
*
*
0
.0
2
3
3
*
*
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
P
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
×
%
F
or
m
al
h
ou
si
n
g
0
.0
0
2
3
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
N
69
30
67
76
4
8
5
1
5
8
5
2
3
4
6
5
1
7
7
1
2
6
1
8
4
0
0
4
2
9
2
6
1
4
6
3
R
2
0.
46
33
0.
47
28
0
.5
1
6
0
0
.4
6
6
8
0
.5
5
3
4
0
.6
4
3
5
0
.5
3
9
8
0
.5
3
0
3
0
.5
8
5
8
0
.6
6
9
3
W
ar
d
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
W
ee
k
F
E
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
×
w
ee
k
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
te
s:
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
w
a
rd
le
v
el
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
is
.
S
ep
a
ra
te
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
co
lu
m
n
s
(1
-7
).
P
re
ci
p
it
a
ti
o
n
is
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
th
e
w
ee
k
ly
a
cc
u
m
u
la
te
d
ra
in
fa
ll
in
a
g
iv
en
w
a
rd
(1
0
m
m
u
n
it
s)
,
ch
o
le
ra
ca
se
s
a
re
th
e
lo
g
o
f
eff
ec
ti
v
e
(t
es
te
d
p
o
si
ti
v
e)
w
ee
k
ly
ch
o
le
ra
ca
se
s
in
a
g
iv
en
w
a
rd
.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
w
ee
k
ly
w
a
rd
a
ir
te
m
p
er
a
tu
re
.
T
h
e
p
er
io
d
co
v
er
er
ed
is
fr
o
m
th
e
fi
rs
t
w
ee
k
o
f
M
a
rc
h
2
0
1
5
to
th
e
fi
rs
t
w
ee
k
o
f
S
ep
te
m
b
er
2
0
1
6
.
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
d
en
si
ty
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
h
a
b
it
a
n
ts
p
er
sq
u
a
re
k
m
(c
en
su
s
2
0
1
2
),
R
o
a
d
s
d
en
si
ty
,
fo
o
tw
ay
d
en
si
ty
,
a
n
d
d
ra
in
s
d
en
si
ty
a
re
th
e
m
et
er
s
o
f
ro
a
d
s,
fo
o
tw
ay
s
a
n
d
d
ra
in
s
p
er
k
m
(O
S
M
),
%
in
fo
rm
a
l
a
n
d
fo
rm
a
l
h
o
u
se
s
in
th
e
w
a
rd
a
re
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
su
rv
ey
ed
p
lo
ts
(n
o
t
a
ll
p
lo
ts
a
re
su
rv
ey
ed
).
*
p
≤
0
.1
0
*
*
p
≤0
.0
5
*
*
*
p
≤0
.0
1
247
T
ab
le
C
.6
:
Im
p
ac
t
of
N
ei
gh
b
ou
rs
’
W
ee
k
ly
P
re
ci
p
it
a
ti
o
n
o
n
C
h
o
le
ra
In
ci
d
en
ce
:
S
p
il
lo
ve
rs
(u
n
w
ei
g
h
te
d
)
C
h
o
le
ra
ca
se
s
(l
o
g
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
P
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
0
.0
1
5
8
*
*
0
.0
1
6
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
6
*
*
*
0
.0
1
7
0*
*
*
0
.0
2
2
6
*
*
*
0
.0
2
2
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.0
06
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
N
ei
gh
b
ou
rs
’
p
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
-0
.0
0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
2
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
U
p
h
il
l
n
ei
gh
b
ou
rs
’
p
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
-0
.0
0
1
1
-0
.0
01
1
-0
.0
0
0
7
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
00
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
D
ow
n
h
il
l
n
ei
gh
b
ou
rs
’
p
re
ci
p
it
at
io
n
0
.0
0
0
8
0
.0
00
7
0
.0
0
0
8
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
00
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
N
6
9
3
0
6
9
3
0
6
9
3
0
6
9
30
6
9
3
0
6
9
3
0
R
2
0
.4
0
4
9
0
.4
0
5
2
0
.4
0
5
7
0
.4
06
1
0
.4
6
3
8
0
.4
6
4
0
W
ar
d
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
W
ee
k
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
ti
m
e
tr
en
d
Y
es
Y
es
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
×
w
ee
k
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
te
s:
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
w
a
rd
le
v
el
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
is
.
P
re
ci
p
it
a
ti
o
n
is
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
th
e
w
ee
k
ly
a
cc
u
m
u
la
te
d
ra
in
fa
ll
in
a
g
iv
en
w
a
rd
(1
0
m
m
u
n
it
s)
,
ch
o
le
ra
ca
se
s
a
re
th
e
lo
g
o
f
eff
ec
ti
v
e
(t
es
te
d
p
o
si
ti
v
e)
w
ee
k
ly
ch
o
le
ra
ca
se
s
in
a
g
iv
en
w
a
rd
.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
w
ee
k
ly
w
a
rd
a
ir
te
m
p
er
a
tu
re
.
T
h
e
p
er
io
d
co
v
er
er
ed
is
fr
o
m
th
e
fi
rs
t
w
ee
k
o
f
M
a
rc
h
2
0
1
5
to
th
e
fi
rs
t
w
ee
k
o
f
S
ep
te
m
b
er
2
0
1
6
.
N
ei
g
h
b
o
u
rs
’
p
re
ci
p
it
a
ti
o
n
m
ea
su
re
s
w
ee
k
ly
a
cc
u
m
u
la
te
d
ra
in
fa
ll
in
a
n
ei
g
h
b
o
u
ri
n
g
w
a
rd
.
U
p
h
il
l
a
n
d
d
ow
n
h
il
l
m
ea
su
re
s
a
re
fo
r
n
ei
g
h
b
o
u
ri
n
g
w
a
rd
s
a
t
a
h
ig
h
er
o
r
lo
w
er
el
ev
a
ti
o
n
th
a
n
th
e
g
iv
en
w
a
rd
.
*
p
≤
0
.1
0
*
*
p
≤0
.0
5
*
*
*
p
≤0
.0
1
248
C.II Main Regressions, Spatial Auto-correlation of Standard Errors
(Conley HAC SE)
Table C.7: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (HAC SE)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2)
Precipitation 0.0157*** 0.0231***
(0.0051) (0.0080)
N 6930 6930
R2 0.0015 0.0049
Ward FE Yes Yes
Week FE Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Conley HAC standard errors in parenthesis (Con-
ley 1999, 2008). Precipitation is measured as the weekly
accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units),
cholera cases are the log of effective (tested positive)
weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions con-
trol for weekly ward air temperature. The period cover-
ered is from the first week of March 2015 to the first week
of September 2016. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
Table C.8: Impact of Weekly Quartiles of Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (HAC SE)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2)
Q1 -0.0089 -0.0030
(0.0327) (0.0259)
Q3 -0.0301 -0.0359*
(0.0211) (0.0193)
Q4 0.1592*** 0.1521***
(0.0508) (0.0567)
N 6930 6930
R2 0.0043 0.0062
Ward FE Yes Yes
Week FE Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Conley HAC standard errors in parenthesis (Conley
1999, 2008). Precipitation is measured as the weekly ac-
cumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera
cases are the log of effective (tested positive) weekly cholera
cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly
ward air temperature. The period coverered is from the
first week of March 2015 to the first week of September
2016. The quartiles of the rainfall distribution are defined
as follows: Q1 (0mm), Q2(0-0.29mm), Q3(0.29-2.69mm),
Q4(2.69-40.86mm). *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table C.9: Impact of Flooding on Cholera Incidence (HAC SE)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2)
Panel A:
Precipitation 0.0154*** 0.0227***
(0.0051) (0.0072)
Precipitation × % Flood-prone area 0.0079 0.0059
(0.0223) (0.0169)
Panel B:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1865*** 0.1856***
(0.0455) (0.0541)
Panel C:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1688*** 0.1658***
(0.0430) (0.0495)
Flooded × % Flood-prone area 0.2181 0.2136
(0.2266) (0.2035)
N 6930 6930
Ward FE Yes Yes
Week FE Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Conley HAC standard errors in parenthesis (Conley 1999, 2008).
All panels are independent regressions. Precipitation is measured as the
weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases
are the log of effective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given
ward. Flooded is a dummy variable for weekly precipitation falling
above the 75th percentile of the total rainfall distribution. Flood-prone
area is the total area of the ward that is prone to flooding. All regres-
sions control for weekly ward air temperature. The period coverered is
from the first week of March 2015 to the first week of September 2016.
*p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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C.III Extensions
Table C.11: Impact of Neighbours’ Weekly Lagged Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (1)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Precipitation 0.0285** 0.0288** 0.0292** 0.0293** 0.0346*** 0.0335***
(0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0110)
Neighbours precipitation -0.0046 -0.0049 -0.0044 -0.0045 -0.0007 0.0008
(0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0047)
Neighbours precipitation w−1 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0007
(0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0013)
Neighbours precipitation w−2 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0007
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
N 6929 6924 6929 6924 6929 6924
R2 0.4493 0.4493 0.4504 0.4504 0.5255 0.5256
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is measured
as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of effective
(tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air
temperature; they are weighted by the population of the ward (census 2012). The period coverered
is from the first week of March 2015 to the first week of September 2016. Neighbours’ precipitation
measures weekly accumulated rainfall in a neighbouring ward. Neighbour’s Precipitationw−n are the
lags of weekly accumulated rainfall in neighbouring wards up to n weeks. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 ***
p≤0.01
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Table C.12: Impact of Neighbours’ Weekly Lagged Precipitation by Elevation on Cholera Inci-
dence (2)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Precipitation 0.0218** 0.0214** 0.0233** 0.0230** 0.0355*** 0.0354***
(0.0097) (0.0105) (0.0100) (0.0108) (0.0098) (0.0105)
Uphill neighbours precipitation -0.0042 -0.0044 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0052 -0.0049
(0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0050)
Downhill neighbours precipitation -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0037 -0.0047 -0.0045
(0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051)
Uphill N’s precipitation w−1 0.0037 0.0042 0.0040 0.0044 0.0055 0.0046
(0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0053) (0.0070)
Downhill N’s precipitationw−1 0.0043 0.0062 0.0047 0.0063 0.0062 0.0070
(0.0054) (0.0073) (0.0054) (0.0072) (0.0052) (0.0073)
Uphill N’s precipitationw−2 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0007
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0042)
Downhill N’s precipitationw−2 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0012
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
N 6929 6924 6929 6924 6929 6924
R2 0.4494 0.4495 0.4505 0.4506 0.5257 0.5258
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the
weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of effective (tested
positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature; they
are weighted by the population of the ward (census 2012). The period coverered is from the first week of
March 2015 to the first week of September 2016. Neighbours’ precipitation measures weekly accumulated
rainfall in a neighbouring ward. Uphill and downhill measures are for neighbouring wards at a higher or lower
elevation than the given ward. N’s Precipitation Uphill/Downhill w−n are the lags of weekly accumulated
rainfall in neighbouring wards up to n weeks according to their elevation with respect to the given ward.
*p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table C.13: Impact of Neighbours’ Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence: Spillovers (HAC
SE) (1)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Precipitation 0.0158*** 0.0162*** 0.0226*** 0.0227***
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0075) (0.0076)
Neighbours precipitation -0.0000 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Uphill neighbours precipitation -0.0011 -0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0010)
Downhill neighbours precipitation 0.0008 0.0008
(0.0009) (0.0008)
N 6930 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.0015 0.0021 0.0049 0.0053
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes:Conley HAC standard errors in parenthesis (Conley 1999, 2008). Precipitation
is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera
cases are the log of effective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All
regressions control for weekly ward air temperature. The period coverered is from the
first week of March 2015 to the first week of September 2016. Neighbours’ precipitation
measures weekly accumulated rainfall in a neighbouring ward. Uphill and downhill mea-
sures are for neighbouring wards at a higher or lower elevation than the given ward. *p
≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
254
Table C.14: Impact of Neighbours’ Weekly Lagged Precipitation on Cholera Incidence:
Spillovers (HAC SE) (2)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Precipitation 0.0189*** 0.0187*** 0.0259*** 0.0257***
(0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0078) (0.0083)
Uphill neighbours precipitation -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0050 -0.0050
(0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0051)
Downhill neighbours precipitation -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0042 -0.0044
(0.0032) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0062)
Uphill N’s precipitation w−1 0.0033 0.0033 0.0044 0.0046
(0.0036) (0.0108) (0.0034) (0.0115)
Downhill N’s precipitation w−1 0.0041 0.0052 0.0052 0.0067
(0.0031) (0.0117) (0.0043) (0.0124)
Uphill N’s precipitation w−2 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0079) (0.0071)
Downhill N’s precipitation w−2 -0.0010 -0.0015
(0.0076) (0.0069)
N 6929 6924 6929 6924
R2 0.0022 0.0023 0.0056 0.0057
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes:Conley HAC standard errors in parenthesis (Conley 1999, 2008). Precipitation
is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera
cases are the log of effective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All
regressions control for weekly ward air temperature. The period coverered is from the
first week of March 2015 to the first week of September 2016. Neighbours’ precipita-
tion measures weekly accumulated rainfall in a neighbouring ward. Uphill and downhill
measures are for neighbouring wards at a higher or lower elevation than the given ward.
N’s Precipitation Uphill/Downhill w−n are the lags of weekly accumulated rainfall in
neighbouring wards up to n weeks according to their elevation with respect to the given
ward. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table C.15: Lagged Dependent Variable Model
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Precipitation 0.0199*** 0.0155*** 0.0119** 0.0111** 0.0103** 0.0103**
(0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051)
Cholera cases w−1 0.6111*** 0.4430*** 0.4037*** 0.3943*** 0.3913*** 0.3914***
(0.0457) (0.0336) (0.0348) (0.0360) (0.0368) (0.0371)
Cholera cases w−2 0.2747*** 0.2112*** 0.1975*** 0.1922*** 0.1923***
(0.0230) (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0281) (0.0283)
Cholera cases w−3 0.1435*** 0.1172*** 0.1085*** 0.1087***
(0.0206) (0.0245) (0.0255) (0.0257)
Cholera cases w−4 0.0652*** 0.0476** 0.0479**
(0.0208) (0.0203) (0.0197)
Cholera cases w−5 0.0447** 0.0455**
(0.0214) (0.0217)
Cholera cases w−6 -0.0019
(0.0185)
N 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.6837 0.7076 0.7136 0.7148 0.7153 0.7153
Ward FE
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the
weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of effective (tested
positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature;
they are weighted by the population of the ward (census 2012). The period coverered is from the first week
of March 2015 to the first week of September 2016. Cholera casesw−n are lagged effective cholera cases up
week n. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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C.IV Robustness check: Linear-Linear Regressions
Table C.16: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (per 10,000s people)
Cholera Ward Incidence Rate (per 10,000s)
(1) (2) (3)
Precipitation 0.0272*** 0.0280*** 0.0359***
(0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0099)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.1908 0.1915 0.2367
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Pre-
cipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward
(10mm units), cholera cases are the number of weekly cholera cases (tested
positive) divided by the population of the ward (10,000s), i.e. cholera cases
every 10 thousand people in a ward. All regressions control for weekly ward
air temperature. The period coverered is from the first week of March 2015 to
the first week of September 2016. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
Table C.17: Impact of Weekly Quartiles of Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (per 10,000s
people)
Cholera Ward Incidence Rate (per 10,000s)
(1) (2) (3)
Q1 0.0196 0.0235 0.0152
(0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0163)
Q3 -0.0215 -0.0158 -0.0216
(0.0250) (0.0248) (0.0276)
Q4 0.0946** 0.1069** 0.0862*
(0.0462) (0.0473) (0.0509)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.1899 0.1905 0.2349
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthe-
sis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a
given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the number of weekly cholera
cases (tested positive) divided by the population of the ward (10,000s), i.e.
cholera cases every 10 thousand people in a ward. All regressions control
for weekly ward air temperature. The period coverered is from the first
week of March 2015 to the first week of September 2016. The quartiles of
the rainfall distribution are defined as follows: Q1 (0mm), Q2(0-0.29mm),
Q3(0.29-2.69mm), Q4(2.69-40.86mm)*p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table C.18: Impact of Flooding on Cholera Incidence (per 10,000s people)
Cholera Ward Incidence Rate (per 1000s)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:
Precipitation 0.0268*** 0.0276*** 0.0354***
(0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0097)
Precipitation × % Flood-prone area 0.0094 0.0080 0.0078
(0.0141) (0.0138) (0.0139)
Panel B:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1164*** 0.1231*** 0.1077***
(0.0344) (0.0351) (0.0395)
Panel C:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1004*** 0.1074*** 0.0877**
(0.0350) (0.0353) (0.0389)
Flooded × %Flood-prone area 0.1981 0.1910 0.2162
(0.1471) (0.1451) (0.1480)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.1901 0.1908 0.2352
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. All panels
are independent regressions. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated
rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the number of weekly cholera
cases (tested positive) divided by the population of the ward (10,000s), i.e. cholera
cases every 10 thousand people in a ward. Flooded is a dummy variable for weekly
precipitation falling above the 75th percentile of the total rainfall distribution. Flood-
prone area is the total area of the ward that is prone to flooding. All regressions
control for weekly ward air temperature. The period coverered is from the first week
of March 2015 to the first week of September 2016.*p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
258
 259 
 
 
 
259 
 
Appendix D. 
 
Second Appendices to Chapter 3.  
Cholera in Times of Floods.  
Weather shocks & health in Dar es Salaam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tanzania 2015-16 DHS Data Analysis
This section presents the results of the analysis of the 2015-16 Tanzania Demographic
and Health Survey and Malaria Indicator Survey (DHS). Its objective is to shed light
on the relationship, if any, between income, wealth, and incidence of diarrhoeal diseases
in Dar-es-Salaam. The 2015-16 DHS collected reliable information on several demo-
graphic and health indicators, including infant and child mortality, nutritional status
of mothers and children, and childhood immunizations and diseases. It was imple-
mented by several government agencies with financial support from various bilateral
and multilateral donors. It is representative at the national, urban and rural area levels.
We restrict the sample to all the households living in the Dar-es-Salaam region.
The DHS only asked children under the age of five questions related to diarrhoea. This
leaves us with a sample of 367 children living in 97 distinct households. The DHS cal-
culates for each household a wealth index using a battery of socio-economic variables.
The construction of this index goes as follows. Respondent households are given scores
based on the number and kinds of consumer goods they own, such as a television or a
fridge. Housing characteristics, such as access to drinking water, toilet facilities, and
flooring materials are also taken into account. These scores are derived using principal
component analysis. Each household is assigned a household wealth score index. Na-
tional wealth quintiles are then compiled by dividing the index distribution into five
equal categories, containing 20% of the population each. The primary objective of this
section is to examine the relationship between this wealth index and the incidence of
diarrhoea among children aged less than five years.
We conduct a simple regression analysis and estimate the linear probability model
in Equation (d.1) below with least squares:
Dih = β0 + β1.Wih + β2.Xi + β3.Zh + ih (d.1)
where Dih indicates whether child i in household h has had diarrhoea in the last two
weeks. Wih is the household wealth index either measured as five quantile dummies
or the continuous index value. Xi is a vector of individual covariates and includes age
and a female gender dummy. Mother educational attainment is controlled for in vector
Zh. ih is the error and βk are the parameters to be estimated. Standard errors are
clustered at the household level.
Table D.1 presents summary statistics of the variables included in the regression
analysis. 16.3% of the children in the sample report a diarrhoea episode in the two
weeks prior to interview. The average child is 1.8 years old. 48% of the sample is
comprised of young girls. Regression estimates of Equation 1 are shown in Table D.2.
The continuous wealth index score is introduced in column 1. The wealth index quintile
dummies are included in the second column. Overall the table presents very weak
evidence in favour of a wealth bias regarding diarrheal risk. The continuous wealth
index score has a negative but insignificant association with the probability of a child
getting diarrhoea. The point estimates of the second column indicate that only children
of the third quintiles are more likely to get sick than the poorest children. All other
quintile coefficients are insignificant at conventional levels of significance.
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Table D.1: Descriptive Characteristics DHS Analysis
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Diarrhoea in last two weeks 367 0.163 0.37 0 1
Urban wealth index (/1000) - continuous score 367 56.985 66.163 -211.621 186.827
Urban wealth index Q1 367 0.014 0.116 0 1
Urban wealth index Q2 367 0.153 0.36 0 1
Urban wealth index Q3 367 0.259 0.439 0 1
Urban wealth index Q4 367 0.297 0.458 0 1
Urban wealth index Q5 367 0.278 0.449 0 1
Age 367 1.845 1.357 0 4
Female 367 0.48 0.5 0 1
Mother education: no education 367 0.065 0.248 0 1
Mother education: incomplete primary 367 0.054 0.227 0 1
Mother education: complete primary 367 0.534 0.5 0 1
Mother education: incomplete secondary 367 0.057 0.233 0 1
Mother education: complete secondary 367 0.243 0.429 0 1
Mother education: higher education 367 0.046 0.21 0 1
Notes:DHS 2015-16 data for Dar es Salaam region. Under five years old children in the sample.
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Table D.2: DHS Regression Analysis
Had Diarrhea =1
Dependent variable (1) (2)
Urban wealth index - continuous score -0.000295
-0.000328
Urban wealth index Q2 0.0657
-0.0546
Urban wealth index Q3 0.134**
-0.0647
Urban wealth index Q4 0.0694
-0.0656
Urban wealth index Q5 0.0363
-0.0694
Age -0.0501*** -0.0500***
-0.0122 -0.0124
Female 0.026 0.0259
-0.0383 -0.0378
Mother education: incomplete primary 0.138 0.0957
-0.085 -0.091
Mother education: complete primary 0.155*** 0.112***
-0.0415 -0.0391
Mother education: incomplete secondary 0.618*** 0.565***
-0.105 -0.105
Mother education: complete secondary 0.100* 0.0677
-0.0596 -0.0579
Mother education: higher education 0.13 0.0959
-0.0949 -0.0879
R-squared 0.142 0.15
Observations 367 367
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in paren-
thesis. Linear probability model regressions. DHS 2015-16 data for Dar
es Salaam region. Under five years old children in the sample. *p ≤
0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Figure E1.  Proportion of Employed by Economic Sector across the Expenditure 
Distribution, by EPZ status 
 
 
EPZ - Municipalities 
 
 
 
 
Never EPZ - Municipalities 
 
 
Notes: The figures show the evolution of the distribution of employment by 
sectors across the expenditure distribution, by treatment status. 
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Figure E2. Parallel Trends – Selected Outcome Variables, Propensity Score Matching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figures depict parallel trends of levels of real expenditure per capita according to treatment and 
control groups. PSM2 corresponds to control municipalities selected according to propensity score 
matching. On the left side, the treated include only those treated in 2001, and on the right side the 
treated are only those treated in 2005. Values are in 
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Figure E3.  Skill Distribution by Treatment Status 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the working age across the 
skill distribution (defined by years of education), across the period and 
according to treatment and control municipalities. 
 267 
 
 
 
267 
Table E1. Household and Individual Characteristics across selected deciles, by 
Treatment Status 1993 
 
1st Decile 3rd Decile 5th Decile 7th Decile 9th Decile 
 
EPZ No EPZ No EPZ No EPZ No EPZ No 
Household size 8.65 9.14 7.24 7.46 7.06 7.12 6.48 6.94 5.64 5.79 
Individuals at working age 0.44 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.55 0.48 0.56 0.52 0.61 0.56 
Age (average) 19.15 18.65 21.03 19.88 22.82 20.16 23.38 21.75 25.96 23.61 
Population under 25 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.70 0.64 0.68 0.61 0.66 0.54 0.60 
Years of education (average) 3.34 3.14 4.07 3.50 3.81 4.42 5.49 4.25 6.15 4.87 
Illiterate 0.48 0.66 0.36 0.57 0.30 0.52 0.26 0.38 0.22 0.34 
Unemployed 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Informal (no social security) 0.93 0.97 0.75 0.94 0.69 0.86 0.61 0.80 0.55 0.74 
Electricity at household level 0.54 0.21 0.90 0.34 0.97 0.44 0.97 0.64 0.98 0.80 
Employed in agriculture NA NA NA NA NA 
Employed in manufacturing 0.18 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.29 
Urban 0.44 0.14 0.81 0.23 0.79 0.32 0.90 0.47 0.96 0.68 
N= 3904 1785 1714 2006 2757 
 
Notes: The data shows main characteristics across selected deciles of the expenditure distribution. The sample size 
N is limited to working age individuals above 15 years. 
 
 
 
Table E2. Household and Individual Characteristics across selected deciles, by 
Treatment status - 2009 
 
 
1st Decile 3rd Decile 5th Decile 7th Decile 9th Decile 
 
EPZ No EPZ No EPZ No EPZ No EPZ No 
Household size 8.15 8.90 7.10 6.74 5.84 5.87 5.09 5.38 4.56 4.60 
Individuals at working age 0.55 0.51 0.60 0.57 0.63 0.59 0.67 0.65 0.71 0.66 
Age (average) 22.42 20.81 24.04 22.23 24.28 25.96 26.51 25.33 29.71 28.80 
Population under 25 0.64 0.69 0.59 0.65 0.55 0.56 0.52 0.54 0.46 0.51 
Years of education (average) 5.18 3.21 6.86 4.45 7.63 4.95 8.49 6.12 10.13 7.27 
Illiterate 0.19 0.35 0.10 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.12 
Unemployed 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.04 
Informal (no social security) NA NA NA NA NA 
Electricity at household level 0.99 0.91 0.99 0.92 0.99 0.92 0.99 0.93 1.00 0.94 
Employed in agriculture 0.06 0.27 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.017 0.20 0.01 0.14 
Employed in manufacturing 0.26 0.16 0.32 0.14 0.37 0.15 0.39 0.22 0.43 0.28 
Urban 0.79 0.12 0.90 0.31 0.92 0.30 0.92 0.44 0.94 0.51 
N= 2901 2727 3059 2107 3515 
 
Notes: The data shows main characteristics across selected deciles of the expenditure distribution. The sample 
size N is limited to working age individuals above 15 years. 
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Table E3.  Quality of Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
Sample 
Group 1  
[<1999] 
Group 2 
[2000-2001] 
Group 3  
[2002-2005] 
Group 4  
[2006-2009] 
Treated 4 5  7 
  
2 
Control 70 67 65 70 
 
Ps R2 
LR 
chi2 
p>chi2 Ps R2 
LR 
chi2 
p>chi2 Ps R2 
LR 
chi2 
p>chi2 Ps R2 
LR 
chi2 
p>chi2 
Matched 0.529 8.89 0.261 0.203 0.203 0.097 0.073 10.26 0.418 0.502 21.14 0.007 
RN Control 0.502 7.98 0.335 0.268 0.268 0.014 0.088 12.21 0.271 0.337 14.53 0.043 
Notes: In the matching exercise, the set of variables used are pre-treatment municipality characteristics (percent of urban 
population, percent of illiterate population, percent completed primary level, percent employed in agriculture, manufacturing and 
services, percent of unemployed, percent working age population, percent of households with access to electricity, proportion of 
paved roads, distances to the coast or large body of water, main trade access quality (as defined in table 4), landlocked, distance to 
capital city, pre-trend of average per capita expenditure levels, share of high skill (definition 1) in municipality. All observations are 
on support. 
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Table E4. Balance of covariates for the pre-treatment period, by Granting Sequence – PSM Control Group 
Percentages (unless otherwise indicated)
Group 1 
[<1999]
P|SM 
Control
t-test
Group 2
[2000-
2001]
P|SM 
Control
t-test
Group 3 
[2002-
2005]
P|SM 
Control
t-test
Group 4 
[2006-
2009]
P|SM 
Control
t-test
B. Municipality Characteristics
Distance To Managua (km) 72.54 104.03 -0.80 42.43 103.33 -3.60*** 90.96 113.85 -1.55 35.65 94.80 -4.13***
Road Density (m) 84.67 80.67 0.07 92.00 69.36 1.38 78.42 66.98 0.93 225.42 153.85 2.99***
Landlocked (=1) 0.67 0.40 0.92 0.40 0.67 -1.78* 0.57 0.70 -1.13 0.36 0.70 -2.41**
Main Trade Access (=1 if main port, airport or 
trade post in municipality)
0.27 0.62 -1.07 0.20 0.36 -1.31 0.42 0.37 0.46 0.63 0.36 1.83*
Electricity (% Households) 0.99 0.89 0.71 0.94 0.90 1.00 0.93 0.89 0.73 0.97 0.90 1.26
Completed Primary Education 0.27 0.09 1.54 0.29 0.20 1.87* 0.27 0.19 2.00** 0.29 0.21 1.12
Illiterate 0.22 0.33 -1.01 0.24 0.28 -1.46 0.24 0.28 -1.26 0.21 0.29 -1.50
Economically Active Population 0.54 0.55 -0.29 0.56 0.55 0.16 0.55 0.55 0.10 0.55 0.56 -0.24
Unemployment 0.02 0.03 -0.60 0.04 0.03 0.3 0.04 0.03 1.25 0.04 0.03 1.16
Manufacturing (% employed) 0.18 0.11 1.15 0.16 0.14 0.66 0.16 0.14 0.96 0.17 0.14 1.26
Agriculture (%employed) 0.08 0.45 -2.17** 0.16 0.4 -2.8** 0.30 0.5 -1.90* 0.20 0.46 -1.95*
Urban 0.90 0.44 1.78* 0.78 0.44 3.20*** 0.56 0.43 1.48 0.35 0.45 -0.93
Migrants in past five years 0.01 0.08 -1.10 0.01 0.07 -2.13** 0.07 0.08 -0.72 0.08 0.09 0.03
B. Pre-trend, Selected Outcomes
Average real per capita expenditure, annual 0.99 0.41 1.41 0.27 0.40 -0.47 0.48 0.41 0.43 0.23 0.41 -0.87
10th p- real per capita expenditure, annual. 1.10 0.54 1.12 0.53 0.51 0.06 0.71 0.52 0.85 0.29 0.54 -0.96
50th p- real per capita expenditure, annual 1.13 0.48 1.54 0.32 0.47 -0.53 0.60 0.47 0.70 0.25 0.48 -1.05
90th p- real per capita expenditure, annual 0.83 0.40 1.02 0.48 0.37 0.42 0.57 0.38 0.97 0.23 0.39 -0.74
Share of high-skill over low-skill (1) 4.30 2.48 0.54 2.28 2.52 -0.15 8.80 2.11 3.98*** 2.46 2.38 0.04
Share of high-skill over low-skill (2) -0.71 2.09 -0.40 -0.69 2.18 -0.90 -0.56 2.32 -0.89 -0.26 2.25 -0.70
N= 4 70 5 67 7 65 2 70
Notes: Municipalities are grouped based on the sequence of EPZ establishment. Values are for simple averages for the pre-treatment period. Definitions are as in Table 3. For municipalities treated before 2000, 
the historical trends denotes the average growth rate of the outcomes before 2001. I would otherwise  have no  pre-treatment trends for this group. A similar approach is done for the rest of the groups, but strictly 
considering only the pre-treatment period. The control municipalities are constructed using a propensity score matching based on k-nearest neighbours (4) with respect to municipalities characteristics and pre-trend 
outcomes. Matched characteristics include all of the variables on this table.
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Table E5. DID Estimates of the Effect of EPZs on Average Real 
Expenditure per capita  
 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
  
  
  
EPZ 
525.8** 477.4** 524.5** 478.0** 454.3* 
(214.1) (203.9) (242.3) (235.0) (238.3) 
Observations 375 375 340 340 340 
R-sq. 0.722 0.818 0.742 0.839 0.936 
 
    
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality-year trend ✓ ✓   
  
Province-year dummies 
  
✓ ✓ 
 
Region-year dummies 
  
  
 
✓ 
Covariates 
 
✓   ✓ ✓ 
Municipalities 84 84 84 84 84 
            
Notes: Dependent variable is levels of real expenditure per capita. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. Covariates in column 2 include 
dummies for time-varying individual and household characteristics: educational 
level, age square, gender, urban, sector of work, household size and having migrated 
within the past five years. Individual observations are only for working age 
individuals. Covariates in column 4-5 include illiteracy rate, the share of population 
with primary and tertiary education, the share of urban population, migrants and 
share of households with access to electricity at municipal-level. Results are 
estimated against the propensity score matched control group.  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E6. DID Estimates of the Effect of EPZs on Average Real 
Expenditure per capita – Includes Pre-Treatment Trend  
 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
  
  
  
EPZ 
932.9** 1,127* 1,006** 935.0* 965.7* 
(464.9) (575.9) (403.6) (558.7) (556.2) 
Pre-Trend 
152.1* 240.2 101.0* 84.83 88.20 
  (72.79) (189.4) (49.79) (54.22) (56.75) 
Observations 52,997 52,997 375 375 375 
R-sq. 0.449 0.451 
 
0.701 0.718 0.718 
 
    
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality-year trend ✓ ✓   
  
Province-year dummies 
  
✓ 
 
✓ 
Covariates 
 
✓   ✓ ✓ 
Municipalities 106 106 106 106 106 
            
Notes: Dependent variable is levels of real expenditure per capita. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses, clustered at municipality. Covariates in column 2 include dummies for 
time-varying individual and household characteristics: educational level, age square, 
gender, urban, sector of work, household size and having migrated within the past five 
years. Individual observations are only for working age individuals. Covariates in column 
4-5 include illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary education, the 
share of urban population, migrants and share of households with access to electricity at 
municipal-level. Results are estimated against the preferred control group using the road 
network buffer. Pre-trend is equal to the interaction between municipality specific linear-
time trends and the EPZ dummy variable (treatment variable). The pre-trend allows the 
time trends to differ for treated municipalities prior to EPZ establishment.    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E7. DID Estimates of the Effect of EPZs across the 
Expenditure Distribution in Treated Municipalities 
Real expenditure per capita (1) (2) 
10th Percentile 222.5 221.5 
 
 
(146.2) (139.5) 
20th Percentile 147.5 144.2 
  
(172.4) (169.7) 
30th Percentile 153.5 152.2 
  
(215.7) (212.4) 
40th Percentile 229.2 226.0 
  
(224.4) (222.9) 
50th Percentile 243.1 241.1 
  
(261.2) (256.6) 
60th Percentile 237.3 232.5 
  
(311.0) (308.1) 
70th Percentile 428.3 429.9 
  
(355.2) (353.8) 
80th Percentile 738.1 739.5 
  
(495.6) (477.6) 
90th Percentile 2,010* 2,035* 
    (1,201) (1,108) 
Year FE ✓ ✓ 
Municipality FE ✓ ✓ 
Province-year dummies ✓ 
 
Region-year dummies   ✓  
Covariates ✓ ✓ 
Observations 340 340 
Municipalities 84 84 
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of real expenditure distribution. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. Covariates include 
illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary education, the 
share of urban population, migrants and share of households with access to 
electricity at municipal-level. Results are estimated against the control group 
constructed using the propensity score matching.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E8. The Heterogeneous Time Dynamics of EPZ Establishment 
  
10th 
percentile 
20th 
percentile 
30th 
percentile 
40th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
60th 
percentile 
70th 
percentile 
80th 
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EPZ establishment, t0 156.9 -6.670 62.52 147.5 103.0 164.5 547.0 434.3 1,723 
 (154.8) (167.4) (162.7) (188.9) (233.7) (267.3) (419.7) (426.6) (1,356) 
EPZ establishment, t+4 339.9 245.3 160.7 203.2 216.4 38.39 330.3 252.5 1,405* 
 (235.3) (292.1) (349.1) (324.6) (331.7) (429.3) (493.5) (580.7) (722) 
EPZ establishment, t+8 290.9* 360.4 244.0 402.3 752.0* 890.7* 1,150** 1,414** 2,415** 
 (173.2) (312.1) (339.8) (246.8) (383.8) (449.5) (498.4) (560.4) (942.5) 
EPZ establishment, t+11 800.4*** 379.8 504.2 528.4 758.2* 648.3 1,139** 824.1 3,103*** 
 (291.1) (398.1) (480.9) (519.2) (393.2) (417.9) (500.2) (665.6) (779.0) 
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 
R-sq. 0.638 0.682 0.683 0.714 0.711 0.633 0.630 0.604 0.375 
Municipalities 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of the real per capita expenditure distribution. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. All regressions 
include year and municipality fixed-effects and province-year dummies. Covariates include illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary education, 
the share of urban population, migrants and share of households with access to electricity at municipal-level. All leads are equal to one in only one year each per 
adopting state. EPZ dummy (t0) equals one only for year of establishment. EPZ t+4 includes t+3, and EPZ t+8 includes t+7, to have balanced dummies. Results are 
estimated against the preferred control group using the propensity score matching. I excludes the negative pre-treatment years to increase precision of the point 
estimates with the smaller sample size.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E9 The Effect of EPZs Establishment & Spillover Dynamics 
 
10th 
percentile 
20th 
percentile 
30th 
percentile 
40th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
60th 
percentile 
70th 
percentile 
80th 
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EPZ 199.2 94.16 99.31 206.9 241.3 249.3 507.8 936.5* 2,159* 
 
(140.8) (174.7) (219.1) (241.1) (280.2) (331.6) (390.3) (497.6) (1,167) 
Neighbouring Municipalities1 -308.2 -373.1 -318.7 46.86 -115.6 -162.3 285.3 664.9 -768.3 
(5 to 15km) (387.0) (310.2) (396.8) (257.6) (290.5) (366.2) (575.1) (751.4) (557.4) 
Neighbouring Municipalities2 -123.7 -151.7 -188.1 -140.9 -7.975 40.85 172.5 641.4* 371.7 
(15 to 35km) (145.3) (176.6) (206.3) (206.0) (262.1) (282.8) (327.9) (377.6) (555.2) 
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 
R-sq. 0.678 0.743 0.744 0.754 0.747 0.752 0.688 0.707 0.580 
Municipalities 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
          
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of the real per capita expenditure distribution. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. All regressions include 
year and municipality fixed-effects and province-year dummies. Covariates include illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary education, and the share of 
urban population, migrants and share of households with access to electricity at municipal-level.  The variables Neighbour Municipalities are dummy variables that equal one 
if a municipality's centroid is situated at 5 to 15km, and 15km to 35km distance from a treated municipality, and zero otherwise. I use the centroid's distance to avoid noise 
from larger municipalities. Results are estimated against the propensity score matched control group. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E10. The Effect of New EPZs on Internal Migration 
 
FE LOGIT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPZ  0.009 0.0169 0.0101 0.0183  
(0.043) (0.0231) (0.043) (0.70) 
Observations 46,339 46,339 46,339 47,556 
R sq. 0.162 0.157 0.162 - 
Municipalities 106 106 106 141 
    
  
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Province FE ✓ 
  
✓ 
Province-Time dummies 
 
✓ 
 
  
Municipality-Time Trend ✓ 
 
✓   
Region-Time dummies ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ 
          
Notes: Dependent variable is migrant in the past five years. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Covariates includes dummy variables for level of 
educational achievement, illiteracy, gender, sector of employment, urban residence, age square, 
number of household members, and access to electricity at the household level. Observations are 
limited to working age population (13-68 years).Logit outputs are margins. I exclude 1998 and 
2009, due to significant measurement error in the dependent variable.  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E11. The Effect of EPZs across the Expenditure 
Distribution in Treated Municipalities - Population Weights 
Real Expenditure per 
capita 
Census weights Sample  weights 
(1) (2) 
10th Percentile 117.5 104.9 
  
(118.9) (103.6) 
20th Percentile 52.42 31.36 
  
(143.0) (134.1) 
30th Percentile 49.59 14.09 
  
(178.3) (161.0) 
40th Percentile 129.7 116.2 
  
(185.6) (199.6) 
50th Percentile 110.9 67.86 
  
(293.8) (278.3) 
60th Percentile 232.0 200.7 
  
(284.0) (289.0) 
70th Percentile 395.9 282.8 
  
(477.4) (428.0) 
80th Percentile 959.9 853.3 
  
(601.1) (566.6) 
90th Percentile 1,856* 1,557* 
  
(956.7) (827.3) 
Year FE ✓ ✓ 
Municipality FE ✓ ✓ 
Province-year dummies ✓ 
 
Region-year dummies 
 
✓ 
Covariates ✓ ✓ 
Observations 375 375 
Municipalities 106 106 
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of real expenditure distribution. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. Covariates 
include illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary 
education, and the share of urban population, migrants and share of 
households with access to electricity at municipal-level. Results are 
estimated against the preferred control group using the road network 
buffer. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E12. DID Estimates of the Effect of EPZs across the 
Expenditure Distribution in Treated Municipalities - 
Robustness Checks 
Real Expenditure per capita (1) (2) 
10th Percentile 262.2 275.6* 
 (164.5) (142.8) 
20th Percentile 186.5 197.4 
 
(142.4) (145.2) 
30th Percentile 206.5 223.3 
 
(191.2) (195.1) 
40th Percentile 268.3 274.8 
 
(254.4) (210.1) 
50th Percentile 282.5 325.2 
 
(274.2) (236.2) 
60th Percentile 315.8 347.5 
 
(284.8) (226.6) 
70th Percentile 581.3 552.9 
 
(341.3) (354.9) 
80th Percentile 874.8* 946.1* 
 
(445.1) (532.8) 
90th Percentile 2,334** 2,239* 
  (1,085) (1,236) 
Year FE ✓ ✓ 
Municipality FE ✓ ✓ 
Province-year dummies ✓ ✓ 
Covariates ✓ ✓ 
Observations 359 370 
Municipalities 80 105 
      
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of real expenditure distribution. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. Covariates include 
illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary education, and 
the share of urban population, migrants and share of households with access to 
electricity at municipal-level. Results are estimated against the preferred control 
group using the road network buffer. Column 1 excludes municipalities observed 
less than 4 out of the 5 years. Column 2 excludes Managua. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E13. The Heterogeneous Time-Effect of EPZ Establishment - Robustness Check 
  
10th 
percentile 
20th 
percentile 
30th 
percentile 
40th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
60th 
percentile 
70th 
percentile 
80th 
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EPZ establishment, t0 220.2 73.75 163.5 207.5 190.1 264.3 523.6 713.2 2,025 
 (177.3) (192.6) (178.0) (230.9) (298.8) (336.1) (500.5) (570.6) (1,678) 
EPZ establishment, t+4 479.7 436.5 387.8 412.0 502.8 364.9 446.6 1,050 2,498 
 (345.8) (413.2) (504.1) (478.6) (472.3) (549.3) (567.0) (773.3) (1,625) 
EPZ establishment, t+8 457.5* 503.8 397.5 522.4* 1,017 1,177* 1,220* 2,265* 3,483** 
 (237.3) (362.3) (356.2) (309.8) (619.3) (695.1) (661.6) (1,319) (1,523) 
EPZ establishment, t+11 1,158** 565.6 825.7 756.9 1,204** 991.6* 1,254 1,668 5,826*** 
 (462.5) (644.3) (870.8) (785.1) (600.5) (593.8) (823.5) (1,020) (1,560) 
Observations 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 
R-sq. 
0.629 0.676 0.677 0.708 0.706 0.623 0.622 0.598 0.364 
Municipalities 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Notes: Dependent variables are deciles of the real per capita expenditure distribution. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality. All regressions 
include year and municipality fixed-effects and province-year dummies. Covariates include illiteracy rate, the share of population with primary and tertiary education, the 
share of urban population, migrants and share of households with access to electricity at municipal-level. All leads are equal to one in only one year each per adopting 
state. EPZ dummy (t0) equals one only for year of establishment. EPZ t+/-4 includes t+/-3, and EPZ t+/-8 includes t+/-7, to have balanced dummies. Results are 
estimated against the preferred control group using the road network buffer. Observations exclude the municipality of Managua. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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